Primakov doctrine (1)

[Chuck Grimes]

I didn't know what the Primakov Doctrine was, so I looked it up. For
those who don't want to bother reading about it, it comes down to
Russia developing tighter relations with its former southern crescent
border and far east---Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and China, as hedge
against the US. Below is the typical cold war take. It is worth reading
since it explains (indirectly) what the latest all the US nuclear saber
rattling is intended to confront, and possibly give a larger rational for
expanding beyond the war in Afghanistan.

Chuck Grimes

ps. This didn't get posted the first time, probably because of the length, 
so its going out in two parts.
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                          The "Primakov Doctrine":
                           Russia's Zero-Sum Game
                           with the United States

                             Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
                           Senior Policy Analyst1
                          The Heritage Foundation

                                 FYI No. 167
                             December 15, 1997

                                    

     Russian Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov is claiming credit for
     calming Saddam Hussein during the recent Iraqi crisis. However,
     Primakov's role in temporarily defusing the crisis should be seen
     not as an exercise in diplomatic finesse, but as an important sign
     of Russia's new post-Cold War foreign policy and as part of a
     larger strategy to challenge America's leadership role in global
     security.2

     The purpose of this strategy is to build a Eurasian counterbalance
     to the American-led Atlantic alliance by forging closer ties
     between Russia, China, and potentially Iran. This goal was evident
     in early 1996 when Primakov and his then-Iranian counterpart,
     Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, issued a joint statement
     describing the foreign military presence in the Persian Gulf as
     "totally unacceptable."3 Moscow and Beijing already have come
     together in what their leaders refer to as a "strategic
     partnership"4 and would like Iran, and possibly India and France,
     to join their efforts as well. The goal of Primakov's policy
     obviously is to weaken U.S. influence in the Middle East and in
     Eurasia, and to establish Russia in the Middle East as a power
     equal to the United States. Under Primakov, Russia seems intent on
     excluding the United States from influencing issues involving the
     former Soviet area while strengthening China's position.

     A partnership consisting of Russia, China, and Iran would be
     dangerous for the United States and its allies. It could pose a
     serious threat to stability in the Persian Gulf and the Taiwan
     Strait. It could endanger the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to
     the West if the extremist regimes in Iran or Iraq, with Russia's
     encouragement, were to break out of their international isolation
     and pursue aggressive policies toward their neighbors. Such a
     strategy, which can be called "the Primakov doctrine," could
     increase instability throughout Europe and Asia and entangle the
     United States in regional conflicts in Eurasia. In short, it would
     turn Russia's relations with the United States into a zero-sum
     game.

     THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD WAR

     The roots of this strategy go back to the Cold War, which gave
     birth to shrewd foreign policy operators such as Russia's current
     foreign minister, Evgenii Primakov. Primakov was the
     quintessential Soviet establishment insider. He was born in Kiev
     in 1929. In the 1950s, while working for the Russian broadcasting
     authority, he was trained by the Soviet KGB as an Oriental scholar
     and speaker of Arabic and English.5 In the 1960s, he rose to the
     position of head of the Arabic broadcasting service of Radio
     Moscow. In 1962, he began working for the International Department
     of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party as a senior
     commentator and Pravda correspondent in the Middle East.6 He
     became the expert on the Middle East for Leonid Brezhnev's
     government.

     Primakov played an important role in the 1970s and 1980s in
     formulating the Soviet Union's policy in the Middle East and South
     Asia. He authored the Communist Party's most authoritative
     ideological justification for the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. In
     his writings, he has lamented the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war as a
     diversion from the struggle against imperialism and the United
     States, while calling for the Palestine Liberation Organization
     (PLO) to overcome its internal differences in order to pursue its
     struggle against Israel. Primakov has befriended and supported
     Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Hafez al-Assad of Syria, Muammar Qaddafi
     of Libya, and Yasser Arafatæleaders of the anti-American camp in
     the Middle East. He maintains close personal relations with these
     leaders to this day.

     After serving as director of two prestigious government think
     tanks, the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of
     International Economics and Foreign Relations, Primakov became
     chairman of the upper house of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1989. In
     September of that year, he became a Candidate Member of the Soviet
     Politburo.

     In late 1990 and January 1991, as special advisor to Mikhail
     Gorbachev, Primakov undertook two last-minute missions to prevent
     the Gulf War. He sought a resolution that would allow Iraq to
     retain occupied Kuwait while preventing the United States from
     using force against Saddam. These missions were designed to
     undermine then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who
     had pursued a policy of cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition.

     In September 1991, Primakov became the last chief of the First
     Main Directorate (foreign intelligence division) of the KGB and
     First Deputy to the Chairman of the KGB. In late 1991, he served
     as head of the Central Intelligence Service, which in December
     1991 became known as the Foreign Intelligence Service of the
     Russian Federation (SVRR). Thus, Primakov supervised the seamless
     transition of that service from Soviet to Russian control. In this
     capacity, he was in charge of supervising major Russian
     intelligence spies in the United States, such as the Central
     Intelligence Agency's former counterintelligence chief Aldrich
     Ames.

     During 1991 and 1992, a parliamentary investigation of organized
     mass theft of property and financial fraud estimated that billions
     of dollars had been illegally laundered and held abroad in bank
     accounts for Communist Party and KGB officials. Lawmakers
     concluded that all detailed records rested with the Foreign
     Intelligence Service and other agencies, and they called on
     Yeltsin to instruct Primakov's agency to cooperate and track down
     the funds. Primakov, however, asked Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan
     Khasbulatov to shut down the investigative commission, and
     Khasbulatov complied.7

     When Yeltsin fired his first foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, in
     December 1995, Primakov assumed the position.8 Unlike his
     predecessor, Primakov managed to consolidate institutional support
     from the Moscow-based bureaucracy, the Duma, the armed forces, and
     the media. Russians of all political stripes uniformly praise him
     as a professional, a tough negotiator, and an outstanding
     bureaucratic infighter. Duma deputies from the Communist and
     nationalist opposition who loathed the allegedly pro-Western
     Kozyrev were pleased with his nomination. Deputies from Yabloko,
     the social democrat opposition led by Grigory Yavlinsky,9 and from
     the center-right parties also lauded him.

     Primakov is a realist and a flexible tactician in pursuit of
     Russia's strategic goals, skilled in dealing with setbacks. For
     example, he was able to put a positive spin on Russia's Founding
     Agreement with NATO which paved the way for the alliance's
     enlargement; and he praised development of energy resources in the
     Caspian Sea area by multinational oil and gas companies-something
     Russia had opposed in the past. For many in the Russian power
     elite, Primakov articulates the country's yearning for recognition
     as a great power, even after the collapse of the USSR, as well as
     its widespread resentment of the United States, which many in
     Moscow see as the winner of the Cold War. Such bitterness may prod
     Russia, through Primakov, to challenge America's interests and
     allies and to attempt to create hostile coalitions.

     PRIMAKOV'S VIEW: A BRAVE NEW MULTIPOLAR WORLD

     According to various staff members of the foreign ministry in
     Moscow, Primakov views Russia's international role as preventing a
     monopolar world dominated by a single superpower.10 In speeches,
     articles, and press conferences, he states incessantly that the
     post-Cold War world is developing along several poles, or focal
     points, which include the United States, Russia (with CIS
     countries), the European Union, China, Japan, the Association of
     South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Latin America.11 Primakov's
     world view has no place for a single superpower, despite the
     current dominant status of the United States.

     By promoting this multipolar model, Primakov is attempting to
     dilute American international power. His version of multipolarity
     also provides cover for a Russian-Chinese strategic partnership
     which may welcome the Islamic Republic of Iran as a junior
     partner. Such a coalition could challenge the United States in two
     vital regions: the Persian Gulf and the Taiwan Strait. In
     addition, Primakov wants an exclusive Russian sphere of influence
     in the Caucasus and Central Asia. He claims that CIS countries
     must integrate with Russia; he supports union with Belarus; and he
     advocates Russia's use of force in the former Soviet region.

     The China Connection. Since 1991, the Russian military-industrial
     complex has been selling China its most advanced weapons,
     including ballistic missile systems, nuclear weapons technologies,
     and modern aircraft, at a cost of at least $2 billion per year.
     China's military modernization program is aimed primarily at
     establishing control over the Taiwan Strait. It may also be
     designed to challenge Taiwan militarily in just a few years. Such
     a scenario, which would hinder the ability of the United States to
     project power and influence in Asia, would be advantageous to
     Russia under the premises of the Primakov doctrine. The leaders of
     Russia and China are calling their relationship a "strategic
     partnership for the 21st century."

     Evgenii of Arabia. Primakov is also working to strengthen
     America's foes and weaken its allies in the Middle East. He is
     personally leading Russia's rapprochement with Tehran and is
     supporting involvement by the Russian natural gas monopoly
     Gazpromætogether with the French company Total-in developing gas
     fields and pipelines in Iran. He approves of legitimate civilian
     nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran while flatly denying
     that Russia is supplying nuclear weapons technology, ballistic
     missile systems, or other modern weapons to the ayatollahsædespite
     ample evidence from intelligence sources to the contrary.12

     In the most recent crisis involving Iraq, Primakov put together a
     coalition in the U.N. Security Council, which included Russia,
     China, and France, to oppose the use of force by the United States
     against Saddam Hussein. He promised Saddam that he would work for
     the lifting of sanctions and even demanded that Iraq's
     self-proclaimed "progress" in complying with U.N. decisions be
     recognized.13

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Part 2 continues in next post