the State Duma, contributed this article to The Moscow Times. The views expressed are his own.
Predicting how long President Vladimir Putin will be able to sustain his pro-Western foreign policy without getting much in return has become the latest growth industry among political pundits on both sides of the Atlantic.
The cliched argument is that Putin courageously stands alone among the hostile foreign policy and military elite who deeply resent his latest rapprochement with the United States, his support for certain U.S. policies and his acquiescence in Russia's failure to secure its traditional interests
on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, NATO expansion and U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the North Caucasus.
The argument then runs that the only way for Putin to sustain his pro-Western course is if he is swiftly rewarded with symbolic deliverables by the West; otherwise domestic opposition to his policies will gel and Putin will share in the fate of his predecessors Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.
As the U.S. and Russian presidents prepare for their summit meeting in Moscow next week, the race is on to predict what "carrots" George W. Bush needs to bring with him to make Putin's pro-Western course more palatable domestically and to help him look better in the eyes of his countrymen.
This is really old thinking on the part of the West that should be offensive
to Putin and to any self-respecting Russian. It betrays a perfunctory and highly stereotyped analysis of Russian politics and it also exposes the cynically condescending way that many in the West tend to view Russia.
Few seem to be aware that the empty talk about the "right carrots for Putin"
is doing more political damage to the Russian president than the absence of those rewards per se.
It sounds extremely patronizing and creates the perception of a secret cabal
to sell out Russia's interests for some personal political gain. Moreover, it portrays Putin before the Russian public as being in the pocket of the West and creates an incentive for the Kremlin to distance itself from pro-Western
policies in case the political baggage becomes too heavy.
Putin has been consistent in saying that his push to create a new cooperative agenda for Russia's relations with the West, particularly after Sept. 11, has nothing to do with expectations of a possible political and economic payoff.
He has steadfastly refused "to haggle over the price."
There are three major reasons for this.
First, Putin appears to genuinely believe that realigning Russia with the West is the right thing to do given the current geopolitical realities. He rightly keeps saying that such a policy is inherently in Russia's interests as it is the only course that can provide the necessary external conditions for Russia's economic and social resuscitation and eventual rebirth as a great power.
Having spent the first year in office trying to implement the "Primakov doctrine" (building a multipolar world as a constraint on U.S. dominance), Putin was perceptive and flexible enough to see how untenable and dangerous this policy was.
It was not lost on him that collecting North Korean and Cuban endorsements for the ABM Treaty was not greatly advancing Russia's cause.
Positioning Russia as a trusted friend of the West would give Moscow much more leverage on Western and U.S. policy.
Putin's choice was a very careful pragmatic calculation, not an emotional impulse prompted by the events of Sept. 11. Where Gorbachev and Yeltsin's rapprochement with the West was a high-stakes gamble, Putin's move is a well-thought-out strategy -- and you do not expect to be rewarded for doing something that is so squarely in your interests and that you have been planning for some time.
Second, Putin's foreign policy instincts were shaped during Gorbachev's perestroika. He seems to be acutely aware that no measure of foreign policy success and international prestige can sustain a presidency if your economic
policy is a dismal failure in the eyes of your own people. Putin is a strong
adherent of the "It's the economy, stupid" school.
Lastly, Putin saw Gorbachev and Yeltsin taken to pieces politically for humiliatingly seeking "Western rewards" for what many in Russia saw as unilateral concessions. Bartering weapons cuts for food aid, trade credits and IMF loans created such a disastrous perception of Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's foreign policy among the Russian public that it became a major domestic political liability and facilitated the coalescence of their vocal opponents.
Putin learned the lesson well. He is deliberately keeping expectations low and has begun (although somewhat late) to publicly make a political case for
his pro-Western foreign policy. He is not standing alone and has a viable political base in the growing Russian entrepreneurial class which is hungry for acceptance in the West. His low-key tactics make the policy sustainable (and, of course, dominating the entire political scene in Russia clearly helps).
Putin is right not to beg the West for petty rewards. He is after something more important and priceless -- reputation and respect.
His objective is to turn Russia into an internationally respected country on
its own merits, primarily through deep internal restructuring and responsible international behavior. He wants Russians to respect themselves for their economic achievements and see their country genuinely admired internationally.
Like his friend British Prime Minister Tony Blair he may be carefully positioning Russia as a "pivotal force for good" in the 21st century.