After thinking about the US War on Terrorism more or less endlessly over the passed couple of months and reading Ali, Rashid and Esposito's books, I have started to think of the war as a game called A Thousand Vietnams.
Here is a quote (May, 1962) from Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie which I am re-reading in sections:
``Prior to leaving Saigon, he and Porter had agreed on a number of goals they saw as the foundation blocks for a strategy to reverse this losing course and win the war. As soldiers, their first priority was to develop offensive operations that would corner and destroy the main striking forces of the guerrillas. The current ARVN operation was appropriately know as `the sweep.' It consisted of marching several battalions across the countryside in dispersed columns. Porter had noted that the scheme of maneuver might be adequate for moving an armored division across North Germany, but it was hardly effective against guerrillas in rice-delta country. He wanted Vann to take advantage of the dexterity that the helicopter offered for landing and shifting assault troops and devise tactics that would stampede the best Viet Cong units into engagements in which they could be annihilated. To initiate these unconventional operations Vann was in turn to persuade Colonel Cao to accept a face-saving ploy that would give the Americans proxy control over the division. The euphemism for the ploy was `joint planning.' Under `joint planning,' Vann and Cao and their staffs would ostensibly plan operations together. In fact, the intent was to persuade Cao to carry out operations that Vann and his staff conceived.'' (50p)
So, here's a trick question. What's wrong with this picture? Why was the new dexterity of the helicopter and shifting assaults in flexible and centerless schemes of engagement just as doomed as the old fashioned column sweep?
The answer is actually provided in the paragraph just before the above quote:
``...While all of the peasantry in the northern Delta did not sympathize with the guerrillas, the majority either favored the Viet Cong cause or tacitly aided the Communists through the silence of a neutrality that worked against the Saigon government. Whether the neutrality was created by fear of guerrilla terrorism or by sympathy made no practical difference: the Saigon government lacked the cooperation of the peasantry, and cooperation was necessary to suppress the Communist-led insurrection. South Vietnam in 1962 was an overwhelmingly rural society; 85 percent of the population dwelt in the countryside. With his training in statistics, Vann was struck by the potential for the growth of the Communist guerrilla power in a society with sort of profile. All of the 2 million people in the division zone, except for the 15 percent who lived in My Tho and the other towns, were currently or potentially within reach of the Viet Cong....'' (50p)
It occurred to me that in all the eight hundred odd pages of Sheehan's history, he never mentioned what the Viet Cong said they wanted. So just for background, here are the stated political objectives of the Viet Cong (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1962vietcong1.html):
PROGRAM OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF VIETNAM January, 1962
1. We will overthrow the Ngo Dinh Diem government and form a national democratic coalition government.
2. We will carry out a program involving extension of democratic liberties, general amnesty for political detainees, abolition of agrovilles and resettlement centers, abolition of the special military tribunal law and other undemocratic laws.
3. We will abolish the economic monopoly of the U.S. and its henchmen, protect domestically made products, promote development of the economy, and allow forced evacuees from North Vietnam to return to their place of birth.
4. We will reduce land rent and prepare for land reform.
5. We will eliminate U.S. cultural enslavement and depravity and build a nationalistic progressive culture and education.
6. We will abolish the system of American military advisers and close all foreign military bases in Vietnam.
7. We will establish equality between men and women and among different nationalities and recognize the autonomous rights of the national minorities in the country.
8. We will pursue a foreign policy of peace and will establish diplomatic relations with all countries that respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam.
9. We will re-establish normal relations between North and South as a first step toward peaceful reunification of the country.
10. We will oppose aggressive wars and actively defend world peace.
Now, consider that the War on Terrorism is almost entirely composed of aggressive military solutions many of which are larger scaled versions of the flexible and centerless variety outlined in Sheehan. Next consider, that in most cases, the regions and countries where terrorist groups and their political allies originate are plagued with deeply conflicted political problems---not to mention the economic and cultural issues as well.
Of course I could be wrong, but I suspect, the likelihood of winning the War on Terrorism, is approximately equivalent to winning a thousand Vietnams. Hence the name of the game.
Chuck Grimes