> A letter by Niels Bohr made public in the wake of discussions
> surrounding Michael Frayn's play "Copenhagen" has made it possible
> to nail down Heisenberg's position and velocity at last, and it
> turns out that his position was squarely in the Nazi camp, but he
> was very slow. The Nazis paid for the germanification of their
> science and promoting racially correct dullards like Heisenberg by
> being deprived of the A-bomb. I always say fascists can't think
> straight. Bohr's letter leaves no doubt as to why his former
> student came to visit him in Copenhagen: The Fuhrer wanted his bomb
> and Werner didn't have a clue how to make it. Otherwise, London
> would have been toast. Still, Heisenberg's student Edward Teller
> compensated somewhat for his mentor's lack of explosive force by
> inventing the H-bomb and the neutron bomb.
>
hakki,
i posted y'day a link to the actual letters themselves from the bohr archive. i do not see, from a reading of the letters, how the controversy is any further resolved than before. bohr says that H was quite certain of a nazi victory, H hinted at a german A-bomb project and mentioned that no details need be discussed since he was aware of them (the details), and that H felt that bohr and co., should be more receptive to the german govt. the last could well reflect H's concern for bohr and the first points seem in fact to hold up H's version of the story: that he was not looking for details on the allies' bomb effort but interested in passing on information. after a reading of the letters we are once again left with bohr's previously stated impression that H was gung-ho about the german A-bomb project, but nothing a lot more substantial. the one significant piece of evidence against H is weizsacker's [sp?] supposed words at a dinner party (or some such) that german victory was assured and that H would play a large part in it.
i think the gratuitous shots at H's theoretical capabilities are misplaced. he seems to have gained universal respect among his peers.
the relevant portions from the bohr archive:
http://www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/docs/d01tra.htm
> Personally, I remember every word of our conversations, which took place
> on a background of extreme sorrow and tension for us here in Denmark.
> In particular, it made a strong impression both on Margrethe and
> me, and on everyone at the Institute that the two of you spoke to,
> that you and Weizsäcker expressed your definite conviction that
> Germany would win and that it was therefore quite foolish for us to
> maintain the hope of a different outcome of the war and to be
> reticent as regards all German offers of cooperation. I also
> remember quite clearly our conversation in my room at the Institute,
> where in vague terms you spoke in a manner that could only give me
> the firm impression that, under your leadership, everything was
> being done in Germany to develop atomic weapons and that you said
> that there was no need to talk about details since you were
> completely familiar with them and had spent the past two years
> working more or less exclusively on such preparations. <...> It is
> quite another matter that, at that time and ever since, I have
> always had the definite impression that you and Weizsäcker had
> arranged the symposium at the German Institute, in which I did not
> take part myself as a matter of principle, and the visit to us in
> order to assure yourselves that we suffered no harm and to try in
> every way to help us in our dangerous situation.
http://www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/docs/d06tra.htm
> During a conversation with Bohr, Heisenberg stated that he was working
> on the release of atomic energy and expressed his conviction that
> the war, if it did not end with a German victory, would be decided
> by such means. Heisenberg said explicitly that he did not wish to
> enter into technical details but that Bohr should understand that
> he knew what he was talking about as he had spent 2 years working
> exclusively on this question. Bohr restrained himself from any
> comment but understood that this was important information which he
> was obliged to try to bring to the attention of the English.
here's the damning part:
> In a conversation with Møller, Weizsäcker further stated how
> fortunate it was that Heisenberg’s work would mean so much for the
> war since it would mean that, after the expected great victory, the
> Nazis would adopt a more understanding attitude towards German
> scientific efforts.
http://www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/docs/d07tra.htm
> I remember quite definitely the course of these conversations, during
> which I naturally took a very cautious position, when <without
> preparation, immediately> you informed me that it was your conviction
> that the war, if it lasted sufficiently long, would be decided with
> atomic weapons, and <I did> not sense even the slightest hint that
> you and your friends were making efforts in another direction.
http://www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/docs/d10tra.htm
> I remember quite clearly the impression it made on me when, at the
> beginning of the conversation, you told me without preparation that
> you were certain that the war, if it lasted long enough, would be
> decided with atomic weapons. I did not respond to this at all, but
> as you perhaps regarded this as an expression of doubt, you related
> how in the preceding years you had devoted yourself almost
> exclusively to the question and were quite certain that it could be
> done, but you gave no hint about efforts on the part of German
> scientists to prevent such a development.
>
> It is true that, during his visits to Copenhagen in 1943 on his
> journeys to Norway to participate in the efforts to increase the
> production of heavy water, Jensen did make hints in such a
> direction, but because of his own mission and the constantly
> growing rumours of new German weapons, I necessarily had to be very
> sceptical and extremely cautious in my ever more dangerous
> existence.
http://www.nbi.dk/NBA/papers/docs/d11atra.htm
> However, what I am thinking of in particular is the conversation we
> had in my office at the Institute, during which, because of the
> subject you raised, I carefully fixed in my mind every word that
> was uttered. It had to make a very strong impression on me that at
> the very outset you stated that you felt certain that the war, if
> it lasted sufficiently long, would be decided with atomic weapons.
> I had at that time no knowledge at all of the preparations that
> were under way in England and America. You added, when I perhaps
> looked doubtful, that I had to understand that in recent years you
> had occupied yourself almost exclusively with this question and did
> not doubt that it could be done. It is therefore quite
> incomprehensible to me that you should think that you hinted to me
> that the German physicists would do all they could to prevent such
> an application of atomic science. During the conversation, which
> was only very brief, I was naturally very cautious but nevertheless
> thought a lot about its content, and my alarm was not lessened by
> hearing from the others at the Institute that Weizsäcker had stated
> how fortunate it would be for the position of science in Germany
> after the victory that you could help so significantly towards this
> end.
>
> In your letter to Jungk you also mention Jensen’s visits to
> Copenhagen in 1943 during his journeys to Norway to participate in
> the efforts to increase the production of heavy water. It is true
> that Jensen emphasized to us that this work was only aimed at the
> production of energy for industrial purposes, but although we were
> inclined to trust his sincerity, we felt in no way certain
> regarding how much he himself knew about the whole effort in
> Germany.
--ravi