> It certainly wasn't some love on the part of the Soviet masses for
> market economics, since 90% of them hadn't a clue what it was, and in
> any case voted for the preservation of the Union (70% of Soviet
> citizens, as opposed to 15% of CPSU delegates
You've mentioned this before and it's kind of an amazing figure. How did the discrepency between the delegate and popular vote come about? Was the popular vote just advisory, with no binding force? And the CPSU delegates just ignored it as it as if it hadn't taken place?
Michael
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I've posted this before, but it's on the subject by somebody who should know what he's talking about.
Chris Doss The Russia Journal ---------------------------
TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
[GORBACHEV FUND OFFICE, 12:10, DECEMBER 21, 2001] SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/) DATE: 12/21/01
....
First, regarding the disintegration of the Union. It's ten years on and understandably the press writes about it and films are coming out. I have seen some of them, but we have most of the films and I will eventually get to see them. But from what I have seen I have noticed that the keynote is an attempt to interpret what happened and the causes of the disintegration and what is to be done. The conversation drifts more and more in this direction. There is less and less attention to details and it is understandable that this is becoming more important. Why the disintegration occurred may be kept on the agenda because it is relevant to the present times, it may provide the key to what is happening in Russia and in the post-Soviet space. Considering the place occupied by the Soviet system and what came afterwards. it is important for the Europeans and for the world.
So, the first thing I would like to say about the breakup. There are arguments as to whether it was an objective process or it was the work of somebody bent on evil. I would like to say that those who suggest that the breakup was programmed even in the Soviet times, by the way it was created and what sustained it, that this system was unrealistic from the start. Others say that it all had started ten years before perestroika and that perestroika by opening the floodgates for freedom, for the initiative of individuals and political elites and so it came about by itself.
In short, the empire was formed, it held somehow for a while and, like all the empires, it had to collapse some day. I do not share that point of view. What are the objective facts? It is an objective fact that the USSR by the time of the start of perestroika was overloaded with problems. A very complicated system was malfunctioning and it could not react to internal problems, it was incapable of restructuring -- and this was the path the world followed in reacting to the scientific and technological revolution
And I must say that objectively what happened was this. During the Soviet period nation states had been formed in the Union republics. Nations were consolidated, state institutions had been formed and political elites, and most importantly, elites were formed capable of running things in politics, economics, culture and education were formed in the Union republics.
And the over centralization that was inherent and that continued because it was after all a totalitarian society was a shackles on the country, on society which had changed and all these processes were set in motion. Over bureaucratization, over centralization outlived themselves and issue had to be addressed. This was the objective imperative. But the scenarios for doing it could have been different. The scenario that was realized here was the worst possible. This despite the fact that those who were at the top at the time believed that the main task was reform on the basis of centralization.
And the task was in fact to implement what was written in Stalin's Constitution and in Brezhnev's Constitution. Namely, that the Union republics are independent state entities enjoying sovereignty, the right to self-determination not stopping short of secession. I have more than once drawn your attention to this. It might not be a bad idea to read them, you may find something there.
We embarked on this path considering the real changes that happened. The form that existed was simply splitting at the seams. It had to be reformed. I think reform was the right strategy. It made it possible to gradually, step by step -- some issues, of course, had to be solved quickly -- but on the whole a transition to a system that would retain the Union structure to tackle important tasks and concentrating on common problems while at the same time have broad decentralization so that all the vital practical question should be solved by the republics themselves.
I am convinced that the right choice had been made. I don't know if any of you remember that five years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 10 years after the beginning of perestroika, Burbulis and Shushkevich appeared on television one day. Shushkevich was at a loss. The press kept on asking him what he had wanted, whether he had understood what he was doing and what he had been taking part in. But Burbulis is never at a loss and said without any sign of shyness, Yes, we must say now. Apparently, it was after he had been kicked out of serious politics. He said, Life shows that a soft union proposed by Gorbachev was the most correct way to go. Today you won't hear even that. Like GKChP plotters tried to justify their action, these people who did the "great" thing in Belovezhye are all saying the same: that everything had been done before them, that they only put the finishing touch and have to be thanked for preventing a civil war and a bloodshed.
So what they are saying that the collapse was inevitable and that they only played the role of midwives to help with the delivery. But I do not share this point of view. I think that the Union could have been preserved. It would have been a different scenario of development. I can't say that it would have been a hurrah scenario, an ideal scenario. It would have been a long and difficult scenario for one and may be two generations.
What is happening in the post-Soviet space -- the existence of generally recognized subjects of international relations, new states, independent states, UN members. But the country is torn apart. It is surviving only because it is cooperating. Kazakhstan with the Urals and Siberia and beyond. Ukraine with Russia here. Five million of Ukrainians work here. They are getting a bit of attention. Appropriate decisions must be adopted first, but while the search is still under way, people are working together. So, even torn apart, the country is continuing to live and work. It's understandable because the level of integration and cooperation that existed in the Soviet Union was higher than that in the EU today. All this must have been used.
Whatever we take either in Russia or Ukraine, we can't do it without cooperation. We need to do things jointly all the time. So, I stick to this point of view. There is another very important conclusion. Despite all efforts by the new president, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, to consolidate the federation to make it a living organism, and I think that he has already succeeded in doing that, at least I think so, there is still a lot of talk that Russia should also objectively disintegrate. These are very short-sighted judgments. As a rule, there are certain interests behind such judgments, but not the interests of citizens.
When people are asked about the USSR today, everybody regrets that it happened. Not everybody, of course, but most people do. What is also important is that when we look at the CIS where over a dozen countries exist, I think those who call for going back to the USSR, for restoring the USSR the way it existed, I think these are reactionary calls and a provocation. This may ruin what has been achieved and done with so much difficulty especially now that all independent states, primarily Russia, are beginning to get some perspective.
I think that if this process continues, and it is already under way and it seems that Putin's ascent to power and his attention to CIS problems and the declaration of relations with CIS states as the main priority gives us reasons to think that this policy will be enhanced, it is oriented toward cooperation and attention to our CIS partners. And I think that integration processes will develop. They may take the form of free trade zones, a currency or a payment union or the implementation of major projects involving three or four countries. But at the initial stage bilateral contacts will provide the basis.
I have been in Kazakhstan twice and had a two-day detailed discussion with Nursultan Nazarbayev during one of my trips. He said that as soon as the payment union had become operational and they had managed to set this mechanism in motion with the new leadership of Russia, it is not operating at full capacity yet, but immediately trade had grown by 35 or 40 percent. In other words, there is a natural base, chance and opportunities for cooperation and they must be used.
It was strange and stupid when this open market, this space, although I loath this word -- we lived for decades in the Soviet Union, a big country on which so much was dependent, in our lives too, and now it's called a space where anyone can do whatever he wants. It has become part of our vocabulary and I use it too. But I think that big interests are involved, primarily ours, but at the same time, I see how our partners in Europe and the US, and China are watching this with big interest. So, I think we must support the policy aimed at enhancing cooperation in the CIS in all areas.
This is the first topic I wanted to discuss today. Regarding the collapse, I'd like to make the following comment. I see that many young people who may not even know what exactly happened writes things in the press using cliches. We find them in films and articles. But we must never forget the fact that there were two factors, two events that had a negative impact on the completion of the reform in the Soviet Union. These are the coup. The people who staged it knew that a treaty was going to be signed , that this treaty promised a new life, new elections, the creation of new bodies. But at the same time it meant the end of their political activities. By the way, not only had they not been put before a firing squad, they were not even asked any questions. They were supposed to retire with honors in their seventy or about that, with dachas, a general's pensions and other privileges to which they were officially entitled.
In the second event, -- yes, they said they were fighting in August to preserve the Union, but in December, Zyuganov at Khasbulatov's request and all others, actually there were 85 percent of communist delegates who stood up to vote for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Obviously they had no interest in the Soviet Union or the fate of people or what was going to happen to them, they had their own selfish interests to pursue. As to who brought up the break up it was Russia. Since 1990, starting from sovereignty and in the autumn, it was because of Russia that for the first time in Soviet history we have no development budget because Russia refused to develop a budget. And so the Union had to live without a budget, to muddle through. So, that's who started dismantling Russia.
They were against the signing of contracts on cooperation between enterprises -- and yet it was a transitional period. And then what started was elementary and open luring of union enterprises from the union jurisdiction to Russian jurisdiction. And they instantly had a ten percent tax cut. If I were to go on describing what was happening -- it all intensified the processes of disintegration so as to create a situation that would seem to suggest: you see what is happening? Something has to be done about it. It was a different scenario, perhaps there was some meaning in it but it was absolutely unacceptable and ungrounded, it could not be implemented. And the underlying idea was that they came to the conclusion that Russia would implement reform faster if it went it alone.
A Burbulis memorandum marked "strictly confidential" was being put together and put on the table and I immediately gave materials to television people and they filmed it. And he wrote that we were forfeiting the victories, the victories achieved in August and had already lost half of them. And if things continued in the same way it would be a defeat. What was worrying them so much? The Union is again gathering strength, a new treaty is being developed at the initiatives of the a Union center; the republics are supportive, and it does not meet our interests. When we were fighting against the Union center before the August 1991 putsch there was one situation because we were partners. Now they are no longer partners to us, and what we need to do is to devise a mechanism for divorce.
You should bear all this in mind. These are lessons, important lessons, they also have to do with the responsibility of the political elite of Russia. And this needs to be borne in mind. These problems arise today too.
....
Today, just like 10 years ago, I think that this is the most serious and the most difficult issue for me because perestroika collapsed. It collapsed having gone through the severest tests and we reached an anti-crisis program. All republics joined it, even the Baltic republics. We were about to sign a new Union Treaty. We made another attempt even after the putsch, we were going to reform the CPSU to divide it according to the trends, and it was at that time that this blow came, from the people around me.
This is why I come to the conclusion that we did everything correctly. Conceptually, we were committed to freedom, democracy and openness with regard to other countries. It's a choice that was made and it benefits the country and the whole world. Today we can only say that there were mistakes in the implementation of this strategy. I think we were late in developing a Union treaty, but on the other hand, it could never occur to anyone that those things had to be rushed. I think we were late, though.
Then there was April 1991 when most or half of the participants in the plenum was to get rid of Gorbachev as the general secretary, and I resigned in response to these feelings, but I should have traveled this path to the end because during those two hours when I was not present there the bureau discussed the situation. They had conducted consultations with the commanders of military districts and other officials. So, they were basically playing out the Khrushchev scenario, but the situation was different, and Gorbachev's position was different because I was president. In order to remove me, they had to deal with a Congress of People's Deputies. But that was something that the Politburo could hardly manage.
This is why they decided to use a different tactic. I saw that the party turned from the initiator of perestroika into a brake for perestroika. I should have gone to the end, should have gone for separation. So, I think it was a mistake, the most serious one. Third, they tried to whip up tension by disrupting supplies to the population. About 150 trains loaded with food products were standing around Moscow. But all this was saved for a better occasion, so to speak, while the population was queuing up for food across the country.
I think the problem should have been solved by reducing the defense budget by 10-15 percent, which meant 15 billion rubles. At that time each ruble invested in the defense sector cost $2. I don't know why this was not done. I think there was too much self-confidence.