Two weeks after flower sellers were killed in the southern Russian city of Vladikavkaz , 42 Red Army veterans, children, and marching band members have been killed and 130 others injured in Dagestan. Was this a show of strength by Islamists following the killing of Chechnya's most ruthless and fearsome warlord ? Was it revenge for the arrest of a more minor Dagestani warmonger, as the Dagestani police believe? Could it conceivably be the work of someone in the Russian establishment, as a former KGB higher-up has suggested ? Could it have been carried out by someone disaffected by the gaping chasm between Dagestan's rich and poor, or frustrated by what had seemed to be the increasingly strong position of the republic's leaders? Typically, to outsiders these seem mad reasons for such indiscriminate mayhem, but plausible to insiders.
As usual, Chechen links are suspected. On this occasion, the argument seems plausible to an outsider. What better day than Victory Day for radical Islamist Chechen fighters to show that they remain undefeated, despite the death of warlord Khattab? And, despite the deaths of children, the principal target of the attack--a military band--suggests a military message on Russia's most important day of military symbolism. In any case, many Chechen civilians and foreign hostages could testify to the extremists' disregard for civilian lives.
But no Chechen group has claimed responsibility. If Khattab's followers wanted to send a message, there seems little reason for them not to have put their signatures on it. Perhaps, then, the intent was simply terror: faceless men with no name or known creed intent on sowing confusion and fear.
The first task of the authorities must surely be to provide some clarification. They must prove, for a change, that the alacrity of the Dagestani police in seizing suspects was more than the usual sudden and unconvincing roundup of the usual suspects.
The second task is to fashion a coherent policy toward terrorism and Chechnya, but the early signs are not convincing. Perhaps President Vladimir Putin's speechwriters were simply reaching for the most convenient simile on Victory Day, but surely they could have done better than to tell the people of the Caucasus that terrorists would be treated as Nazis. Too many people in the region know what that meant in World War II: the shunting of whole peoples--Chechens included--to the steppes for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Whatever the reasoning, this was unfortunately in keeping with Putin's usual verbal extremism in all matters relating to the Chechens.
Perhaps strong actions will follow the strong words. As Putin promised: "During [World War II], there was a slogan, 'Tread on the viper.' And it was destroyed. Difficult as the tasks facing us today are, they will be carried out." That may be good rhetoric to Russian ears, but the insensitive application of force and the creation of an ever more authoritarian regime would surely make for bad politics in Dagestan, known as a "mountain of languages" and the most complex mosaic of peoples in the northern Caucasus.
And if Chechens are deemed to be the "vipers," rather than keeping to Russia's current strong-arm approach--which has frequently meant rape, torture, and death for Chechens--Putin should be a strong politician and follow the example of the late General Aleksandr Lebed by pursuing peace in Chechnya.
Pursuing peace now, after a terrorist attack, might seem to be craven weakness. But there is no good time, and delay merely promises further destabilization of the region. Secondly, given that progress in this war comes in geological time, the chances of an initiative coming soon after this attack are remote. Thirdly, no one can argue that Russia has been weak in its response to alleged Chechen terrorism. And, most important, peace should of course be pursued with those that want peace. Doing so would address Putin's fundamental problem regarding Chechnya--his failure to distinguish between the Chechens' national cause and the cause of extreme Islamist fighters and users of terror among them.
The first step should surely be to recognize Aslan Maskhadov for what he is: the president of Chechnya, elected in a 1997 vote accepted by Russia and rated by international observers as free and fair. Of course, Maskhadov's peacetime rule between 1996 and 1999 was not stable or peaceful. But to demand peace and stability before negotiations can start or expect it afterwards would be unrealistic given the brutalization, destruction, and radicalization of Chechen society in the two Chechen wars and--before that--the communists' failure to create any kind of Chechen nomenklatura that would have been capable of exerting greater control after 1991.
Coming to terms with a moderate rebel leader such as Maskhodov seems to be Russia's best option. The Chechens are unlikely ever to unite behind the pro-Moscow Chechen administration. The Russian military appears unable to win this war (and profiteers are merely feeding the Chechen war effort). And, given the ties between extremists in Chechnya and extreme Islamist movements, if things stay as they are, the chances for an Afghan scenario will grow, with war and chronic instability encouraging radical Islamic fundamentalism. With some kind of peace, Russians and moderate Chechens could struggle against at least one common enemy--militant Islam.
The shame is that Putin appears to view the more moderate Chechen leaders as if they cannot be negotiated with, as if they were Hitler (or at least Hitler after 1939). The preconditions for talks finally presented to Maskhadov in November 2001 equated to total surrender. Putin needs to purge his thinking--and not just his language--of World War II rhetoric and imagery. This is not a war where total surrender is the only option.