> Because it would have to be be a miracle if the scientific theories we use
> that work, and cohere so nicely, weren't even approximately true. Note that
> this isn't a justification of a method like induction, except insofar as
> science uses the "will work in the future" assumption. I'm talking ahout the
> truth of the theories, not the jsutification of a method. The approximate
> truth of the theories is the best explanation of why they work. What's your
> alternative?
But you're then just using "true" to mean "work" so that, though you can have good reasons (this would require that 'solipsism of the present moment' not be entailed in the premises you're arguing from) for believing a theory is "true," these are not reasons enabling you to reasonably believe it will be "true" in the future.
I pointed to an alternative. Treat the obviousness ("it would have to be a miracle" etc.) of the truth content of modern science as making the skeptical conclusion entailed in its scientific materialist ontological premises a reductio ad absurdum and then find a way of changing the premises which sublates the obvious truth while eliminating the obvious absurdity.
Ted