On May 8, the Turkmen judiciary charged a former defense minister and 21 top security officials with various crimes, such as torture, murder, corruption and drug trafficking. The incident, preceded and followed by arrests and trials of other top Turkmen civilian and military officials, demonstrated the depth of the power struggle within the Turkmen elite. Despite the intention of its proponents, the endless campaign of arrests, convictions and removals of influential figures since last year has contributed to the fragility of President Safarmorad Niyazov's administration and raised questions about its long-term survival.
Arrests, trials and convictions of senior civilian and military officials have been a defining characteristic of the Turkmen state since its independence in 1991. Unlike the majority of the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkmenistan has not experienced instability in the forms of violent political activities or civil war. Nor have destabilizing forces outside the political system challenged the state. However, unlike its Central Asian and Caucasian counterparts, the Turkmen state has kept the Soviet authoritarian system intact. As a result, it has pursued a policy of zero-tolerance toward any form of dissent, whether peaceful or violent, both within and outside of the political system. Thus, while those other states have gradually shifted to authoritarianism in different forms and at a different pace since their independence, the Turkmen state under Niyazov opted for Soviet-style authoritarianism right after independence. As with the Soviet model, the Turkmen regime's survivability has required the elimination of dissidents and potential dissidents in the elite's rank.
Niyazov's cult of personality has consolidated and shaped Turkmen authoritarianism. Known as Turkmenbashi (father of Turkmens), his Stalin-style form of government has left absolutely no room for any type of political freedom and dissent, particularly among the elite. The Niyazov administration has not tolerated dissent or even disagreement within the top echelon of the Turkmen state for fear of its development into a political force challenging from within the authority of the lifetime president, now equated with the authority of the state. Moreover, members of the elite have been used as scapegoats for all the shortcomings, wrongdoings and failures of the government and the president since independence.
No wonder, then, that Turkmenistan has faced constant insecurity an and unpredictable future, as was the case in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This has been reflected in numerous purges of top military, security and civilian officials charged with various crimes of political, economic, security and criminal natures. Since January, for instance, more than 50 top military officers and technocrats and hundreds of junior military officers and civil servants have been arrested and charged with incompetence, embezzlement, misuse of funds and drug trafficking, to name a few allegations. Although Turkmenistan, like its Central Asian neighbors, has suffered from all these evils since independence, dealing with the alleged wrongdoers and criminals has not been the main reason for their prosecution in most cases.
A blatant recent example is the May 8 arrest of many high-ranking officials and certain close confidants of Niyazov. According to reports, the Turkmen Prosecutor General's investigation into irregularities and wrongdoings in Turkmenistan's secret service, the National Security Committee (KNB), led to the arrest of its former chairman, Muhammed Nazarov, along with 20 security officials who allegedly committed 80 crimes, including torture of prisoners, murder, procuring prostitutes, bribery and fraud. Another top official, former defense minister Kurbandurdy Begendjev, was also charged with four counts of corruption. The arrest and the prosecution of the mentioned officials happened two months after Niyazov fired the latter and the former KNB chairman for their "incompetence". Apart from them, many top officials, such as several military and border guard officers and regional officials, including deputy prime minister and Central Bank chief Seyitbay Gandymov, were replaced or sacked for their alleged incompetence or wrongdoings between March and May of this year.
Suppressing intra-elite dissent and appeasing the dissatisfied Turkmens aside, fear of losing control over the state apparatus and removing the possibility of coups seem to have been the main driving force behind the recent extensive purges of top military, security and bureaucratic officials. The growing number of defections of such officials, especially since late last year, has clearly created anxiety within the administration. Defection is not a new phenomenon in Turkmenistan, but the recent cases seem to have worried Niyazov. Despite their current insignificance, there is a fear that the defectors who have gathered in Moscow and who have taken steps to establish opposition groups may be able to mount a serious challenge to Niyazov at the time when he faces emerging, although still muted, social dissatisfaction. The defectors who have sought foreign assistance include several top diplomats, including the Turkmen ambassadors to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and technocrats such as a former deputy prime minister. The most vocal of them has been Boris Sheikmuradov, the former ambassador to China, who has set up the Turkmenistan Popular Democratic Movement.
Authoritarianism has been growing in all the Central Asian and Caucasian countries at differing pace and intensity. However, it has taken its cruelest form in Turkmenistan, whose political system has become even more rigid and repressive than the Soviet one was. Among other factors, the increasing popular dissatisfaction with the status quo marked by poverty, unemployment, lowering living standards, rampant corruption and political repression have contributed to the creation of a situation prone to the eruption of popular dissent and political violence all over Central Asia and the Caucasus. Additionally, Niyazov's version of authoritarianism has provoked a growing dissatisfaction both among ordinary Turkmens and their elite. The expanding dissent among the latter partly reflects an intra-elite power struggle and partly demonstrates the elite's concern about instability in the form of widespread and, most probably, violent forms of popular opposition, a possible outcome of Niyazov's high-handed style of government. Instead of ensuring the stability of his administration, the president's massive purges and dismissals of leading figures and senior officials will likely weaken the pillars of his authority by denying him the elite's support while losing that of his people.