(First half of article yanked off by me.)
Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia
By Timothy Heleniak
October 2002
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Returning to Russia
The majority of the migration turnover in Russia has been with the other FSU
successor states, and has been driven to a large extent by the ethnic composition of those migration streams. Other key factors in this include ethnic violence, which has resulted in steep drops in economic output.
The Soviet Union was, and the Russian Federation remains, a mosaic of nationalities. There were 128 nationalities enumerated in the 1989 census, 55 with populations over 100,000. At the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, there were 53 ethnic homelands, which were then incorporated into the
15 successor states to the Soviet Union. Including Russians, of the 15 major
nationalities, a total of 43.4 million people lived outside of their homelands in 1989. Thus, it should not be surprising that when the Soviet Union broke up, significant ethnic unmixing followed, with many people believing that their standard of living would be best in their own homeland thanks to preferential access to better jobs, schools, and other resources.
Since 1989, there has been a total net immigration to Russia from the non-Russian FSU states of 3.7 million. Immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was a large wave of immigration, which has since subsided substantially. Net immigration to Russia from the non-Russian states rose from 105,000 in 1991, the last year of the Soviet Union's existence, to a peak of 915,000 in 1994 before falling to just 124,000 in 2001, as the migration momentum seems to have nearly exhausted itself.
Between Russia and the non-Russian states, the two states with the largest Russian diaspora populations -- Ukraine and Kazakhstan -- accounted for the largest shares of immigration between 1989 and 2000, with each contributing a quarter of total immigrants. Overall, Central Asia (including Kazakhstan) has been the source of about half of all migrants to Russia, the three Transcaucasus states 15 percent, and the Baltics only four percent.
Ethnic Russians Remaining in FSU
When 25 million Russians found themselves suddenly members of minority groups in 14 successor states that were often hostile to their existence, they had several choices. One was to stay and accommodate themselves as minorities in the newly independent states, which often meant learning local
languages. In cases where they were geographically concentrated in regions bordering Russia, such as northern Kazakhstan or eastern Ukraine, some advocated attaching those areas to Russia. A third choice was migration back
to the homeland (although many had been born and lived their entire lives outside Russia).
In the 1989 USSR population census, a total of 25.3 million people living outside of Russia stated that their nationality was Russian. Since that time, there has been a net migration to Russia of 3.0 million Russians representing 12 percent of the diaspora population, or one in eight Russians
living outside of Russia.
A clear regional grouping emerges in terms of the percentages of Russians residing in the non-Russian FSU states who have left each of the newly independent states. From Armenia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, half or more of the Russian populations have chosen migration as a strategy of adaptation. It was also from these states that significant shares of the various other nationalities living in diaspora have fled as well, because of
deteriorating economic conditions.
>From two states, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, roughly a quarter of the Russian
populations have left, and from Kazakhstan, 18 percent. In the three Baltic states and Moldova, between 10 and 13 percent of the Russian diaspora populations have left, in spite of rather restrictive citizenship policies in Latvia and Estonia. Only small portions of the Russians living in the other two Slavic states of the FSU (Belarus and Ukraine) have returned. Turkmenistan, with its oil and gas wealth, has not seen a great shrinking of
its ethnic Russian population.
Part of what these numbers reveal is that despite what seems like a large-scale migration of Russians to Russia, the fact is most have not chosen to move and approximately 22 million remain in the other FSU states.
The fact that Russians and other ethnic groups are choosing to migrate to Russia should come as no surprise, given the economic divergence of these states during the post-Soviet period. Of the 15 successor states, only tiny Estonia has a higher gross national income per capita than that of Russia. Most of the Central Asian and Transcaucasus states, as well as Ukraine and Moldova, have incomes that are half or less than in Russia.
Ethnic Violence and Regional Conflict
A major push factor behind the migration of both Russians and non-Russians seems to be ethnic violence, and resulting economic decline. Aside from the war in Chechnya, most has not been aimed at Russians, but they are nevertheless caught in the crossfire. Tajiks, Armenians, Georgians, and Azeris, pushed by episodes of violence during the post-Soviet period in their ethnic homelands, all moved in significant numbers, thereby significantly increasing their population size in Russia.
Large numbers of Russians and other former Soviet citizens entered Russia as
"forced migrants," although many found it difficult to register as such. Russia acceded to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and Protocol in 1992, enacted supporting legislation in 1993, and established the Federal Migration Service in the 1990s as the agency charged with implementation. Though the agency has been eliminated, the concepts of "refugees" and "forced migrants" that Russia adopted are still at odds with international refugee law. The concept of "refugees" has been applied only to people not eligible for Russian citizenship, and "forced migrants" has been applied to those persons with Russian citizenship or those who could obtain Russian citizenship by virtue of being former Soviet citizens (the latter including internally displaced persons).
At the end of 2000, there were 667,000 persons registered as refugees or forced migrants from the other FSU states and only 9,710 refugees from non-FSU states, down from previous years, as many had obtained Russian citizenship and lost their forced migrant status. Most forced migrants arrived either from Central Asia or the Caucasus, including about 600,000 persons displaced during the first war in Chechnya between 1994 and 1996. About one-third, mostly Chechens, have since returned. As a result of the second Chechen war, which started in 1999, there are nearly a half million displaced within Russia, most in neighboring regions around Chechnya.
Critics believe that, given the lack of complete control over its external borders and the chaotic situation in some of its neighboring FSU states, it was premature of Russia to accede to the refugee convention. Of the refugees
in Russia, most enter the country legally and then overstay their visas. The
refugee law was revised in 1997 to reduce the burden on the state for caring
for these people and made more restrictive, similar to the laws of Western European countries.
There is a large and growing undocumented population in Russia, pushed there
by factors such as underdevelopment in their own countries, the large underground economy in Russia that they can disappear into, higher standards
of living, lack of enforcement, Russia's long porous borders, and its adherence to the UN refugee convention. The ease with which people can travel through Central Asia to Russia is often cited as the major source of the increased drug trafficking in the country.
The Depopulation of Siberia
As a result of Soviet regional development policies, Siberia and the Far East became the site of many narrowly specialized industrial settlements. The majority of Russia's fuel and energy resources, as well as other strategic raw materials, are located in this northern periphery. Together, the regions officially defined as the "North," which constitutes much of the
European north, Siberia, and the Far East, make up 70 percent of Russia's territory, but contain less than eight percent of the population.
Under the market conditions that are emerging in Russia, the previous level and type of development of the northern regions has proved to be unsustainable. The dramatically rising cost of living and the shrinking economy resulted in mass out-migration from the northern regions to Russia and the other FSU states. Between 1989 and 2001, from the 16 regions that are defined as the "Far North," over 12 percent of the population migrated out of the region. From seven of these regions, over 20 percent have left. At the extreme are two regions in the far northeast, Magadan and Chukotka, that have respectively seen 43 and 61 percent of their populations leave the
regions in the past decade. Many people who wish to leave the north, however, do not have the means to do so, creating an enormous social problem
for Russia.
Chinese-Russian Border
As a result of the depopulation of the Siberian and Far Eastern periphery and the opening up of Russia's borders, there is a fear of massive Chinese immigration into the region followed by annexation of parts of the Far East to China. Unfounded estimates given by local officials in this region (the last, historically, to be incorporated into Russia) are that up to two million Chinese live illegally in the southern regions of the Far East. This
fear is based on the simple demographic fact that there are five million people in the regions bordering China in the southern Far East, and 110 million Chinese in the three regions bordering Russia. Some worry that the demographic imbalance will cause the Chinese to spread into Russia. However,
the local officials' estimates are wildly exaggerated; the little research that has been done in the region indicates a Chinese population in the Russian Far East of 100,000 to 300,000.
Attempts to tie the region in with the more prosperous Pacific Rim countries
have not produced the desired results, and the regional economy continues to
stagnate. Meanwhile, efforts to induce people within Russia or returnees from aboard to settle in the Far East, "where they are needed," according to
Putin, have failed.
Some favor increased Chinese migration into the region, citing the fact that
Chinese shuttle traders occupy an important economic niche with imports of inexpensive food, clothing, and other consumer goods, while also filling an important labor market niche by taking unskilled jobs in construction and agriculture. They maintain that the demographic imbalance is unnatural, and that increased migration is unavoidable and necessary in order to develop the resources of the Far East.
Those opposed to further Chinese migration underscore the fact that the Far East is a crucially important region, being Russia's naval outlet to the Pacific and storehouse of large amounts of strategic minerals. They allege that if migration continues, there may be up to 8-10 million Chinese residing in Russia as a whole by 2010. This would make the Chinese Russia's second-largest ethnic group.
However, more careful assessments based on discussions with local officials,
analysis of data from local migration offices, and eyewitness observations, place the totals closer to 100,000-300,000 Chinese in the region, most arriving under rather closely monitored labor contracts. It appears that the
Chinese have more of an interest in shuttle trade than long-term residence. In fact, there are probably more Chinese in Moscow than there are in the Far
East.
Russia as Migration Magnet
Russia has become a "migration magnet" for both legal and undocumented immigrants. Estimating the scope of illegal migration to Russia, however, has been difficult. Arriving at a meaningful definition of who is an illegal
immigrant is even harder in Russia then elsewhere because of the legal status of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose confederation of 12 former Soviet countries. The consensus estimates are of 3.0 to 3.5 million illegal migrants in Russia, with plausible estimates of up to six million. China, Vietnam, Korea, other Asian countries, and Africa are common source countries for the undocumented.
Some of these people see Russia as a destination, while others view the huge
Russian area as a transit point for reaching Western Europe. Since most are denied refugee status, they are considered illegal migrants, and are denied the right to work and access to social services. There are many such people from Africa, the Middle East, and the Asian countries along Russia's southern borders. Many slip in by taking advantage of Russia's adherence to the Bishkek Agreement, which opened visa-free travel among CIS states.
The high-side estimates actually call into question the reality of Russia's demographic crisis. If all six million people are included in the total, Russia's population may not actually be declining after all. If the 3-3.5 million estimate is correct, undocumented immigrants make up approximately the same percentage of the Russian population as they do, by the most commonly given figures, in the United States.
Migration Debates and Russia's Future
As with other migration destination countries, there is a vigorous debate underway in Russia as to how much migration should be allowed. At present, the anti-immigration side seems to be ascendant -- but demographic
projections paint a dire picture that could temper policies to limit new immigrants.
For its part, the pro-immigration side asserts that Russia needs more people
to make up for a demographic shortfall and to stimulate economic development. In these respects, Russia's declining and simultaneously aging population is not unlike that in various Western countries with low, below-replacement fertility. Like Russia, many of these countries are considering "replacement migration," that is, international migration to offset population decline and aging. The primary backers of more immigration
are social liberals.
Certain realities seem to support the pro-immigration lobby. For example, in
the absence of immigration, in order to maintain the same ratio of workers to pensioners, it would be necessary to raise the retirement age to 73 -- a politically unpopular proposition in a country where the current life expectancy for both sexes combined is now just 65.
In fact, one way that Russia differs from most other countries, and may actually have an advantage, is that with an estimated 22 million Russians in
the non-Russian states, it has a large pool of educated people who share the
language and culture of Russia. This could potentially ease their integration.
The anti-immigration lobby -- which currently seems to be winning the debate
-- maintains that there are already too many "foreigners" in the country, claims that most engage in criminal activities, and insists that their incorporation into Russian society is problematic. Along these lines of thought, the Federal Migration Service was abolished in 2000 and its duties folded first into the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Nationalities, and Migration Policy, and then in May 2002 into the Ministry of Interior (which controls the police force). During its existence, the Federal Migration Service was chronically under-funded and felt by many to be too weak to regulate migration in a new, more liberal setting. By giving migration regulation to the Ministry of Interior, some see a willingness to rely more on force to manage Russia's complex immigration scenario.
Restricting Immigration
In a similar vein, laws have been revised to limit immigration and its costs. The refugee law was revised in 1997 to reduce the burden on the state
for caring for these people, and was made more restrictive and similar to the laws of Western European countries. In May 2002, a strict new citizenship law was passed designed to help curb illegal migration, replacing the old law, which was so lax that it lured people hoping to get citizenship. The new law requires a five-year residency period in Russia, demonstrable fluency in Russian, and evidence of a legal job. The law does not give any special preference to Russians in the other FSU states, on the premise that with the slowdown in migration, all those Russians who might return to Russia have already done so.
Other new strict migration legislation includes requiring two-part migration
cards for foreigners arriving in Russia starting on November 1, 2002. The first part will be retained by Ministry of Interior authorities, while the second will remain with the foreigner to confirm his or her right to be in Russia. Authorities in Moscow, the destination of so much illegal migration in the country, want to create a database of all city residents by the end of 2003 in order to track local demographic trends and migration to the city.
EU Expansion
Looking ahead, Russian migration will be affected by the impending European Union expansion, especially as a result of a rather peculiar geographic situation. When the EU expands, visas will be required of citizens of non-member states. This will mean that residents of Kaliningrad (the Russian
exclave of 950,000 people on the Baltic Sea, bordered by Poland and Lithuania, both candidates for EU membership), will be required to obtain visas in order to travel to the rest of Russia. This former piece of German territory, know as Koenigsberg, was seized by the Soviet Union at the end of
World War II.
Russia finds the idea of these mandatory visas unthinkable, a situation compounded by the fact that President Putin's wife is from the region. Various proposals have been suggested to deal with this development, including allowing Russians from Kaliningrad to travel without visas through
Lithuania, a situation to which the EU is unlikely to consent. One somewhat impractical idea has been to move the Russians in special sealed train cars.
The debate continues, but the deadline for a solution is looming.
2002 Census
Some of the difficulties associated with formulating sound migration policy may be relieved by better basic information in the form of Russia's first post-Soviet population census. This was originally scheduled for 1999, following the schedule of previous Soviet censuses. However, it was delayed due to lack of funding and will finally take place in October 2002. Given Russia's size, importance, and the enormous demographic changes of the past decade, the results are eagerly anticipated.
Among the changes from previous censuses will be the inclusion of a separate
section consisting of seven questions for those persons temporarily in Russia, who permanently reside outside the country, including questions on place of birth and permanent residence, citizenship, nationality, and purpose for being in Russia. The goal of these questions is to attempt to estimate the extent of illegal migration, and define various characteristics
of the people involved. In this undertaking, Russia will certainly face the same problems encountered by other countries in the region.
Conclusion
According to the most recent set of United Nations population projections, the population of Russia in 2050 will be 113 million according to the high scenario, 104 million in the medium, and 96 million in the low. Most of these projections do not fully incorporate the full impact of possible AIDS mortality in Russia, which has had one of the steepest infection rates in the world in the past few years. Others project the population of Russia to fall to 70 million by mid-century.
Using these UN population projections as the basis for a feasibility study on replacement migration, researchers found that in order for Russia to maintain the same population size as in 1995, there would have to be a net migration of 24.9 million in the first half of the 21st century. For the size of the working-age population to stay the same, there would have to be a net migration of 35.8 million. Even the lower figure assumes that the entire Russian diaspora in the non-Russian states would return, implying an average annual influx of between 500,000 and 700,000. Such hopes must be looked at in the context of recent peak migration of 810,000, and the drastically reduced 2001 net migration of just 72,000.
While it appears likely that Russia's migration balance will continue to be positive, much of the post-Soviet migration appears to have been exhausted. Thus, the possibilities of maintaining the current demographic balance through migration appear slim, unless Russia wants to begin recognizing and assimilating the massive illegal population that currently resides in the country. Most countries with long histories of immigration have had difficulty pulling off similar feats. For Russia to do so would put a quite different literal and figurative face on the Russian population.