Zyuganov *Weekly Worker" of the CPGB cont.)

[Michael Pugliese]

<URL: http://www.cpgb.org.uk/worker/317/cprf.html >
In the turgid theorising’ of such works as Russia - my homeland we discover 
a doctrine directed not towards the liberation of humanity from alienation 
and oppression, but towards its continued enslavement. In seeking to 
bolster his notion of Russian statehood, Zyuganov is not content with 
ransacking the works of such people as NA Berdyayev - the ‘legal Marxist’ 
turned mystic and god-seeking apostle of social inequality, or the theocrat 
VS Solovyov. He goes back to such reactionaries as S Uvarov, minister of 
education under tsar Nicholas I, whose formula of nationality-autocracy- 
orthodoxy, employed in the 19th century to underpin tsarism and serfdom, 
Zyuganov puts to a new use: this trinity, rich in “cultural-historical 
meaning”, is adapted to the present day, comprising the CPRF (popular 
unity), the rightwing nationalists (Russian statehood) and the Russian 
orthodox church (ibid pp232-37). For this former ideologist of the CPSU, 
writing in a pamphlet entitled Russia and the world today, “Russian 
statehood grew and ascended from strength to strength as imperial 
statehood” and the Soviet Union was the “historical and geopolitical 
continuator of the Russian empire” (GA Zyuganov Rossiya i sovremenniy mir 
Moscow 1995, p46). In this pamphlet, Zyuganov treats us to a disquisition 
on the role of the Russian state that bears the unmistakable imprint of 
Great Russian messianism: Russia constitutes “a cultural-historical and 
moral tradition, whose fundamental values are conciliatory, great-powerhood 
and a striving to embody the highest ideals of kindness and justice”; as “a 
unique ethno- political and spiritual-ideological unity”, it is the mission 
of a strong Russian state to save civilisation from the consequences of 
western dominance and the rise of islam (ibid pp65-6). Such are the 
mystical and messianic vapourings of Gennadiy Andreyevich when he dons the 
philosopher’s mantle. They reek of obscurantism and reaction and are 
evidently the product of a third-rate, perhaps slightly hysterical and 
paranoid intellect. Does that mean that we should dismiss them as mere 
bunkum, or as opportunistic pandering to the nationalist sentiments of the 
Russian electorate? Certainly not. To do so would be a serious mistake for 
two reasons. First, it is the duty of communists to fight against 
reactionary, proto-fascist ideology of this kind in all circumstances, but 
especially when it is propagated by so-called ‘communists’ themselves. 
Secondly, Zyuganov is not just a cranky Great Russian chauvinist - he is 
also an anti-semite. It can hardly be a coincidence, for example, that 
Zyuganov has sat on the editorial board of Zavtra, a newspaper, edited by 
his close collaborator and mentor Prokhanov, that regularly publishes anti- 
semitic articles. Zyuganov’s own remarks about the baleful influence of 
Jews on the history of Russia are well documented, as is the fact that, in 
a manner and tone worthy of the Protocols of the elders of Zion, he 
attributes Russia’s catastrophic economic state to the machinations of 
international Jewry. His close colleague, Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of one 
of the duma committees, states quite openly: “If there were less Jews in 
the Russian government, then Russia would not be in the state it is in 
today.” In his writings, Zyuganov repeatedly maintains that there were in 
fact two parties within the old CPSU: a patriotic, Russian party - “the 
party of Sholokhov and Korolev, Zhukhov and Gagarin, Kurchatov and 
Stakhanov”; and the anti- patriotic “party of Trotsky and Kaganovich, Beria 
and Mekhlis, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze” (see Rossiya 
- rodina maya p327). The list is revealing: of the ‘good guys’, all are, of 
course, Russians and not a single one was a politician; on the other hand, 
Zyuganov’s contemporary ‘villains’ are linked with the names of three 
prominent Bolsheviks - LD Trotsky, MM Kaganovich and LZ Mekhlis - whose 
could hardly have differed more from each other politically, but who just 
happen to have been Jews. Needless to say, the CPRF denies that it is 
remotely anti- semitic. For example, on December 23 1998, the party’s 
website carried a statement by Zyuganov intended to reassure us that in its 
ideology and composition the party is “internationalist”. It states: “Any 
forms in which chauvinism and national intolerance manifest themselves ... 
are incompatible with communist convictions.” But the language he uses to 
defend himself actually demonstrates his guilt. Accusations of anti- 
semitism are just “lies and slander” put about by “Russophobic”, “non- 
national” and “anti-popular” forces in the mass media. It just so happens 
that these epithets, like the Stalinist code word ‘cosmopolitan’ - also 
much loved by Zyuganov - are regularly employed in CPRF materials as 
euphemisms for ‘Jewish’. In time-honoured fashion, Zyuganov seeks to 
dissociate himself and his party from anti-semitism by drawing a sharp 
distinction between Zionism and what he calls “the Jewish problem”. But the 
manner in which he attempts to do so is hardly convincing: not only is 
Zionism part of an imperialist world conspiracy, striving for “world 
supremacy”, but, he claims, it is also actually worse than Hitler’s 
national socialism, for “Hitlerite Nazism acted under the mask of German 
nationalism and strove for world supremacy openly, while Zionism, when its 
appears under the mask of Jewish nationalism, acts in a concealed manner 
...” Let the conclusion of his extraordinary tirade speak for itself: 
“Zionisation of the governmental authorities of Russia was one of the 
causes of the country’s present-day catastrophic situation, of the mass 
impoverishment and extinction of its population. They cannot close their 
eyes to the aggressive and destructive role of Zionist capital in the 
disruption of the economy of Russia and in the misappropriation of its 
national property. They are right when they ask the question as to how it 
could happen that the key positions in several branches of the economy were 
seized during privatisation mainly by the representatives of one 
nationality. They see that control over most of the electronic mass media, 
which wage a destructive struggle against our motherland, morality, 
language, culture and beliefs, is concentrated in the hands of the same 
persons.” And these are the words of a man trying to prove that he is not 
an anti-semite. However painful it may be for some, we have no choice but 
to acknowledge that the ideological roots of Zyuganov’s approach to the 
“Jewish problem” go deep into the history of the CPSU. It is a matter of 
plain historical fact that in the post-war years Stalin was planning a 
wide-scale purge of Jews. The ZIS case (November 1950) was a precursor - a 
number of doctors, executives and bureaucrats working at the Stalin 
Automobile Factory in Moscow were arrested and shot. They were all Jews. On 
January 13 1953 Tass issued a communiqué concerning the discovery of a 
“terrorist group of poisoning doctors” and the arrest of prominent Jews 
began. The February 8 Pravda article ‘Simpletons and scoundrels’ contained 
a long list of names - the ‘scoundrels’ (Jews) against whom the 
‘simpletons’ (Russians) had relaxed their vigilance. Only Stalin’s death 
prevented the purge, which reportedly included plans for the mass 
deportation of Jews to Siberia, from going ahead. In this connection, it 
should come as no surprise that Zyuganov’s reading of post-revolutionary 
Russian history is thoroughly Stalinist. He speaks of the “ideological 
Russophobia of the radical-cosmopolitan [ie, Jewish - MM] wing of the 
party” having been “seduced” by the idea of world revolution, and 
incidentally blames the “radical-cosmopolitans” for the “dekulakisation” 
and mass repressions of the 1930s. Stalin, however, “like no one else” 
understood the need for the revival of the “Russian idea” and in the post- 
war years initiated an “ideological reconstruction”, with the patriotic 
teaching of Russian history and a new approach to religion and relations 
with the orthodox church (Rossiya - rodina maya pp141-143; p327). Some 
might ask why I have devoted so much space to the question of the CPRF’s 
anti-semitism. Because this vile and perverse aspect of the party’s 
ideology should alone be enough to condemn it in the eyes of anyone calling 
themselves Marxist or communist. Lenin’s attitude to the question was 
absolutely clear: “Only the utterly ignorant and cowed can believe the lies 
and slanders against Jews ... It is not Jews who are the enemies of the 
workers. The enemies of the workers are the capitalists of all countries. 
The majority of Jews are toilers. They are our brothers as victims of 
capitalist oppression, our comrades in the struggle for socialism. Amongst 
the Jews there are kulaks, exploiters and capitalists, just as there are 
among Russians, just as there are in all nations ... the capitalists 
attempt to sow and to inflame hostility between workers of different 
religions, different nations and different races ... Rich Jews, like rich 
Russians, like rich people throughout the world, ally with each other and 
crush, oppress, rob and divide the workers ... Shame on those who sow 
hostility towards Jews, who sow hatred of other nations!” (VI Lenin, ‘On 
the pogromist persecution of Jews’, quoted in Perspektiva, journal of the 
Union of Marxists, Moscow February 1999). On this occasion there is not 
sufficient space to deal in detail with the CPRF’s programme - in every 
sense a heavy document - but the main planks of the platform on which the 
party will fight the December 19 duma election were clearly set out in an 
interview which Zyuganov gave earlier this year to Pravda correspondent 
Vladimir Bolshakov. The party’s campaign will be fought under the central 
slogan of ‘Victory to the patriots of Russia’, reflecting the fact that, 
while standing in its own right, the CPRF is also part of a block of more 
than 200 organisations comprising the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia, a 
broad coalition of nationalist forces that came into being after the 1996 
presidential elections, and of which Zyuganov was unanimously elected 
chairman. According to Zyuganov, the PPUR can be likened to “the resistance 
movement operating in France during World War II: it includes communists, 
agrarians, social-democrats, and rightwingers who have all united on the 
basis of patriotism ... Our motto is ‘Order in the land - prosperity in our 
homes’ ... We are all united above all by a common concern for our native 
land [and] share the same views about the protection of Russia’s national 
interests and restoration of a unified federal state.” Just in case this 
sounds rather too rightwing, Zyuganov adds that “Our primary concern is 
about social justice and the protection of the interests of the working 
people” (‘When my country is in danger’ Pravda February 9-10 1999). The 
sycophantic Bolshakov is too polite to ask Zyuganov how the latter 
assertion about the interests of the working people, coming from a 
‘communist’, can be squared with an economic platform that is almost 
unreservedly committed to stabilising the hybrid semi-capitalist, semi- 
bureaucratic socialist relations of production and circulation which at 
present characterise Russia. As Zyuganov puts it, “I’m for the market ... 
We have discarded many of the dogmas that used to be as untouchable as the 
sacred cows in India ... If we come to power, we will not move towards all- 
out nationalisation and egalitarianism. We are now in favour of state 
ownership and various other forms of ownership” (ibid). According to the 
assessment of Mikhail Dimitriev of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, this 
markedly understates the reality of the CPRF’s volte face: “In 1995 a major 
aim of the CPRF was to alter the outcome of privatisation, including the 
long-run goal of renationalisation of major industries ... The CPRF is now 
talking about how to enforce property rights. In unambiguous terms it 
accepts that, where competition exists, private property should be the 
dominant form of ownership. Although the CPRF continues to support 
collective ownership, it now defines this term as it is defined in western 
economies, meaning private, employee-owned firms. The CPRF’s economic 
programme supports state ownership only for natural monopolies and 
enterprises in need of long-term restructuring” (Russian and Eurasian issue 
brief October 28 1999). When it comes to answering questions about the 
CPRF’s relationship to its communist and Soviet inheritance, Zyuganov is 
necessarily ambiguous, because he needs somehow to reconcile the glaringly 
contradictory forces both within the CPRF and the broader PPUR. On the one 
hand, he tells us that “the Soviet era was the heyday of Russia’s 
prosperity and greatness, the acme of its history”. When rather 
pathetically depicting himself and the CPRF as possible victims of future 
persecution by rightwing extremist oligarchs such as Berezovsky, he has the 
gall to claim that such persecution will be on account of the fact that 
Zyuganov and his comrades have “never renounced our credo and have remained 
communists.” Asked why he has always resisted changing the party’s name, he 
replies candidly: “We are using it to present our party as a political 
force capable of returning to the Russians all those social gains, social 
protection, the prosperity, greatness and power of our country which have 
been taken away from us by the ‘democratic’ traitors (Pravda February 9-10) 
”. On the other hand, “It’s time we stopped dividing the left into true 
believers and infidels. Social democracy and the communist movement 
represent one political trend in the struggle for social justice, democracy 
and human rights. Today’s communists should take and apply the best of the 
international experience of leftist movements. And not only leftist” (ibid) 
. What, we might ask finally, do “today’s communists” in the CPRF actually 
represent? Despite the plethora of contradictions and absurdities in their 
writings and statements, the answer seems unequivocal: rank opportunism, 
counterrevolution and a poisonous brew of the most reactionary Great 
Russian chauvinism and anti-semitism. That is the reality. It could be 
argued with some justification that Zyuganov is a true son of Stalin, that 
his ‘state patriotism’ is the natural continuation of that ‘Soviet’ - ie, 
Russian - patriotism which characterised Stalinism. Stalin, of course, 
however sweeping his power, was still obliged by the political character of 
the Soviet regime and its ideology of Marxism- Leninism to continue 
claiming adherence to the ideas of revolution, class struggle and 
proletarian socialist internationalism. Zyuganov is under no such 
constraint, and has repudiated the lot. Stalin turned Marx, Engels and Lenin 

 into icons in the temple of Soviet state power and nationhood. Zyuganov 
has discarded the old icons and replaced them with the icons of Russian 
orthodoxy. Whatever its precise origins in the realm of the history of 
ideas, ‘state patriotism’, like all ideologies, did not spring up from nowhere, 

 but arose out of a complex of politico-economic circumstances, namely the 
vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR. It reflects not the interests 
of the working class of Russia, but the dashed hopes of that stratum of the 
Soviet bureaucracy that dreamt that the old system could work and would 
sooner or later dominate the world. Either way, born of disillusionment, 
humiliation and despair, maturing in a climate of nationalism, xenophobia 
and racism, Zyuganov and his party represent the negation of every value 
which Marxists and revolutionary internationalists hold dear.
-- 
Michael Pugliese

I got an axe-handle pistol
with a graveyard frame.
It shoots tombstone bullets
wearing balls and chains.
I'm drinking TNT.
I'm smokin' dynamite.
I hope some screwball
start's a fight,
'cause I'm ready,
ready,
ready

Muddy Waters, "I'm Ready."