>> Yoshie Furuhashi wrote:
>>
>>> Surely a world must have existed long before the appearance of human
>>> beings (or any other creatures capable of subjective investigations
>>> of objects), and a world will continue to exist after the
>>> disappearance of human beings (and other creatures capable of
>>> subjective investigations of objects) as well.
>>
>> such a world might have existed and might exist in the future but it
>> might still be unimaginable.
>>
> Unimaginable to whom? Creationists?
>
to us of course. something might very well exist out there, but the notion that it corresponds to our imagination of it is only a device of convenience, to be be used carefully under ockham's guidance. if we say that the universe as spoken about by us "exists" in our minds (our imaginations) then no such image exists before or after our (our = sentient beings) existence. if we start referring to the "thing-in-itself" even the existence of our mind and imagination cannot capture that, so why make statements about it unless when useful (in a pragmatic sense)?
> Ravi says:
>
>> i do not know where you are going with that question, but i will
>> take it down this possibly wrong direction: popper's theory is
>> not scientific (its meta-scientific) and does not need to be
>> falsifiable.
>
> What is the demarcation criterion that distinguishes "scientific"
> from "meta-scientific" theories?
>
> How do you judge which "meta-scientific" theories are true, false,
> better, worse, more accurate, less accurate, progressive,
> degenerative, etc.?
the demarcation criteria between science and meta-science can be the same as the demarcation criteria between science and any other activity, but unfortunately that is exactly what we started out debating! (i hold that no such demarcation criteria exists, and can be shown to be meaningful, between science and anything else. i am not defending popper's notions here - only trying to describe them). popper would answer that the demarcation criteria is falsification. a theory is scientific if it is falsifiable. meta-scientific theories make noises about science and may choose to forego the prestige of being a science themselves, in exchange for the greater freedom in making these noises.
which leads to two questions, at least one of which you bring up above with respect to judging meta-scienctific theories (and in a response to another poster, in which you asked why one is to take popper's word). i guess one can judge meta-scientific theories using rational argument and other criteria - perhaps elegance, consistency, coverage, parsimony, etc (the same set of criteria, i claim, that we use to judge any theory including scientific theories i.e., i am skeptical of the position i am describing above).
this immediately leads to the question of whether it is meaningful to use a less rigorous theory (rationality, elegance, etc) to evaluate and define a more rigorous one (any scientific theory). if we cannot do that then it seems we are in trouble: formal logic is the most rigorous system we have at hand and we are aware of its limitations. so are we then not to make meta-scientific noises at all?
in effect all we are left with is some good rules of thumb that we can employ (knowing their weakness of lack of rigour) to choose between alternative theories (and the criteria can legitimately include the advancement of other not discredited rules of thumb such as the increase of human equality. this is not as heinous a position as anti-relativists would like to claim, but i guess that would be another discussion).
sorry about the meandering style above,
--ravi