Carrol
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Protracted guerrilla war foreseen for US in Afghanistan - Stratfor03-11-02 Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2002 14:54:44 -1000 From: Ralph Johansen <michele at MAUI.NET> Reply-To: Discussions on the Socialist Register and its articles<SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YorkU.CA> To: SOCIALIST-REGISTER at YORKU.CA
"Finally, the U.S. war against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan is turning into a war by the United States, its Western allies and local collaborators against various forces that are united behind one goal: to get rid of foreign occupation. The Taliban is just a part of this emerging anti- foreign consensus. This bears a striking resemblance to Afghan unity against Soviet occupiers backed by weak collaborators. A very dangerous indicator of this trend is evident in Operation Anaconda: Hundreds of local tribesmen and some Pushtuns from Pakistan moved to help Taliban guerrillas once the U.S. troops arrived in Paktia."
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S T R A T F O R
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11 March 2002 Operation Anaconda: Questionable Outcomes for United States
Summary
Operation Anaconda signals the beginning of a new phase of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. In this phase insurgency and counterinsurgency operations will become the main feature. Militarily, Operation Anaconda shows the United States has yet to find an effective response on the ground to guerrilla warfare. Dominant air power will remain the only sufficient means to win battles, but it might not be enough to win the war in Afghanistan.
Analysis
Operation Anaconda, the fiercest battle in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, continued March 8, with the U.S. command claiming that complete victory was near after the deaths of several hundred al Qaeda fighters. Islamic news agencies, meanwhile, claimed the operation has been a failure: They say only a few dozen militants holed up in snowy mountain caves have been killed and that U.S. losses have been significantly higher than the eight dead and 40 wounded that officials have acknowledged.
Because journalists do not have access to the battle area in the eastern Afghan province of Paktia, Western media have mostly cited Pentagon sources. However none of the claims made by either side can be confirmed independently. With that in mind, STRATFOR is trying to reconstruct what has happened and to ascertain the ramifications Operation Anaconda will have for Afghanistan and the broader U.S. war on terrorism. We base our analysis on a critical study of available sources and on human intelligence sources from the region.
Ultimately Operation Anaconda will not finish off al Qaeda or even the Taliban fighters. Instead it signals the beginning of a protracted guerrilla war that will allow Afghanistan to continue to serve as sanctuary for al Qaeda. A guerrilla war -- against which the United States has found only one effective answer, overwhelming air power -- also could affect Washington's timeline for fighting terrorism in other parts of the world.
It appears to us that Operation Anaconda began after U.S. commanders received intelligence from warlord Zadran (also known as Badsha Khan), who controls much of Khost, the province east of Paktia. Zadran's information has proven questionable in the past, prompting U.S. forces to attack and kill innocent Afghans he had identified as Taliban or al Qaeda members. The biggest blunder occurred Dec. 20, when Zadran triggered the U.S. blitz of a convoy of Paktia's elders that killed about 65 people.
Zadran has a vested interest in talking the United States into attacking his rivals from Paktia: He is lobbying the government in Kabul to add both Paktia and Paktika provinces to his fief, which would make him the most powerful warlord in southeastern Afghanistan. More to the point, Zadran attempted to take Gardez, the capital of Paktia, a month ago but was repulsed by locals. Nevertheless the United States continues to rely on his information because Zadran, for his own purposes, eagerly puts his forces at the U.S. command's disposal, as is the case with Operation Anaconda.
Acting on his information, the United States launched an operation March 2 against what Zadran apparently reported was a group of 150 al Qaeda fighters hiding 60 miles south of Gardez. U.S. officials did not realize that enemy forces in the area were actually much larger and that al Qaeda represented only a fraction of those fighters. Most -- and in fact, the command -- were Taliban forces. Saifur Rahman, a young Taliban commander who is related to a respected Afghan mujahideen and tribal leader, has led the battle against the United States in recent days. His fighters, all locals with several years of guerrilla experience and intimate familiarity with the region, launched surprise attacks on allied forces. Rahman was behind the first ambush of about 100 U.S. troops on March 2 in which a U.S. soldier was killed.
The fact that Afghan guerrilla war veterans command and comprise the bulk of anti-U.S. forces in the region is the main reason the operation did not go as planned and the United States suffered its heaviest losses so far in Afghanistan. Consider that all U.S. helicopters engaged in Operation Anaconda were struck the very first day, with one downed and five disabled, as U.S. forces acknowledge.
Taliban fighters did not have surface-to-air missiles; all choppers were hit by small-arms fire and grenade launchers. This level of marksmanship, using inferior weapons, could be developed only through years of guerrilla warfare in the same mountains where the battle now is being fought. It is local Taliban fighters, not al Qaeda, who have mastered such skills and who fought guerrilla war at high altitudes during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. Ambushes such as that of six U.S. soldiers, who were killed just after landing March 2, were frequent in the 1980s.
At first U.S. commanders hoped to use Afghan units as the main striking force in Operation Anaconda. But Afghan forces showed low combat capabilities and morale on the first day: Under heavy fire they immediately retreated and in some cases ran away. As a result about 1,000 U.S. forces were deployed with other allies almost immediately on the ground, and more are now coming to the area. But this option has not worked well: Coalition ground forces have come under heavy fire and suffered losses, and helicopters also proved vulnerable.
Tactics therefore changed again. Since March 4 the U.S. Air Force has played by far the main role in the operation, with a vast majority of air strikes delivered by aircraft flying at altitudes safe from the Taliban's small arms. B-52s, AC-130s and devastating vacuum bombs are heavily used, and A-10 ground attack planes and Cobra gunships are moving to the area as well. U.S. ground forces are still in Shahi Khot, where the fighting is, but not within firing distance of diehard militants hiding in snow- covered caves. The ground forces' task is to block escape routes and navigate U.S. air strikes. The plan now is to bomb Taliban fighters until all are dead, as they will not surrender. However that would not be enough to consider the operation a success, contrary to what a U.S. military spokesman has said. A ground force at some point should move to the caves and ascertain that everyone there is killed or captured. For that, new U.S. and Afghan reinforcements are being shifted to the area.
Within several days, the United States is likely to capture many caves from where militants fire, but some enemy hideouts -- hidden in deep snow and rocks -- will never be found. Some 100 to 200 diehard fighters in the caves are likely to be killed in the near term, but that will not mean the United States has won either the last major battle with al Qaeda or the last major battle of the Afghan war, as some Pentagon representatives and mass media have claimed.
Those battling the United States from caves represent only a small portion of Taliban forces in the region and a tiny portion of their forces nationwide. Furthermore, by their resistance to death, these fighters fulfill a diversion mission that benefits other Taliban forces -- fighters who have never holed up in the caves but are on the loose seeking opportunities for new ambushes. This is a classic guerrilla tactic: Dozens of militants draw the attention of U.S. units while guerrilla groups in the rear of the attackers stage hit-and-run operations. The United States was able to destroy one hit-and-run force, numbering about 50 people, with air strikes before fighters dispersed into smaller groups, but other guerrilla units remain active.
It is worth noting that Taliban forces have slipped away from known positions before, outwitting allied forces. This occurred in November, when Taliban fighters abandoned Afghanistan's cities with almost no losses only to regroup in the countryside and prepare for future battles. These weathered warriors are too skillful to simply lie still and wait for U.S. air power to destroy their main forces.
In the end, as diversionary forces draw fire in the caves, much of the main guerrilla force will escape through mountain paths known only to locals. There is no way for even several thousand U.S. and allied troops to block all the routes in this rugged, snow-covered terrain. Again, recent history provides a lesson: Coalition forces claimed late last year that hundreds of enemies were killed during the bombing of Tora Bora, but when the fighting was over, fewer than 10 prisoners were taken and few corpses were found.
The biggest reason most of the Taliban fighters will likely disappear again is that local Pushtuns do not cooperate with the United States: Pro-U.S. troops consist of Pushtuns from the neighboring provinces of Logar and Khost, but many locals favor the Taliban. Indeed, a majority of anti-U.S. forces in the region are locals themselves, including their commander-in-chief, Rahman.
What lessons and implications can be drawn from Operation Anaconda?
First, there is no end to the war in Afghanistan -- or of U.S. involvement there -- on the horizon. STRATFOR has long said that Taliban fighters would regroup and launch a long guerrilla war. This is what is happening now. The guerrilla action is being led mostly by local Afghans rather than foreign militants and thus is especially dangerous. This tactic also creates favorable conditions for foreign Islamic radicals, including al Qaeda, to continue to use the country for sanctuary and training purposes despite the fact that a pro-U.S. group holds power in Kabul. For this reason U.S. ground and air forces are unlikely to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. More operations like Anaconda and more guerrilla attacks lie ahead. Although the United States and its allies likely will be able to hold major cities, they will find it difficult or impossible to control much of the countryside.
Second, Operation Anaconda shows that local U.S. allies are relatively weak and lack sufficient will to contain guerrilla forces -- even with extensive air support -- let alone defeat them. Thus the United States will have to send more ground troops to Afghanistan, signaling longer and heavier U.S. involvement in this war. That in turn may affect Washington's plans to fight terrorism in other parts of the world.
Third, the United States so far has found only one effective tool against guerrilla forces that strike from difficult terrain: overwhelming air power. U.S. commanders still must think how to deploy ground forces and helicopters in order to minimize losses and ensure success on the ground. The current situation -- in which relatively small, diversionary groups of militants are killed while a major force escapes air strikes and emerges in other areas to strike again -- cannot be considered success.
Finally, the U.S. war against al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan is turning into a war by the United States, its Western allies and local collaborators against various forces that are united behind one goal: to get rid of foreign occupation. The Taliban is just a part of this emerging anti- foreign consensus. This bears a striking resemblance to Afghan unity against Soviet occupiers backed by weak collaborators. A very dangerous indicator of this trend is evident in Operation Anaconda: Hundreds of local tribesmen and some Pushtuns from Pakistan moved to help Taliban guerrillas once the U.S. troops arrived in Paktia. ___________________________________________________________________
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