(The following article by Matthew A. Cordova, Deputy Director of the Office of Political-Military and Regional Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, appeared in the latest issue of "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda" devoted to the topic "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The New Strategic Framework." This article and the rest of the electronic journal, which was published on July 18, may be viewed on the Web at: http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0702/ijpe/ijpe0702.htm. There are no republication restrictions.)
The Transformation of U.S.-Russian Relations By Matthew A. Cordova
(The path to a dramatically new relationship between the United States and Russia was not laid by chance -- it evolved by design, beginning early in 2001, says Matthew A. Cordova, Deputy Director of the Office of Political-Military and Regional Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Engagement by President Bush and the U.S. national security team with its Russian counterpart laid the groundwork for Russian President Putin's historic decision to stand with the West in the aftermath of September 2001, he says, and since then, positive trends in the new U.S.-Russia relationship have accelerated.)
If 1989 is the bookend to the end of the Cold War, then perhaps 2001 can be regarded as the bookend to the post-Cold War transition period. Just over a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S.-Russian relations continued to be viewed primarily through the prism of the strategic nuclear balance. This reinforced the adversarial bilateral relationship of the past based on suspicion and distrust and inhibited cooperation in a number of areas of mutual interest. Very early on, Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed that the U.S.-Russian relationship should be broad-based and focused increasingly on issues such as trade and investment. The tragedy of September 11 highlighted counterterrorism efforts as a natural area for bilateral cooperation. The significant progress we have made was recorded in the Joint Declaration signed during the May 2002 summit in Moscow. Reaching that point involved early and sustained bilateral engagement at all levels.
Few if any could have anticipated the profound changes that would occur in 2001, but the groundwork for a deeper and more tangible cooperative relationship with Russia was by design, not by chance. Both presidents and their foreign and defense policy advisers began to engage one another in 2001 to develop an agenda and roadmap to deepen cooperation and move beyond the constraints of our past relationship. Bush led this effort, which was directed and shaped by meetings with Putin in Ljubljana, Shanghai, Washington/Crawford, Moscow and at the G8 (Group of Eight) summit in Kananaskis, Canada. The leaders continue to communicate regularly by telephone and correspondence. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld meet, converse, and correspond regularly with their counterparts to advance the United States' new strategic framework for relations with Russia.
On May 1, 2001, Bush outlined his vision of a strategic framework for the "post-Cold War" era at the National Defense University. The president emphasized that, while the United States and Russia would continue to have areas of disagreement, we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. In that regard, Bush stated that he sought to transform the nature of the bilateral relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and interests. During their June 2001 meeting in Slovenia, Bush and Putin initiated a conversation about building a strategic framework that is "post-Cold War" in substance, not just rhetoric, and one that would endure beyond their presidencies.
The United States and Russia have been working very closely on a wide array of political issues and common challenges. Aside from our countries' cooperation to transform Afghanistan into a stable and viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors, we have been engaged in other regions. We are also working together to resolve regional conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, the Middle East, and most recently in South Asia. Russia has been a strong supporter of the Middle East peace process and of U.S. efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The United States and Russia are also cooperating effectively on transnational issues other than but related to terrorism, such as narcotics trafficking and organized crime. Drug trafficking is a threat to both nations and provides significant financial support for international terrorist organizations.
In the economic realm, we continue to encourage and support Russia's complete transition to a market economy. This is a priority for both countries. We seek to expand our bilateral economic ties and to integrate Russia further into the global economy as a member with both full rights and responsibilities. We thus fully support Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will reinforce Moscow's broader economic reform efforts and help to prepare Russia for a larger role in the global economy. The presidents have agreed to explore new possibilities for energy cooperation, where U.S. and Russian interests converge on several major questions.
Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations also demands that we move ahead. The Department of Commerce's recent decision to designate Russia as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade laws is an important step forward in that regard. We are working with Congress to end the Jackson-Vanik amendment's application to Russia, thus enabling them to gain permanent Normal Trade Relations with the United States.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 accelerated U.S.-Russian engagement and cooperation in a number of areas already under way and created opportunities for new areas of dialogue and potential cooperation. One of the most remarkable developments during the months since the attacks has been our extraordinary cooperation with Russia in a region that was formerly part of the Soviet Union -- Central Asia.
On October 19, 2001, we conducted the first-ever U.S.-Russian consultations on Central Asia. We were both pleasantly surprised and gratified by the convergence of interests in this region. We both desire long-term stability and prosperity in Central Asia, where we both have important interests. And we have pledged transparency and collaboration in our efforts and activities. The United States will support economic and political development and respect for human rights in the region while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and narcotics. There need be no tension between our support for the Central Asian states and our desire for broader and deeper cooperation with Russia.
In fact, Bush and Putin are leading our countries to a new level of cooperation in Central Asia. Putin has shown noteworthy leadership in the way he has actively coordinated with Central Asian leaders to encourage their cooperation with the United States in the battle against terrorism. This supports what we have long said: that Central Asia is not a zero-sum game. We have offered support to efforts by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan to foster a new Caspian Sea maritime boundary arrangement, as long as these efforts do not hinder the future transport of energy resources. Our shared interests with Russia -- indeed, with the other regional powers of China and Iran -- are greater in many cases than our areas of competition.
The degree of cooperation with Russia on our efforts in Central Asia -- a region in which Russia has significant historic, cultural, political, and economic interests -- is unprecedented. Russia has shared intelligence, provided search-and-rescue (SAR) assistance, supported international humanitarian relief efforts, and did not obstruct the Central Asian states' decision to accept U.S. military presence on their national territories. Russia has provided two military liaison officers to CENTCOM (the U.S. Central Command) in Florida. The U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan has also been an invaluable mechanism. Its mandate has been expanded to include other geographic areas and new and related threats. To this end, the two presidents agreed at their recent summit in Moscow to broaden the group's mandate and rename it the Working Group on Counterterrorism. This kind of cooperation will help to combat a number of 21st century global challenges, including international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.
Our allies have been among the strongest supporters of expanding our new relationship with Russia. In the global war on terror, Russia and NATO are working as partners to counter regional instability and the multitude of evolving threats. During the NATO-Russia Rome Summit, we inaugurated the NATO-Russia Council, which will permit NATO member states and Russia to work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) gives us the opportunity to move forward together on common challenges, and to begin building ties that can be expanded far into the future.
We will start with areas where our ability to help one another as equal partners is unmistakable: areas such as counterterrorism, preventing the spread of WMD, emergency planning, and maritime search and rescue. NATO and Russia will also seek to improve coordination in places where they are already working together, such as the Balkans. NATO, Russia, and our other partners can take great pride in the greater peace and stability we have brought to that region. NATO and Russia are also looking ahead to other areas where we can expand our cooperation, such as missile defense, civil-emergency response and airspace control -- these, too, can strengthen the security of the United States, Russia, and all of Europe. Our NATO allies and Russia have already begun work on a number of NRC agenda items approved during the Rome Summit. We believe that initial successes in the NRC will lay a basis for expanding cooperation between the Alliance and Russia.
A discussion of the new and evolving relationship would not be complete without addressing the historic changes regarding strategic offensive force reductions, missile defense, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the ongoing strategic dialogue. That strategic nuclear forces no longer dominate the bilateral relationship is evidence of the broadening ties and full agenda ahead for both countries. During the Moscow Summit in May, the United States and Russia established a Consultative Group for Strategic Security, to be chaired by foreign and defense ministers. This group will be the principal mechanism in which we discuss strategic, nonproliferation, and security issues and consult on a broad range of international security issues.
The manner in which we agreed to disagree on the ABM Treaty reflects the intense dialogue we had with Russia over a period of months, a dialogue in which we told the Russians where we were headed. We were candid about the seriousness and priority we accorded effective missile defenses to enhance our national security. This is why we engaged Russia to determine if there was a way that we could move jointly beyond the ABM Treaty, in light of the threat to both of our countries from ballistic missiles and WMD.
In the end, we agreed to disagree. Following intensive consultations, including between Secretary Powell and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and between the two presidents, we notified Russia on December 13, 2001, of the U.S. intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002. The world did not end; an arms race did not break out. No crisis occurred in U.S.-Russian relations.
The limited missile defense that we intend to deploy will not pose a threat to Russian strategic forces. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia, signed in Moscow on May 24, specified steps to foster confidence, transparency, and cooperation in missile defense. Such measures will include information exchange on missile defense programs and tests, reciprocal site visits to observe tests, and implementing a joint center for exchanging early warning data. Our governments will also study some possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including joint exercises and joint development.
The recently concluded Treaty of Moscow is a landmark achievement, significantly reducing strategic forces beyond the levels of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Many critics insisted that strategic reductions would be impossible in the absence of the ABM Treaty. In fact, in responding to the U.S. withdrawal notice on December 13, 2001, President Putin announced Russia's intention to reduce its strategic forces to no more than 2,200 warheads -- responding in kind to President Bush's Washington-Crawford Summit announcement of U.S. reductions in operationally deployed strategic warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade. The Russian attitude since December 13 has been to look to the future, not dwell on the past. Both governments have submitted the treaty for ratification to their respective legislative bodies and are working to secure ratification this fall.
We are also engaging Russia to seek broad international support for a strategy of "proactive nonproliferation." International terrorism and proliferation concerns are closely linked. The United States and Russia plan to work closely together to ensure the security of WMD and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. Both countries remain determined to support all countries in improving and enforcing export controls, interdicting illegal transfers, prosecuting violators, and strengthening border security and defense to support territorial integrity and prevent proliferation.
It is no surprise that the states that sponsor terrorism are also the most active proliferators. It is critically important that we find a creative solution to end the problem of Russian entities' sensitive assistance to Iran's WMD and missile programs. We also must work with our Russian partners, and others, to combat the gray arms problem (illicit arms transfers, set up by arms brokers with falsified end-users, intended for state sponsors of terror and terrorists) and the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons to states such as Iran and Iraq that threaten U.S. forces and those of our friends and allies. This has taken on greater urgency since coalition combat operations began at the end of 2001. President Bush has made clear repeatedly that the United States is committed to strong, effective threat reduction and nonproliferation cooperation with Russia and the Eurasian states. Work will continue with our G8 partners to find creative ways to assist Russia in funding lasting and effective critical threat-reduction activities.
Looking to the future, the way we have handled the global war on terrorism, NATO-Russia relations, the ABM Treaty, strategic nuclear reductions, and threat reduction reflects the way we will be working together with Russia. Building on the progress we have already made will require determination, energy, goodwill, and creativity on both sides as we seek to resolve some of the tough issues on our agenda. We will continue to press on issues where we disagree, including human rights and a political settlement in Chechnya, media freedom questions, the Russia-Iran proliferation problem, and our concerns about chemical and biological weapons issues. Indeed the presidents have set a tone in which we can talk candidly about difficult problems as well as areas where our interests converge.
The administration harbors no illusions about the amount of work that remains to be done to implement fully the Joint Declaration and move this relationship forward; it will take years. Russia's transformation to democracy and a market-based economy will continue to face challenges and our interests will not always converge. Congress remains an important partner, and there are a number of issues where we need its support, including ending Jackson-Vanik's application to Russia and waiving Cooperative Threat Reduction certification requirements so those important programs can continue. We will be working closely with the Senate regarding ratification of the Treaty of Moscow.
In view of the 21st century challenges ahead, the United States has embarked on the road to a vastly changed and improved relationship with Russia. The new strategic framework we are developing with Russia provides a strong base to continue the transformation of our critical bilateral relations, manage our differences, and create opportunities for both countries, in tandem with our allies and friends.