Zizek: Are We in a War?

[Michael McIntyre]

Pakistani intelligence is far more closely tied to al-Qaeda and Taliban than is Saudi intelligence.  ISI created and managed the "Arab Afghan" troops in the 1980s.  They sponsored the network of madrassas out of which the theocratic fascist supporters of both al Qaeda and Taliban came.  They intervened in Afghanistan to bring Taliban to power, and to sustain it there.  They gave and continue to give support to the network of al Qaeda camps that stretched across northern Pakistan and into "Azad Kashmir".  Even as late as the siege of Kunduz, late last year, the US agreed to hold back for a day so that ISI could airlift its officers out of Kunduz before the final assault.  (They also used this opportunity to airlift Taliban and al Qaeda cadre out of Kunduz).  Now, the leaders of both al Qaeda and Taliban (the ones we were ostensibly in Afghanistan to get) have taken refuge in Pakistan.  And here's the ass-kicker: ISI is not an instrument of the Pakistani state; ISI for all int!
en!
ts and purposes IS the Pakistani state.  No chief executive of Pakistan since Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who fell afoul of ISI has managed to stay in office.

So, saying we should "deal with" the Pakistani intelligence agencies covers a lot of ground.  So far we've dealt with them, alright - as in "let's make a deal".  But if we really are serious about our announced aims in going into Afghanistan - aims that have NOT been achieved - then we're going to have to "deal" with ISI in a very different fashion.  And how far are you willing to go along those lines?  This is not a rhetorical question.

My frustration with the "do somethings" is not their denunciation of al Qaeda and Taliban, but their failure to recognize just how deeply al Qaeda and Taliban are tied into the set of US alliances in the region.  o far, we're trying to prosecute a war against them without disentangling ourselves from the set of alliances that gave them birth.  Predictably, we have therefore failed to roll up the al Qaeda network, since Pakistan, not Afghanistan, is its real redoubt.  When it comes to the question of what to do about Pakistan, the "do somethings" - quite rightly - see complications, and hesitate.  What are we to do?  Fight a nuclear capable state with hundreds of thousands of troops?  Let India do the job for us, with the risk that Lahore and Delhi end up as glowing ruins?

A little knowledge of the region made all of this foreseeable some months ago.  Our intervention has had the positive side-effect of removing Taliban from power (although its replacements are horrible - just not quite AS horrible).  But if dismantling the terror network really is its primary intended effect - and here I'm accepting the announced aims of our action at face value - then we have so far failed and now face choices far more treacherous than the choice of whether or not to smack around a basically defenseless country.

So, Peter, you seem equable and reasonable.  Seriously - what do you think ought to be done next on the subcontinent?

Michael McIntyre


>>> peterk at enteract.com 05/20/02 22:33 PM >>>

...

I feel for those who do, just as I feel for those who live in Pakistan and
India during this tense time. Israelis, meanwhile, should get their government
out of the occupied territories as the brave refuseniks are trying to do.
And I do think the US and its allies should try to deal with the Saudi and
Pakistani intelligence agencies who are funding the Islamic fascists.

...

Peter