I continue my tradition of forwarding articles from the Russian media obtained courtesy of JRL.
Every time I get the LBO digest that usually comes between 5 and 8 pm, there's a lot of stuff by me, then some stuff by Tahir and people in the UK, then Yoshie, then a slew of material from people in the US (obviously because of geography). Which makes me curious -- what is the breadown of country of residence of LBOers?
Chris Doss The Russia Journal ---------------------------- Ekspert No. 20 May 2002 UMBRELLAS ARE NO PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR WINTER No real threat of the US creating an effective missile defense Author: Olga Ruban [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] EVEN IN ITS CURRENT STATE, RUSSIA IS NOT IN ANY DANGER FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ITS MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS. THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IS AN EXAMPLE OF WISHFUL THINKING. MOST LIKELY, THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY WILL RECOVER SUFFICIENTLY TO ENABLE RUSSIA TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSE. Russia will find that 1,000-1,500 warheads are sufficient
Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush signed the third treaty on offensive nuclear weapons cuts at the Moscow summit. This is the first such agreement since the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty of 1972, the cornerstone of the international strategic stability framework.
The brief, vague nature of START III stems from the fact that Russia has not settled into the new reality yet, nor considered all the disadvantages - or even the advantages - arising from the appearance of the national missile defense system in America.
The way it is presented by the Bush Administration, the future global missile defense system, with several layers, resembles the analogous program of the Reagan era, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Back in the mid-1980s, the American political and military establishment promised to deploy thousands of interceptors (to be launched at enemy warheads) and outer space battle platforms (to be able to use deadly lasers against any region of the world). This is a promise the United States never kept.
These days, the US Administration's plans are less ambitious and requirements for the future system are more modest. And yet, even this second program of missile defense is more an example of wishful thinking rather than anything else.
"Intercepting a missile is an extremely difficult problem, technically," says Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "The United States spend over $165 billion on technical and scientific research into missile defense. So far, the mountain has given birth to a mouse."
Let us begin with facts and, more exactly, with land-based interceptors. Six tests were organized, four of them successful. According to the Pentagon. The question is, what the term "success" denotes. The tasks the interceptors were given in the tests did not include the most important one, namely the ability to tell bona fide warheads from innumerable false targets.
"Intelligence is supposed to update scientists working on the missile defense system on the enemy's capacities every two or six months... Effectiveness of the system will be greatly reduced without parameters of warheads and false targets," a document of some of the Pentagon's departments states. "The Americans admit that this problem defies them," says Pavel Podvig, an expert with the Center for Studying Problems of Disarmament of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technics. "The program of interceptor tests for the next five years does not specify the objective of telling warheads from false targets. It means that the task is not going to be tackled."
Rogov says that the THAAD naval system is also supposed to be able to intercept targets beyond the atmosphere. THAAD is another promising idea the Pentagon has been pursuing. Unfortunately, the system requires a new powerful radar. Radars with the required parameters are so heavy and bulky nowadays that mounting them on surface combatants is impossible.
Plans carrying laser weapons (the so-called ABL project which requires overhauling of Being 747s) are the second strike means of the missile defense system. There are difficulties here as well. The weapons will have a small range only because the ray loses power when passing through the atmosphere. Moreover, focusing a ray of the required power required an objective capable of withstanding more heat than the target itself. Building an objective such as this will be very difficult indeed.
Space platforms, the third echelon of the future system, are not worth discussion at all for the time being because the Americans themselves admit that they will be able to launch laser weapons to the orbit only fifteen years from now, not earlier.
According to Rogov, the Pentagon reactivated the project of the so-called shiny pebbles. While in the orbit, these "pebbles" are supposed to take out missiles and warheads in the spatial part of their trajectories. Even that is a weapon of the future at this point.
In other words, technical limitations nullify numerous advantages of advantages of anti-ballistic missile weapons. That is why authors of the future American missile defense system are so irked by the fact that their potential enemies will have no difficulties at all. "The technical arsenal of piercing missile defense systems is so broad that absolutely every country that really wants to reach America with its missiles will be able to do so," says Podvig. "Means of piercing missile defense systems are relatively cheap and simple. They do not require ultra-advanced technology, and are therefore easily available."
As for Russia specifically, its Topol-M systems can carry multiple warheads, and a great many decoy targets. "There are lots of original and cheap methods of overcoming missile defense systems. For example, false targets like foil which will generate thousands blips on radars," says Rogov. "Or the funny idea of a think balloon of metal the missile releases in space. The balloon is dozens kilometers long. It is impenetrable for radars. The warhead is somewhere in it but no one knows exactly where..." It follows that when the Americans report that their system "will be quite effective against any strike", they themselves know it to be a bluff.
The conclusion is clear. All its financial and technical might notwithstanding, the United States will probably fail to build what has been announced with such pomposity. "The system intercepting 99% warheads will never be built," says Yevgeny Myasnikov, another expert with the Center for Studying Problems of Disarmament. "Even 50% effectiveness is an impossible ideal."
We will be able to take America's plans with regard to national missile defense systems in stride only when we understood what the Americans really need it for.
Specialists are of the opinion that what the United States is really after is this - Washington wants its national military- industrial complex kept busy and honed, capable of responding to any challenge in the future. Not so long ago, the Strategic Defense Industry played the part of a stimulator and a watering hole for the military-industrial complex. It was squeezed dry. The new program of missile defense system has a similar objective - it is supposed to serve as an excuse for state subsidies to the defense industry and science.
Neither shall we forget the military-industrial lobby promoting interests of giant corporations used to lucrative contracts worth millions. The new program of missile defense system is perfect for their purposes: it is large, expensive, and will take years. This time, however, the Americans do not expect any substantial breakthroughs in civilian technology (not like in the 1950s and 1960s when nuclear and cryptography programs led to microchips and computing breakthroughs). Experts say that modern military technologies are too specialized for that. The Americans invested about $60 billion (in the prices of the mid-1980s) in the Strategic Defense Initiative, and do not have anything to show for it.
Let us consider the worst possible option: pumping new and new billions into the missile defense system, the Americans do come up with something that really works. Rogov assumes that "Creation of the combat control system of the future missile defense system is the most dangerous factor. Firstly, it will require a network of the so-called land X-band radars. Secondly, it will require a group of SBIRS high and SBIRS low satellites which will essentially control the whole planet. When Russia has 1,000 warheads and hundreds delivery means, neither five, nor ten or one hundred interceptors will be adequate for even a reciprocal strike, much less the first one. this is how things stand now, more or less. But when the combat control system is built, upping the number of available interceptors to several thousands is a task that does not present any serious challenge."
And when is this danger going to be a reality? "It does not seem as though the Americans will be able to build strategic strike systems or combat control systems until the end of the decade," says Rogov. "Most experts agree that the United States will be able to initiate construction of the national missile defense system in 2012 or 2015, not earlier. Deployment of the system in full will take years after that."
In other words, we do have time. Most likely, the Russian economy will recover sufficiently to enable Russia to make an adequate asymmetrical response. It should be noted as well that this response will be much cheaper than the nuclear umbrella the United States is aiming for.
This worst scenario is, however, unlikely. The previous decade is a clear indication of the possibility that the world as such and correlation of forces on the international arena may change beyond recognition. What really counts is that a new president will come to the White House, the Administration and the Congress will be different. It means different political and other national priorities. In other words, Russia should not be in a hurry to make any military- technical gestures in response to the new American anti-ballistic missile initiative.
On the other hand, America's attempts to build a global missile defense system may really jeopardize Russia's security. The threat will be concentrated right on our south-eastern and southern borders.
Rogov: The American national missile defense system is not going to pose a threat to Russia for years and decades to come yet. At the same time, it is a serious challenge to China. What the Americans will have achieved by the end of the decade will nullify China's nuclear potential. [These days, China possesses 20 monoblock ICBMs - Ekspert.] It is only logical to assume that China will increase its nuclear arsenals, and may even approach the level of Russia 15 or 20 years from now. I mean, in its strategic capacities. When we talk about China upping its nuclear arsenals, it means that India will follow suit and Pakistan will do everything its power not to be left behind. And a war between India and Pakistan is not something fantastic at all... Besides, there are forces like Al Qaeda which has already tried to obtain mass destruction weapons. In other words, we will find ourselves in a world with several nuclear players, but with nuclear deterrents effective only for Russia and the United States.
What should Russia do in response to attempts to build a nuclear umbrella? Some politicians and military suggest sharpening our "sword". They mean production of new delivery means and deployment of new ICBMs with MIRV which they think will permit us to retain at least a semblance of parity.
Specialists know, however, that there will be no nuclear exchange strikes where the number of delivery means and warheads is of any importance. National Resources Defense Council analysts say that one Trident submarine (24 missiles, eight warheads each) would kill up to 50 million people. Approximately the same number of lives would be claimed by twenty Russian RS-20 Satan missiles with ten warheads each. Obviously, no conflict of interests between Russia and the United States could justify casualties as great as these.
In other words, the question should be phrased as follows: how many nuclear weapons should we have in our arsenals without crippling our still-weak national economy? Without putting every effort into strategic programs, by 2010-15 we may have between 100 and 150 Topol-M systems (one warhead each), six or seven Dolphin class submarines with sixteen R-29RM missiles (four warheads each), and 67 TU-95MS and sixteen TU-160 long-range bombers (all of them can carry 600 warheads). About 1,200 warheads in all. Will that be enough?
"The threshold of unacceptable damage in the world as we know it is very low," says Podvig. "Most likely, therefore, just a few warheads delivered to enemy territory would suffice. It follows that 1,000-1,500 warheads in the national arsenals will be enough, as far as Russia is concerned."
Myasnikov: Why strive for quantitative parity? In order to be quite confident, Russia has to retain the infrastructure of the strategic nuclear forces and the ability to produce missiles. And 1,000-1,500 warheads (provided they are invulnerable and combat ready, will be quite enough for the next 10-15 years to deter any enemy, including the United States included. (Translated by A. Ignatkin)