> It's not supposed to make any such assumptions. It's semantics, not
> metaphysics.
Some treatments of "semantics" embody unacknowledged ontological premises, e.g. G.E. Moore's treatment of the meaning of a "part".
>>
>> Consequently, the history of the development of rational
>> self-consciousness can't be represented by reasoning that assumes that the
>> "identity," in this sense, of individual self-consciousness remains
>> unchanged in the face of changes in relations.
>>
>
> You build a lot more into Marx than I do. I don't dounbt that of of it is
> there. But it doesn't have to be to justify a move from capitalsim to
> socialism.
The ontological premises I'm attributing to him produce particular meanings for "capitalism" and "socialism." For instance, capitalism means, among other things, the domination of production by a particular kind of subjectivity; socialism means domination by a different kind of subjectivity. They also entail a particular meaning for "justification", e.g. they entail the idea of a good life to which I pointed, an idea which includes as aspects non-coercive, non-exploitive (including in this the treatment of persons as ends rather than means) social relations. You can't reject the premises and retain the same meanings for "capitalism," "socialism" and "justify."
>> Both the
>> atomism and the concept of rationality are inconsistent with Marx.
>>
> Maybe, and ifs o maybe Maerx is wrong.
To show that he is, though, you'll have to show that social relations are external and that rationality is properly identified with instrumental axiomatic deductive reasoning. This will be something different from dismissing the ideas as a "relentless holistic approach." Why, for instance, is the conception of "forces of production" as expressive of the development of rational self-consciousness, "the power of knowledge, objectified," and of this development as internally related to relations of production a less realistic and hence less "productive" conception of these forces and their relation to relations of production than technological determinism?
> I'm not a communist. I'm a market socialist. But I don't arrive at this in a
> rounndabout way from fundamental premises. I'm not a c-ist because I don't
> think a nonmarket economy can be efficient enough to support a rich society,
> for the reasons Hayek argued.
Hayek's conclusions depend on his premises about individuals. These include atomism and the identification of rationality with instrumental deductive reasoning. They can't be used to reach conclusions about either "socialism" or "communism" as Marx conceives them. For instance, Marx has taken over from Smith the idea that capitalist relations of production are radically inconsistent with the full development of the rationality, the "productive powers," of those who work within them.
"Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth - the soil and the worker." (Capital, vol. 1, p. 638)
Relations more consistent with such development will, therefore, be much more "efficient" in Marx's sense which includes the sense of minimizing the time spent in producing the means necessary for life in the "realm of freedom."
An argument about the relation of markets to efficiency that excludes by assumption any effect of the organization of production on the "rationality" of the producers can't show that Marx's claims about the "efficiency" of nonmarket forms of economic organization are mistaken. Such forms, e.g. a form characterized by "mutual recognition," embody premises about individuals inconsistent with Hayek's. For instance, "planning" by freely associated universally developed producers in relations of mutual recognition would differ radically from the idea of planning on which Hayek's argument is based.
>> You can't demonstrate that Marx's premises are mistaken
>> by showing that Marx's conclusions don't follow from premises Marx doesn't
>> make.
>
> Oh yes you can. Marx thought that communism required the abolition of
> scarcity. He argued that it would unleasre the productive forcesl. He was
> wrong. Anyway, you can get to this point from Marx's own premises, as
> Stanley Moore has shown in Marx vs. the Market. Marx argues (correctly) that
> under historical materialsim, it is markets that drive the development of
> the productive forces. So when you geyt rid of them . . .
How does any of this show that you can "demonstrate that Marx's premises are mistaken by showing that Marx's conclusions don't follow from premises Marx doesn't make"?
How do you know Marx was wrong? I take it you're not implicitly assuming that the relations of production in the former Soviet Union were "communist" in Marx's sense i.e. fully free relations of mutual recognition.
Stanley Moore can't have shown that, on Marx's assumptions, nonmarket forms of organization are incompatible with the development of productive forces. On Marx's premises nonmarket forms are necessary to the full development and effective use of these forces because, on his premises, they are necessary to the "full development of the individual."
The full development of the individual and the full utilization of the fully developed individual's productive powers require both "free time" in the "realm of freedom" and "freedom" in the "realm of necessity."
"The saving of labour time [is] equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest productive power. ... Free time - which is both idle time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject." (Grundrisse, pp. 711-2)
"Freedom, in this sphere [the "realm of necessity"], can only consist in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate to their human nature." (Capital, vol. 3, p. 959)
>> Unlike Hayek, Marx assumes that the content of a "good" life is objective
>> and knowable.
>
> You are wandering here. I agree with Marx, but like Hayek I am also a
> liberal, so I would not impose my conception of the good life on others who
> disagreed, even if I thought they were wrong.
No I'm not. On Marx's premises about the "good" life, market relations contradict "good" relations. Hayek's defense of such relations ignores this aspect of Marx's criticism of them. To impose your conception of the good life on others while agreeing with Marx's conception of it would be self-contradictory. Good relations with others as Marx conceives them are relations completely free of coercion.
Ted