Central Asia: Russia's Image Rising -- Cultural Ties With Kyrgyzstan And Uzbekistan Still Strong (Part 2) By Zamira Eshanova
Many observers believe that there is more to Russia's reemerging influence in Central Asia than simple economics. While Russia's relative prosperity is a model for the struggling economies of Central Asia, there are also more subtle ties that bind the region's former Soviet republic to Moscow: notably, more than a century's worth of shared history and language. In the second of
a three-part series on Russia's rebound in Central Asia, RFE/RL examines the
strength of these long-standing cultural ties.
Prague, 13 November 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Many foreign observers looking at the question of Russia's waxing influence in Central Asia focus on Moscow's lingering political and military interest in the region.
But the long arm of Moscow's geopolitical influence -- often seen as a grim reminder of Central Asia's past as both a Soviet republic and a tsarist colony -- can hardly explain why, more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's image is once again on the rise in the region.
Central Asian sociologists and analysts say the about-face lies not in politics or economics but in the cultural ties that still bind Moscow to the
Central Asian states. In some cases, they say, ties appear to be even stronger now than they were during the Soviet era.
One of the closest ties is language. Marat Khadjimukhamedov, vice director of Ijtimoiy Fikr Public Opinion Center, said that Russian continues to serve as
a lingua franca in Uzbekistan and throughout Central Asia. "Without a doubt,
Russian is not regarded as a foreign language in Uzbekistan. A majority of the population, even in remote villages, speaks Russian. This means that there is no need to explain to them [what Russia is]. They know it well," Khadjimukhamedov said.
The widespread use of Russian is the legacy of Moscow's intensive Russification drive during the Soviet era. Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became among the most highly Russified Soviet republics, with urban populations speaking Russian almost exclusively and local tongues relegated to so-called "kitchen" or "village" languages.
When the Central Asian republics announced their independence in 1991, compulsory Russian study was thrown out and local tongues resumed their place as official languages. But the nationalistic move ultimately failed. Within just a few years, many Central Asians resumed Russian lessons voluntarily and used the language for both domestic and outside communication.
The respected Kyrgyz author Solidjon Djigitov offers an explanation for this
phenomenon. "To make a developed literary language out of your own language is very difficult. And then, putting all existing knowledge into your own language is almost impossible for small nations. That's why a representative
of any small nation, if he wants to be an educated and civilized person, has
to know a language that is rich with knowledge and culture," Djigitov said.
Djigitov said Central Asia's decade of independence has done little to alter
Russia's status as the preeminent language in the region. He said education funding has dropped precipitously over the past 10 years, leaving Central Asians with little access to information in their native tongues.
Observers say the past decade, which began with pledges from the region's leaders to restore national pride and culture, has in fact brought Central Asia even closer to Russia as it continues to tap into Russia's vast resources. Khadjimukhamedov put it this way: "We are living in a single information field with Russia. Naturally, a majority of the population in Uzbekistan, especially in cities, is still intensively absorbing information
from Russian mass media. This single information field, the fact that people
here are getting information directly from Russia, creates closeness between
our two nations."
Education is a key factor in Russia's renewed influence in Central Asia. During the Soviet era, education in the Central Asian republics underwent a massive revision, with private religious schools and madrasahs replaced by Russian-style institutions and a Russia-oriented curriculum. Better-funded and leading to better career opportunities, the schools in which Russian was
the language of instruction gradually emerged as the preferred pedagogical option. It was a trend that regional leaders attempted to reverse over the past decade of independence, but this too failed. Djigitov described this period in Kyrgyzstan: "In the years of euphoria during the last years of perestroika, all Kyrgyz, at least, put their children in Kyrgyz schools. But
since education and teaching are at a low level in Kyrgyz schools, and due to the shortage of books and textbooks, now all urban Kyrgyz are sending their kids back to Russian schools. There are few private English schools, but they are for the Kyrgyz new rich."
Gulnora is a devout Muslim living in Uzbekistan. She wears a hijab, the head
covering worn by Muslim women, and strictly follows an Islamic lifestyle. But even her strong religious beliefs did not stop her from sending her only son
to Russian school in Tashkent. She explained why: "Tomorrow, when he finishes secondary school, he may want to enter a university. Or even if he works somewhere, he will need Russian for communication. Despite the separation of
the 15 [Soviet] republics, Russian is still the main communication language between them. That's why I put my son in a Russian school. And then, education even in ordinary Russian schools is much better than in Uzbek schools. Whichever field he chooses, I believe, there will be the need for Russian and English. This is only reason for my decision."
Gulnora said she would have put her son in an English-language school had she been able to afford it. But in a country where the average monthly salary is
just some $10-15, few Uzbeks are able to afford the tuition for such private
schools, which can run as high as $200 a month.
How long will the Russian language, mass media, and education system maintain their influence in Central Asia? Observers say the answer depends more on Russia than it does on regional governments. As long as Russia continues to enjoy relative economic prosperity and uses it to gain influence in the region, they say, there is every reason to expect relations to grow even warmer in the years to come.
Central Asia : Russia's Rising Image -- Still No Local Alternative To Russian Media (Part 3) By Zamira Eshanova
The past decade of Central Asian independence has not borne fruit in terms of developing a local alternative to the so-called "central TV" or "central press" -- otherwise known as Russian media. A majority of the region's 55 million people still watch only Russian television and read only Russian newspapers. In the last of our three-part series on Russia's re-emerging influence in Central Asia, RFE/RL looks at the role of Russian media in the region.
Prague, 14 November 2002 (RFE/RL) -- In Uzbekistan, people commonly refer to
local journalists as "messengers from heaven" -- an ironic dig at correspondents whose over-the-top reports read like paeans to Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the country's sterling economic achievements.
The situation is more or less the same throughout Central Asia. In Turkmenistan, local media carefully record the activities of the nation's "great leader." In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, newspapers and television stations are also subject to varying degrees of government control.
Stephen Hegarty is a Central Asia analyst with the InterMedia Survey Institute based in Washington, D.C. He said Central Asians have grown tired of the "rosy" news reports emanating from local media, and are turning to Russian news and television as a better source of information: "In every country in Central Asia the leading television stations are from the Russian
Federation. For example, in Kazakhstan the leading TV station is, of course,
ORT. About 80 percent of the people say they watch it every day. Compare that to local TV, which is not as nearly as popular -- only about 40 percent of the people in Kazakhstan say they watch Kazakh TV everyday. It's the same in
nearly every Central Asian country."
Kyrgyzstan is no exception. Kyrgyz author Solidjon Djigitov said the quality
of local programming leaves a lot to be desired: "First of all, they [local media] are very boring. Second, the way material is presented is very poor, and then third, there is their lack of money. Our only local channel in Kyrgyzstan is a state channel. There are some private channels, but it's believed that they are bribed or have been privatized by our rulers."
Hegarty says the quality of Russian programming is markedly more sophisticated that anything local Central Asian channels produce. InterMedia
polls indicate that many Central Asians think of regionally produced news reports as watered-down copies of news broadcast on Russian channels days earlier. In terms of entertainment programs, Hegarty says, Russian channels are again far superior to any local alternatives.
Part of the problem, Hegarty says, is that local media in Central Asia are hamstrung by the country's repressive media policies and tight state censorship: "This [state censorship] is a huge factor. There is no question about it. Like I said, people really don't turn to local TV for news, especially in countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, because they know that what they are getting from local TV, or local radio, or local newspapers, is heavily censored, isn't telling them the whole truth, gives only positive aspects of life in these countries without talking about real issues or real problems."
The failure of local media to provide a reliable and entertaining alternative to Russian programming is having an additional effect: Central Asians are taking a non-critical approach to the Russian news they consume. This tendency, in turn, is opening the gates to Russia's reemerging influence in the region.
Malik Abdurazzoqov, an independent Uzbek analyst, says the mass media -- TV in particular -- plays a crucial role in defining social mores and beliefs. In Central Asia, he says, local governments have already lost much of their influence to the programming and newspapers emanating from Russia. He says Central Asians' near-complete dependence on Russian media is giving Moscow an easy opportunity to manipulate public opinion in its former Soviet neighbor-states.
"During the Balkan war [the NATO-led war against Yugoslavia in 1999] there was an opinion poll conducted in Uzbekistan. Results showed that more than 90 percent of respondents supported Serbs. But logically, one would expect public opinion to be on the side of the Bosnian Muslims [since 94 percent of
country's population are Muslims]. So why then did Uzbeks support Serbs? Because they were watching Russian TV channels [which were strongly pro-Serb], and their opinion was based on Russian reports. This clearly shows that public opinion in Uzbekistan is being formed under strong influence of the Russian media."
The tight restrictions placed on regional media in Central Asia also means that local journalists, envious of the relative political and financial independence of their Russian counterparts, use Russian news to set the tone
for their own reports. One correspondent for an Uzbek national newspaper, who wished to be anonymous, had this to say: "As a print journalist, I can say that local mass media is more and more often using Internet information. But
when it comes to analysis, we still rely on the Russian press's commentary and analysis, because they are quick and efficient. Besides, people here love them."
These combined trends raise a question: Can Central Asians remain politically and spiritually independent from Russia's social and political influence? Kyrgyz author Solidjon Djigitov appears to think not -- particularly, he said, because Central Asia has so little true independence to begin with: "Of course, there is no freedom. Spiritual freedom is absent. This is because we
couldn't create a progressive and modern culture [after independence], we couldn't put a fundamental knowledge of modernity into our languages. Besides, our intelligentsia -- I mean all the Central Asian intelligentsia -- is very provincial. There are not so many developed personalities. Most of the smart, talented, and sharp-minded Kyrgyz are working either in the U.S. or in Russia. These people have been leaving the country."
Djigitov says local governments are to blame for Central Asians' growing dependence of Russian media. He said rather than using the past decade of independence to modernize information technology and media practices, Central Asia's authoritarian leaders have been ruling as if they were isolated medieval sultans: "Unfortunately, we [Central Asians] are alienated from each other. Cultural, information ties have been cut off between us. We [in Kyrgyzstan] don't know what's happening, for example, in Kazakhstan, unless Russian central TV reports on it. We don't get any books -- either research or literature -- from each other. We don't get any newspapers, for example, from Uzbekistan, and they don't get ours. We don't watch Uzbek TV -- we get Kazakh channels very irregularly. This is too bad. It would be much better for us small nations [like Kyrgyzstan] if [bigger Central Asian nations] like Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan would develop into industrialized countries with a modern culture. For unfortunately, Soviet rule [based on dividing up Central
Asia] has been in place too long."
But Djigitov says he is optimistic that positive changes will come in a matter of time. He says in 50 years, when Central Asia is free of its current ruling elite, new generations will focus their efforts on realizing the region's potential and push for true political and cultural freedom.
Stephen Hegarty of InterMedia says he is also optimistic about the future of
media in Central Asia. He says Central Asians, once given a viable local alternative, are happy to move away from Russian media It is a view supported by the growing popularity of regional radio stations, which are the least restricted of the local media outlets, and which have drawn listeners away from Russian radio by improving programming and offering audiences a greater
variety of options. A free and established media, Hegarty says, would go a long way toward restoring the social, political, and cultural independence of the Central Asian mind-set.