[If we take the "war on terror" seriously, for argument's sake, the "terror" it's against could be defined as "new fangled transnational terrorist networks that pursue goals fundamentally different than old fashioned local wars of liberation" -- and where a global logic is thus supposed to be more important than local ones in providing a solution. Even if defined so narrowly, it may not be true that that threat is largely past. But it's an interesting contrarian idea]
New York Times July 11, 2002
The Death of bin Ladenism
By AMIR TAHERI
P ARIS Osama bin Laden is dead. The news first came from sources in
Afghanistan and Pakistan almost six months ago: the fugitive died in
December and was buried in the mountains of southeast Afghanistan.
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, echoed the information. The
remnants of Osama's gang, however, have mostly stayed silent, either
to keep Osama's ghost alive or because they have no means of
communication.
With an ego the size of Mount Everest, Osama bin Laden would not have,
could not have, remained silent for so long if he were still alive. He
always liked to take credit even for things he had nothing to do with.
Would he remain silent for nine months and not trumpet his own
survival?
Even if he is still in the world, bin Ladenism has left for good. Mr.
bin Laden was the public face of a brand of politics that committed
suicide in New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001, killing
thousands of innocent people in the process.
What were the key elements of that politics?
The first was a cynical misinterpretation of Islam that began decades
ago with such anti-Western ideologues as Maulana Maudoodi of Pakistan
and Sayyid Qutb of Egypt. Although Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb were not
serious thinkers, they could at least offer a coherent ideology based
on a narrow reading of Islamic texts. Their ideas about Western
barbarism and Muslim revival, distilled down to bin Ladenism, became
mere slogans designed to incite zealots to murder.
People like Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb could catch the ball and run
largely because most Muslim intellectuals of their generation (and
later) had no interest in continuing the work of Muslim philosophers.
Our intellectuals were too busy learning Western ideologies of one
kind or another and they left the newly urbanized Muslim masses to the
half-baked ideas of men like Mr. Maudoodi and Mr. Qutb and eventually
Mr. bin Laden.
Now, however, many Muslim intellectuals are returning home, so to
speak. They are rediscovering the philosophical heritage of Islam and
the challenges of Muslim political thought. And Maudoodi-Qutbism is
now being seen as a pseudo-Islamic version of Western fascism.
The second element that made Mr. bin Laden possible was easy money,
largely from wealthy individuals in the Persian Gulf area who believed
that they were buying a place in the hereafter while protecting
themselves against political opposition in this world. Some paid
because they believed they were helping poor and oppressed Muslims.
Others paid so militants would go and spend their energies far away
from home.
That easy money is no longer available, at least not in large
quantities. Many donors have realized they were financing terrorists.
Some have been forced to choose between the West, where they have the
bulk of their wealth, and the troglodyte mujahedeen of the Hindu Kush.
The third element that made bin Ladenist terror possible was the
encouraging, or at least complacent, attitude of several governments.
The Taliban in Afghanistan began by hosting Mr. bin Laden and ended up
becoming his life-and-death buddies. The Pakistanis were also
supportive because they wanted to dominate Afghanistan and make life
hard for the Indians by sending holy warriors to Kashmir. The Sudanese
government was sympathetic, if not actually supportive, and offered at
least a safe haven. This was also the case in Yemen, where in November
2000 I accidentally ran into a crowd of Qaeda militants who had flown
in from Pakistan for a gathering.
We now know that Qaeda cells operated, often quite openly, in Muslim
countries from Indonesia and Malaysia to Morocco and Tunisia, without
being bothered by anyone. The fall of the Taliban means the gang no
longer has a secure base. All the other countries are also closed, and
in some cases even hostile.
The fourth element was the mistaken practice of many Western powers
that sheltered the terrorists in the name of freedom of expression and
dissent. We now know that London was a critical haven for Al Qaeda.
The murder of the Afghan resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was
planned in London. Qaeda militants operated in Germany, Holland,
Belgium, France, Spain and Italy without significant restraint.
The fifth element that made bin Ladenism possible was the West's,
especially America's, perceived weakness if not actual cowardice. A
joke going around militant Islamist circles until last year was that
the only thing the Americans would do if attacked was to sue. That
perception no longer exists. The Americans, supported by one of the
largest coalitions in history, have shown they will use force against
their enemies even if that means a long and difficult war.
The sixth element of bin Ladenism was the illusion in most Western
nations that they could somehow remain unaffected by the violence
unleashed by fanatical terrorists against so many Muslim nations from
Indonesia to Algeria.
Mr. bin Laden could survive and prosper only in a world in which these
elements existed. That world is gone. Mr. bin Laden's ghost may linger
on perhaps because Washington and Islamabad will find it useful.
President Bush's party has a crucial election to win and Pervez
Musharraf is keen to keep Pakistan in the limelight as long as
possible.
But the truth is that Osama bin Laden is dead.
Amir Taheri, editor of the Paris-based journal Politique
Internationale, is a frequent contributor to the "Arab News" of Jidda,
Saudi Arabia.
Copyright 2002 The New York Times Company