I explained last fall that I'd had plopped in my lap a load of books and documents about AlQ and the Taliban, stuff that was written in the 80s. Remember, part of what we do has to do with research on terrorism. If you read this material--with a big ol' salt lick nearby--it's quite clear that the Taliban don't have visions of world domination. They are ultra-rightwing nationalists, but I don't see them as anywhere close to wanting to subsume any and all in their path. Not to mention that religious movements tend to rationalize--grow into formalized bureaucracies--and that tempers the fanaticism as they turn to this-worldly pursuits. I see Al-Q as, basically, a quasi-rationalized (but networked) gang of drug runners, gun runners, etc. with definite stakes in a this wordly orientation. They use anti-imperialist sentiments in their favor, to recruit and to command loyalty to a charismatic leadership. That our plane bombers weren't highly religious ought to be a big klew x four!
In that sense, they may not operate that much differently than your beloved IAC, for both cynically marshal anti-imperialist sentiments. IF you can see how IAC leadership can become dissociated from its roots (ideological fervor) in order to become a network of cynical leaders who take advantage of true believers and useful idiots, then you can see how that happens with AlQ. And, if you can see that, then you can see how the AlQ can be bought off in far more creative ways than the "account deficit" that runs this country have mustered thus far.
kelley