A couple of days ago Johnson's Russia List ran a transcript of a press conference with a group of Russian foreign-policy mucky-mucks on Russia-US relations and the "war on terror." I thought people might find some bits interesting, which I attach below. If anybody wants the whole thing -- which is about 20 pages long -- I can forward it or it could probably be found using google.
Chris Doss The Russia Journal ------------------
TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS AFTER THE ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 11
[RIA NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY, 11:00, MARCH 12, 2002] SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/)
Kortunov: Good day, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to begin with an apology for some replacements in our team. First, Yuri Mikhailovich Baturin is unable to take part although he was the key figure in preparing the document. Pyotr Ivanovich Ladygin was also to take part in the press conference, but he has fallen ill. With your permission, we have another worthy general, Dvorkin Vladimir Zinovyevich whom many of you know. And perhaps he can't totally replace the absentees by as far as nuclear affairs are concerned and nuclear terrorism is concerned, he can answer your possible questions even more competently.
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Zolotaryov: I would like to say just a few words to give a little bit more insight into the problem of international terrorism and its causes. Everybody is talking about military actions being carried out by the US in Afghanistan. But strictly speaking, what is happening there may be relatively called a fight against international terrorism.
The root causes of international terrorism are as follows. First of all, it's the heritage left behind by special services since the Cold War when -- (audio break) --
Second, the processes of globalization and accompanying events. Third, a systemic crisis of the world order, that is the unstable condition of the world that some call one-polar and others multi-polar. As we know, only a bipolar system is stable, if we are talking about a self-developing system.
I will not dwell upon the first cause -- the heritage of special services -- except, perhaps, for the fact that what Western special services created turned out to be more enduring because it was based on the ideology and extremist trends of Islam. This ideology turned out to be more lasting and applicable in the current conditions.
Sometimes even the poorest nations, which become even poorer due to globalization, are beginning to pool under the green banners of extremist Islamic trends. The second cause is globalization. It divides countries into very rich and very poor, into very weak and very strong. And very often, very poor countries have no other ways of fighting very rich countries but terror.
Another factor that accompanies globalization is the appearance of transnational corporations, including criminal ones. And they do not have anything else to lean on but international terrorism. Plus, a systemic crisis of the single-polar world. These are the causes of international terrorism.
The fight against international terrorism does not eliminate these causes. So apparently the US and other countries, including Russia, should revise their priorities. As for our relations with the US, I think we still have megalomania by inertia as we claim that everything the US does in the field of defense is directed against Russia. It's not directed against Russia, it's directed against the whole world, because the US clearly and openly stated its strategic goal -- retain its leadership. And it is taking concrete measures to achieve this goal, including in the field of defense.
So, we must be realistic on the one hand, but on the other hand, if we have made our choice in the system of values -- and we have chosen democratic values -- we must proceed from the premise that there will be no confrontation with the US. But at the same time, I think we can't speak about tactical or strategic partnership because the sole leader must always feel certain counteraction from his partners. In the international arena, such partners for the US are European countries, including Russia, but again taking into account its Eurasian nature.
I think we must not talk about Russia's weakness because Russia's strength is not in its economic and military might but in the spiritual and intellectual potential, in certain moral principles which influence Russia's foreign policy. I think that when demand for moral principles in foreign policy in the world grows, Russia will become a more and more important player. And I think that jointly with Europe Russia will be able to serve as a healthy opponent, but not a confronting force -- there is no point in talking about attempts to drive a wedge between Europe and the Americans -- an opponent to the US, thus making it possible in the temporary one-polar status of the world to work out a more reasonable policy and avoid making a transition to bipolar world through confrontation between north and south. I can see a future role for Russia there. Thank you.
I am sorry, I forgot to introduce myself. I am retired general Zolotaryov Pavel Semyonovich, President of the Interregional Independent Fund in Support of Military Reform.
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Konovalov: My name is Konovalov Alexander Alexandrovich. I am President of the Strategic Assessments Institute. I would like to single out two points in the report. First, the Russian foreign policy strategy after September 11 involved a choice, a choice between civilizations. It should not be construed in terms of concessions. It is not a choice in favor of Christianity and against Islam. Such a choice would be disastrous for Russia. The same is probably true for most countries of the world. It is a choice between democratic values, the values of human rights and freedoms and totalitarianism, violence and terrorism as a form of solving state problems.
I think the consequences of the events on September 11 will be long lasting because they changed the strategic landscape dramatically. We argued a lot whether it should be described as a strategic change, a decisive change and so on. Several definitions are warranted. But several things are already obvious. First, in the face of new threats not a single country, no matter how strong and how rich it is, can assure its security single-handed. The euphoria in the United States over the brilliant success in Afghanistan will pass. In fact, there were no brilliant military successes in Afghanistan. It was more of a trade and economic operation than a military operation. The land forces involved numbered a little more than a regiment.
Actually, bombings even with high precision weapons, have shown that one can pound the mountains for a long time without any success and you cannot bomb out ideology. And finally, another thought which has already been formulated very professionally by Vladimir Zinovyevich is that we will have to revise many concepts. Although we have made a choice civilization-wise, it is unclear whether the West will welcome it, or on the contrary, will assume that this is just a natural choice of Russia's. But many concepts will have to be revised, both military-strategic and political.
For example, the well-known concept of deterrence. A paradoxical situation is arising. Where deterrence has any military-strategic meaning, for example between Russia and the US, deterrence is not needed because there is no confrontation and there won't be a confrontation and there are no contradictions that would make it necessary for us to deter each other from some actions by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. And where deterrence is indeed necessary, where terrorists or terrorist organizations need to be deterred and terrorist acts and regional conflicts need to be prevented, nuclear deterrence is totally ineffective.
In general, how can you deter a person who has tied explosives to his body and is prepared to sacrifice his life in order to take as many lives around him as possible? He cannot be deterred by the threat of death. He has already chose death. And it makes even less sense to deter ideological extremists.
So, I think there is a lot of work to be done, work together with the West in many areas. One shouldn't entertain great expectations. Russia in general tends to expect a great deal from its partners before being disappointed. Russia has a highly feminine character in political terms. First, we do not notice shortcomings and then we cannot forgive them.
So, we should proceed from our own interests that should be clearly understood and spelled out. We have backed and joined the anti-terrorist operation not to curry favor with America but to liquidate Al Qaeda close to our borders. And for the first time Russia has acted not as a foot soldier of Europe and the West paying with blood to achieve its political goals. On the contrary, we promoted our own goals and national interests on the money of American taxpayers which bought the bombs that were dropped on these targets and with the help of the Northern Alliance which we have backed and provided with weapons, with some external financial assistance. At least Iran took an active part in it.
So, I think the main thing is a clear idea of our interests and corresponding actions and an awareness that there is no other option. But we are moving in that direction not because we want to please the West, but because it meets our objective needs today and tomorrow. Thank you.
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Konovalov: If you don't mind, I would like to add a couple of things to the question about Iraq first. I think the US is trying if not to garner the support of the world community then at least find out if such an action will not cause an explosion in the Arab world. This is what US Vice President Cheney is doing now touring Middle East countries.
I think the US public opinion is ready for carrying out an operation against Iraq under all circumstances, with or without the blessings of the international community. There is a bipartisan consensus on this issue in the US -- Iraq must be punished.
I fully agree with Sergei Vadimovich that our task is to prevent this from happening outside the Security Council. There are means to prevent this, and these means are quite impressive. And there are possibilities for this too. But what if this happens all the same? I think we must not go into hysterics and make a pause because America which has already bogged down in Afghanistan, America which has already moved into the Philippines and which has almost moved into Yemen, if it begins an operation in Iraq -- there is no Northern Alliance in Iraq, and it would be very unwise to count on Kurd communists as manpower that could be used in the fight against the Saddam Hussein regime, or to think that the Arab world will not respond or explode and that this will not affect the situation in Israel, some already say that the Americans have changed Yemen for Iraq, perhaps temporarily, because they fear the consequences of such an action not for themselves, but for Israel.
So, I think that if the Americans get into Iraq in spite the will of the international community, this will be one of the biggest stupidities on their part, and in this case we will simply have to step aside and let the situation develop by its own scenario. Let them realize what fighting feels like, although there will be no quick victory in Iraq -- victory is a rather relative term here -- like in Afghanistan. And a coalition will also be in question. I don't know how European countries will react.
In other words, the price the Americans will have to pay for this will be incomparably higher than the price they paid for Afghanistan. I have big doubts that this will be justified. But I repeat, if they do such a stupid thing, we must not participate in it and we must not go into hysterics because of this.
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