On Wed, 19 Jun 2002, Brad DeLong wrote:
> My friend John Boykin has just finished a book [John Boykin (2002),
> Cursed Is the Peacemaker (Belmont, CA: Applegate Press: 0971943206)]
> about American diplomat Philip Habib, and his attempt to stop the 1982
> Beirut Massacre (which in the end did not happen).
Could you elaborate? The only Beirut massacre I see mentioned in the rest of your review is the Sabra and Shatilla one, which is the one that did happen. There was also the large scale killing of civilians by bombing and heavy shelling of Beirut during the 70 day seige. That also happened. So which one didn't happen? Do you mean the one that might have happened had the Israelis gone right in when they arrived? I don't think Habib can take much credit for that. It seems at least arguable that the Israelis didn't go right in because they didn't want to take the casualties (est. 600). And that that's why they shelled. That was by then the classical and cowardly method of attacking Beirut, but it was a new departure for for the Israelis, who had never laid siege before. They had always thought in terms of quick wars. And shelling and bombing clearly shows no regard for civilian lives. So it seems on the face of it that the thing that stopped them from entering Beirut during the seige was that the PLO refused to run under the shelling, weak as they were. And what stopped them from entering Beirut after the PLO left was . . well, nothing. Certainly not Habib. His comments about Saudi Arabia underline how important he thought it was *not* to go on the public record as being against the Israelis entering Beirut. So am I honestly puzzled as to what massacre he thinks he prevented.
The main problem with trying to understand the Lebanese war from Habib's perspective is that it's completely directed at self-exculpation. And it doesn't jibe with the facts. Haig couldn't have been the main constraint on his peacemaking for the simple reason that he was fired 3 weeks after the war began. The Israelis invaded Lebanon on June 3, 1982. Haig resigned as Secretary of State on June 25th. (Lebanon was one of several reasons. His nature as a loose cannon was no secret. Remember when he went on TV and said "I'm in charge?"). Habib brokered his agreements for the PLO's retreat at the end of August. And the massacres happened in mid September. So for 80% of the period between the initial invasion and the massacres, Habib was serving under George Schultz, not Alexander Haig. And since Schultz had to get up to speed on the whole world, Habib was presumably as autonomous as a second in command could be. So blaming Haig for his problems doesn't wash at all.
And blaming Sharon and the IDF seems rather like breaking down an open door. After all Lebanon was a clear case of an aggressive war. Israel started it to accomplish meglomaniacal ends they didn't achieve. So it was a surprise that a month after they started they were loathe to leave? And it's supposed to be a revelation to us today -- after we've seen that they continued to occupy the country for 18 years thereafter -- that they were an obstacle to peace from the beginning?
There are lots of things worth going over about the Lebanese war, especially now. But Habib's account of this period muddies our understanding rather than clarifying it. And although it has been filtered through Boynton and then through you, as far as I can see, it's exactly the same account Habib gave 20 years ago: that it was all the fault of those crude soldiers-turned-ministers, Haig and Sharon, mucking up his delicate game. I think a fairer appraisal is that he entirely failed to appreciate, or to do anything to stop, their blunt games -- especially Sharon's. A mistake we are about to make again? A clear case where history not understood is doomed to be repeated?
The other sad part about this story is the dog that didn't bark. Habib's story, then and now, is that Sabra and Shatilla had nothing to do with him and were in no way his fault, nor was the US in any way responsible. That it happened on his watch, a week after US troops were sent home, was just an accident. A comparison with the Dutch government's response to their indirect responsibility for Srebrenika is salutory. But nobody paid for for Sabra and Shatilla. The Kahan commission forced Sharon out of the Defense portfolio only so he could become a minister without portfolio. He never even left the government, never mind public life. People suffer worse for lying to the press about embarassing memos. He was a power member in government after government thereafter -- usually in Interior, building settlements. And now he's prime minister. And hailed by us as a man of peace. While he tries the same blunt game again. And his assurances to the contrary are worth as much. And we rely on them once more.
Habib never lost his job either. On the contrary, he continued to be hailed as a wizard of mideast politics. A rep he now seems eager to burnish.
In the end, I think this is a good example of a case where one gets a better understanding from reading the newspapers than from knowing the inside baseball.
Michael