I said: >
>
>----->
> >That's why the pragmatic/sociological definition of science helps:
>astrology
> >isn't science because it's not accepted as a science by people who call
> >themselves scientists, it isn't taught in sciewnce depts, etc. If you
> >evaluate it by scientific standards, moreover, it turns oit that it si
>very
> >bad science, not worth serious consideration. So the scientists are right
>to
> >ignore it. Does it really matter whether you say it's very bad science or
> >not science at all? There is no a priori determinable essence of science.
> >Science is a set of social practices we stumbled on that happens to allow
>us
> >to do things we want pretty effectively. So why should we expect a
> >definition of it more exact than a description of those practices?
You replied:
>I agree with you. . . . >
>And yet, this is not a wholly satisfactory conclusion. . . . science,
>somehow, really works. It is one of the most wildly
>successful practices in history. Why? Why should a social class somehow
>be
>so key to the production of real value? How does one inconsistent set of
>cultural values become the source of so many effective practices?
>
>The sociological definition . . . doesn't explain anything. It doesn't
>tell us why we can trust
>our lives every day in the claims of scientists and would never place such
>a
>faith in astrologers.
>
The sociological account _doesn't_ explain why science works. It isn't supposed to. It's supposed to tell us, to the extent anything can, what science _is_. The reason these practices work, what explains why science is successful, is the fact that in them we have stumbled on the techniques that allow us to find out the way world is. That's not a fact internal to the practices. This is of fcoyrse the realsit answer. I will let the constructivists offer their own answers.
jks
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