Chinese Labour Movement

Michael Pugliese debsian at pacbell.net
Tue Jun 11 15:54:16 PDT 2002


http://www.3bh.org.uk/IV/ March and April 2002, two parter by Hong Kong based writer for October Review. International Viewpoint is the Trotskyist journal founded by Ernest Mandel. Publishes folks like Livio Maitan ("Party, Army and Masses in China, " classic from NLB/Verso on the GPCR, published in 1970 or so.) and Tariq Ali. Michael Pugliese http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20011101fabook5805/anita-chan/china-s-workers- under-assault-the-exploitation-of-labor-in-a-globalizing-economy.html

Will China shake the world? LIU YUFAN

Private business is rapidly replacing the public sector in China. Rapid economic growth and corruption is leading to huge social tensions. Will China present a challenge to US economic and political domination in the coming decades?

In the decade following the 1989 uprising of the democratic movement and its subsequent repression, the Chinese government - led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - has remained stable. Many commentators agree that it will remain so for the foreseeable future, and that the one party state will not face serious challenges. However, despite conjecture about stability, the social base of the CCP has already undergone profound change. These changes to a great extent contribute to China's current stability. In 1989 the CCP faced enormous challenges not only from tens of thousands of students, but from a mass of workers and farmers. Prior to l989, 10 years of market reform were enough to enrich the bureaucracy and at the same time move enormous burdens onto workers and common citizens. A gulf, deeper than ever, was laid between the rulers and the ruled, which later led to the eruption of the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square.

After the crackdown, the CCP could no longer rely on the passive support of workers for reform, as had previously been the case. Instead, under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP leadership decided to further encourage the growth of a new class of entrepreneurs and professionals through the provision of increasing market opportunities. In the process, professionals, entrepreneurs and Party officials not only further enriched themselves, but also shifted China's social base from workers to a new elite. According to the latest official statistics, the private sector now accounts for 26.1 per cent of industrial production while in 1990 the figure was only 4.4 per cent. At the end of 2000, China had 1.76 million privately owned enterprises, employing 20.11 million workers. In addition, the private sector contributes one-third of China's GDP.

The government and the private sector have, therefore, developed and maintained a de-facto social partnership. Furthermore, a substantial number of intellectuals and students, who had already harboured suspicions towards workers in l989, are now no longer keen to promote democracy in the aftermath of the crackdown. Instead they engage themselves in the pursuit of commercial success or personal career advancement. Most of them turn a deaf ear towards the growing numbers of unemployed state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers, viewing them as obstacles to modernisation or as simply those who fail to adjust to a new and better system. The free market and neo-liberal theory and practice dominate their intellectual thinking and outlook. Those who have better guanxi (personal connections by which to conduct business, attain more status or better jobs) can be easily absorbed into this new class of entrepreneurs. Even those whose guanxi is not so good can at least join the seemingly ever growing new middle class.

Apolitical era

The 1990s were the most apolitical era that 'new' China has ever experienced. The CCP succeeds in winning the active support of entrepreneurs and the passive support, if not passive tolerance, of considerable number of intellectuals. The liberals who may regret the fact that the CCP maintains its grip over the state, nevertheless appreciate its determined efforts in dismantling the last trace of the command economy and its consequent harmonisation with the global market. This line of development culminated in the recent pronouncement by Jiang Zemin that the CCP should allow entrepreneurs to join the Communist Party, praising their contribution to 'the development of productive forces in a socialist society'.

At the same time, the further opening of the market since the early 1990s has boosted investment confidence both at home and abroad. Beijing has won the friendship of the west and transnational corporations (TNCs) despite its continued poor record in human rights. This is demonstrated by the huge amounts of foreign investment which have poured into China over the past decade. In the first half of the 90s, China experienced very high growth rates. In the later half of the decade economic growth began to slow down but still maintains an average of 7 per cent, which seems to help promote confidence and stability within the ruling party and discourage or dispel criticism from both inside and outside the country. Dissidents who have defected overseas admit that since China's economy is still growing and providing benefits to some sectors of the population, the one party state is still far from crisis. Or to put it another way, conditions in Chinese society are not ideal for the growth of any form of democratic movement.

The metamorphosis of the CCP has, however, not gone totally unchallenged. Between 1994 and 1998, high ranking 'orthodox leftists' issued a series of five documents attacking Jiang's pro- entrepreneur and pro-western policy. Currently it is widely reported that a counter attack launched against Jiang prompted him to close down two organs of the 'left'. His opponents have vowed to stop Jiang's attempt to officially revise the constitution of the CCP. Whether they will succeed remains to be seen, but it will not be easy given that their influence within the Party is small. The overwhelming majority of technocrats and bureaucrats - the backbone of the CCP - have benefited handsomely from the restoration of a capitalist market economy, and they certainly see no reason to reverse its course.

The support within the party for the 'leftists' comes mainly from old cadres and those who are responsible for overseeing 'ideological and political work', and as such reap little or no benefit from the reform. In some instances reform has led to the sackings of such cadres, and hence they nurse a grudge against Jiang's faction. However, within the Party this group's influence is shrinking. These disgruntled Party members will only pose a threat to Jiang if they forge coalitions with the disenchanted under and unemployed.

The restructuring of the economy has led to the bankruptcy of thousands of SOEs, and the loss of 30 million jobs. According to official figures, the number of protests and demonstrations by workers in l998 was nine times that of l993. The reasons for protests are varied, but it seems that in most of the cases they are not so much over being laid-off as such, but rather against non- payment of wages, pensions or unemployment benefits. Or they are over corruption and the rock-bottom price of privatisation. For instance, last year in Liaoning province, 30,000 miners fought the police against unscrupulous privatisation. However, partly because dissent carries a high price, and partly as a result of inexperience in forming linkages with other groups, workers' protests remain fragmented. It is perhaps only when protesting workers have a conscious political outlook that discontent will play a role on the political stage. For the time being the social crisis resulting from economic restructuring continues to develop, but at a constrained and slow pace.

However, this does not mean that challenges to the present leadership can only come from without. Powerful centrifugal forces have always been at work within the CCP. The pro- market reform has been so successful that today not only the SOEs, but also many government departments and public social services, are being subjected to profit incentives. For a long time even the army was involved in commercial undertakings (this was prohibited after Jiang instituted serious measures, but the ban has not been extended to all other government departments).

Fierce competition

When all levels of officials involve themselves in profit making, it follows that fierce competition among the ruling bureaucracy for attracting investment, for market share and for the commercialisation of resources will result. Major and minor conflicts among officials in different regions and at different levels are reported from time to time. It is common for provincial governments using administrative measures to stop the inflow of goods from other provinces. Conflicts over economic interests among different departments have been reported.

Prior to the reforms, the disparity between the countryside and cities, and between coastal and inland regions, was narrowing; since the implementation of reform the situation has reversed. The reforms have had a deep impact too on the internal cohesion of the CCP. In rural areas, a central concern for county and village officials is over the discrepancy between urban wealth and rural poverty, and what has become a race for economic development. They also believe that since it is they rather than provincial and central governments who shoulder the burden of providing rural education, they thus should not be blamed by their superiors for being too harsh in taxing the rural population. (1) As to the western and central regional officials, they believe that the central government has favoured the coastal regions since reforms began. In 1997, five big western provinces expressed serious discontent towards the central government for preventing them from setting up the third stock market in China.

Widespread corruption and ruthless privatisation also contributes to the growing centrifugal forces within the CCP. Before the reforms, corruption was mainly confined to the theft of public property in the form of consumer goods. Then in the mid-1980s, officials began to profit by speculating in the market. Since the early 1990s, however, officials have been able to set up their own companies or prompt their friends and relatives to set up private companies to make money. One of the easiest methods to make money is to effect the transfer of public properties into their own companies. Prior to the reforms, a low ranking official could be bribed by the offer of a pack of cigarette. In recent years one may need millions of dollars to effect such a bribe. Such a degree of corruption greatly weakens the administrative capacity of the state. Even when a policy is good in itself, its implementation is often obstructed or twisted by the profit making incentives of the bureaucracy, resulting in chaos, mistakes and damage to people's lives. The lower level bureaucracy covers up all problems which arise by all means possible. It is common knowledge that all statistics in China are unreliable. For instance, trade balance figures for August 1998 recorded a US$ 20 billion surplus. Strangely, the foreign currency reserve recorded an increase of less than US$1 billion.

This anomaly not only reflects the seriousness of unreliable statistics but also illegal capital flight (unreliable statistics masking theft). Hence, it is common for problems to accumulate to a point of crisis and only then coming to the attention of the central government; by which time it is often too late. Moreover, corruption is the single most important issue that antagonises common people, and which has resulted in countless incidents of protests, strikes, and even riots. Faith in the CCP that it could resolve such problems is rapidly fading across many sectors of society. In March 1998, a rare scenario occurred: in the first session of the Ninth National People's Congress, 25.4 per cent of the deputies either abstained or voted against the report of the Supreme People's Court, and 44.7 per cent either abstained or voted against the report of the Supreme People's Procuratorate as a protest against their official record in fighting corruption.

Another factor that may affect the stability of the one party state is the economy. Since the latter half of the 90s, the economy is losing steam. The government reacted with a typically Keynesian policy of increasing government spending to stimulate demand. Increasing the fiscal debt may result in some positive effects on the economy, but in the long run more problems arise than are solved. Most importantly, market reforms have greatly decreased the percentage of government revenue in the economy. In 1978, government revenue accounted for 29.5 per cent of GDP. In l999 the figure dropped by more than half to 13.3 per cent; a figure much lower than many other countries. This indicates that the regulatory power of the government has been shrinking rapidly. For its Keynesian policy to succeed, the government has to rely on borrowing, which in turn creates a mountain of debt. In the long term this may have disastrous implications.

The economic situation <snip>



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