Chris Doss The Russia Journal --------------------------- Novaya Gazeta No. 51 July 2002 THE LIBERAL EXTREME It is the brown future that is dangerous, not the red past Aggressive nationalism remains a pillar of state propaganda Author: Andrei Kosmynin [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE WAVE OF EXTREMISM WHICH HAS RECENTLY SWEPT RUSSIA IS A DIRECT COROLLARY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM CREATED IN RUSSIA OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION OWES ITS ASCENT TO THE TOP TO NATIONALISM. ITS OPPONENTS WERE IMMEDIATELY BRANDED AS ENEMIES OF THE STATE.
The recent wave of extremism is a direct corollary of the political system created in Russia over the past three years.
The current administration owes its ascent to the top to nationalism. Its opponents were immediately branded as enemies of the state.
State officials, including the president, have held forth on "improving the image" and creating a "positive impression". This idea is essentially based on the assumption that most of Russia's problems don't really exist - in effect, that they are the result of incorrect opinions about the state and the regime.
This image-making zeal has abated somewhat. Judging by his April address, the president is trying to turn to real problems. It even seems that neo-Nazi skinhead gangs are being viewed as a greater danger to the state than human rights activists.
Too late. The arrangement is in demand because the powers-that-be do not offer any real solutions to existing problems, nor any ways of improving living standards for the majority of citizens.
Higher salaries for state-sector workers, so widely publicized in late 2001, have resulted in wage arrears and depletion of regional budgets. Labor and Social Development Minister Alexander Pochinok is now cautiously advocating the idea of cutting the number of state- sector workers; and Economic Development Minister Herman Gref dwells on a 30% budget sequestration.
The gap between imitation of action and reality is deepening. Citizens are becoming more and more disillusioned with their lives and with the regime.
Meanwhile, public democratic channels for expressing one's disillusionment are closed. The system classifies as its opponents any critical media (any media outlets that dare to criticize the regime) and the "unconstructive" (i.e. still resisting) opposition. Aggressive nationalism remains a pillar of state propaganda.
It is possible, of course, for the regime to give the order to broadcast several anti-extremist stories on the RTR network, for example; but they will be negated by the already traditional commentaries on the dangers presented by the Catholic Church, or the death penalty as a means of reducing the crime rate. Or reports and commentaries sympathetic to Colonel Yuri Budanov.
At first sight, there is also the anti-communist front - which is supposed to prevent a return to the totalitarian past. In fact, however, the regime's battle against communism leads to precisely the opposite results.
In the first place, the regime reduces the problem of totalitarianism and dictatorship to the danger of a return to communism; yet it is the "brown" future that is much more of a danger for the state than the "red" past.
Secondly, the CPRF is really a conservative party, restraining nationalist-minded voters within certain limits. If and when they ever decide to abandon the Communists, those voters will support nationalists and chauvinists.
Nationalism and a nostalgic longing for an iron hand remain the sole - and officially approved - escape.
Attitudes to what has been happening in Chechnya are very revealing. Everyone sees that despite what the president might be saying on the subject, the war in Chechnya is not over. All the same, any proposals for a political settlement are inevitably viewed as treason. Once again, there is only one solution - kill them, all of them, and do a more thorough job that is being done now. Which means that a new regime is necessary to do so.
This is how the political system created since 1999, the system that looks stable and long-lasting outwardly, may turn out to be a short-lived authoritarian prologue to a truly nationalist regime.
The wave of extremism is neither the only nor the major precondition. We cannot help noticing that FSB officers are becoming regional leaders, starting to drive the Communist governors out of the so-called "red belt". We cannot help noticing the activity level of nationalist parties. These instances, representing more widespread nationalist leanings, are not even mentioned when extremism is discussed. Everything is reduced to "the skinheads".
Fear creates the delusion that the dangers will be successfully dealt with by the very same system that gave rise to them in the first place - if only the system can gain additional powers. I am referring to the bill "On prevention of political extremism" which the president submitted to the Duma.
Meanwhile, everyone knows that convictions of nationalists and extremists are rare (and they inevitably draw only mild sentences); and it's not because of the lack of special legislation. A great many law enforcement personnel and judges sympathize with the suspects, just as the prosecution is sympathizing with Colonel Budanov.
Meanwhile, the wording of the new legislation is such that its adoption may lead to an outcome the opposite of what is expected. The so-called "liberal" Nikolai Svanidze says he cannot understand why during the first reading of the anti-extremist law, objections were raised by the Communists, the Agrarians, and Yabloko. The explanation is simple. The Altai branch of the Communist Party has already been placed on the list of extremists by the regional government. Regional leaders are gaining a perfect tool to use against any opposition at all. As for local skinhead gangs, they are smart enough to explain that they are patriots, not extremists.
There is only one real way of avoiding the ultimate cul de sac. It involves restoration of democratic institutions, which have been transformed into something purely decorative over the last three years; proper public debate; and a search for solutions to the problems Russia is facing.
Of course, this would mean dismantling the system created and shaped to suit the president. It would also mean considerable personnel changes. The question is whether or not it is possible in principle - and whether the president can steer the process.
It should also be noted that the reforms drafted by the Cabinet do absolutely nothing to minimize social inequality. Reforms to housing and utilities, as planned by Herman Gref and his associates, shift virtually all of the burden from the state to the individual. Mass protests are taking place already. The protesters are simple, ordinary Russian citizens who have been placed in intolerable conditions. They do not see any hope for themselves; and they might join the radicals as well.
They cannot be blamed for doing so. But the helpless regime - and democratic politicians who only pretend to be concerned about extremism - can be blamed. (Translated by A. Ignatkin)