http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html
Resources
Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme
IAEA Action Team's extensive inspection activities in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 resulted in a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. The programme was very well funded and was aimed at the indigenous development and exploitation of technologies for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material and production and manufacturing of nuclear weapons IAEA report S/1997/779 to the UN Security Council provides a detailed overview of Agency activities in Iraq and its assessment of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme. An update and summary of this report can be found in S/1998/927 and S/1999/393. The reports cover all Agency activities in Iraq between 1991 and 1998.
This fact sheet is based upon these reports and highlights the components of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme, IAEA assessment of the past nuclear programme, and IAEA achivements.
I - Components of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme Acquisition of weapons usable material Indigenous production and overt procurement of uranium compounds Development of indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities Intended diversion of research reactor fuel Production and separation of plutonium Weaponisation Facilities Research & Development Nuclear delivery system II - Assessment of Iraq's past nuclear programmeE[ III - IAEA Achievements in Iraq
I - Components of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme Acquisition of weapons usable material Indigenous production and overt procurement of uranium compounds Imported 4,006 kg of natural uranium and 6,005 kg of depleted uranium (DU) from Italy in 1979 Imported 1,767 kg low enriched uranium (LEU) from Italy in 1982 Imported almost 50 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia and France Procured 429 drums containing 138,098 kg yellowcake from Portugal in 1980 Procured 487 drums containing 148,348 kg yellowcake from Portugal in 1982 Procured 432 drums containing 137,435 kg of yellowcake from Niger in 1981 Procured 426 drums containing 139,409 kg of yellowcake from Niger in 1982 Imported 24,260 kg of uranium dioxide from Brazil between 1981-82 Produced 109 tonnes of uranium in 168 tonnes of yellowcake at Al Qaim uranium recovery plant, which was constructed between 1982-84 Produced 420 drums containing 99,457 kg uranium dioxide at Al Jesira uranium conversion facility
Produced UF6 at Rashdiya Engineering and Design Centre Processed uranium dioxide to produce UF4, uranium metal and UF6 at Tuwaitha Chemical Laboratories Processed UO2E[ and yellowcake to produce UO2, U3O8, UO3, UO4, UF4, and uranium metal at Tuwaitha Experimental Research Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication Processed UO2 to produce UCl4 at Tuwaitha Chemical Engineering Research laboratories Development of indigenous uranium enrichment capabilities Electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS)
Designed and constructed electromagnets and different magnet separators systems between 1982-87 in Tuwaitha Designed and constructed one R50 and three R100 separator systems starting from 1985 and operated them until 1991 in Tuwaitha Designed and constructed R120 and R60 separator systems in Tarmiya Produced 640 grams of enriched uranium with an average enrichment of 7.2%
Gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment
Initiated in 1982 Constructed related facilities at Tuwaitha and Rashdiya Manufactured a barrier tube suitable for operation in UF6 in 1988
Gas centrifuge enrichment
Initiated in 1987 Built first oil centrifuge in 1987 and conducted laboratory trials; later shifted to magnetic bearing centrifuge Developed a series of sub-critical centrifuge designs in 1989 Designed and assembled and tested magnetic centrifuges using a carbon composite rotor in 1990 Construction work for the mass production of centrifuges and a pilot-scale cascade hall at Al Furat began in 1989
R&D on chemical uranium enrichment also took place In 1981, laser isotopic separation work began and studied both atomic (AVLIS) and molecular (MLIS) technologies Intended diversion of research reactor fuel Planned to divert highly enriched uranium, that was subjected to Agency safeguards, at Tuwaitha under a ç”[rash programmeッTto use the material in the production of a nuclear weapon Installed a chemical processing plant at Tuwaitha in about three months in 1990 to extract HEU from research reactor fuel Had capability to commence the conversion of HEU from UNH to metal in 1991 Production and separation of plutonium Reactor design did not go beyond theoretical studies Used IRT-5000 to irradiate three indigenously fabricated natural uranium fuel elements Separated five grams of plutonium at laboratory-scale process line in Tuwaitha Weaponisation Facilities Tuwaitha had facilities and infrastructure for all Group Four activities except for the fabrication, handling, and testing of high explosives Experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves Developed a 32-point electronic firing system using detonators and lenses developed at Al Qa Qa Tested firing system Tested flash X-ray systems, gas gun systems, fiber optics with fast response electronic equipment, high speed electronic streak cameras towards nuclear weapons Produced and recovered polonium by irradiating bismuth Research & Development Created special unit at Al Qaqaa for the production of high explosive lenses, detonators and propellants for nuclear weapons Compiled large stocks of imported HMX and RDX and own operating RDX production plant Al Atheer designed to accommodate all technical activities related to nuclear weapon development, including experiments with high explosives for which an elaborate complex was designed and constructed Iraqç—ƒG primary focus was a basic implosion fission design, fuelled by HEU Using open-source literature and theoretical studies, ran various computer codes through Iraqç—ƒG mainframe computer to adapt the codes and develop the physical constants for a nuclear weapon development programme Was aware of more advanced weapon design concepts Invested significant efforts to understand the various options for neutron initiators Tested high explosivelenses Made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of uranium metal Casted a uranium sphere of about five centimeter diameter, several hemispheres of similar size and a small number of rods weighing 1.2 kg per piece, from which to machine 郃Xub-calibre munitionsッT Nuclear Delivery System Considered two options:
Production of a derivative of the Al Hussein/Al Abbas missile, designed to deliver a one-tonne warhead to a maximum range of 650 km Using an unmodified Al Hussein missile with a range of 300 km II - Assessment of Iraq's past nuclear programmeE[ As of 16 December 1998, the following assessment could be made of Iraq's clandestine programme:
There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq's explanation of its progress towards the finalisation of a workable design for its nuclear weapons was considered to be consistent with the resources and time scale indicated by the available programme documentation.
Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of HEU through the EMIS process, the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines, and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon
There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of weapons-grade nuclear material through its indigenous processes.
There were no indications that Iraq otherwise clandestinely acquired weapons-usable material
All the safeguarded research reactor fuel was verified and fully accounted for by the IAEA and removed from Iraq.
There were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. III - IAEA Achievements in Iraq IRAQ IAEA Procurement and production of uranium compounds Removed all known weapon usable materials
All known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium compounds useful to a nuclear programme were destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored the sites as part of their OMV activities.
Took custody of all known imported compounds and indigenously produced uranium compounds Industrial-scale facilities for the production of uranium compounds suitable for fuel fabrication or isotopic enrichment All known indigenous facilities capable of producing uranium compounds useful for fuel fabrication and for isotopic enrichment were destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of facilities; IAEA monitored the sites as part of their OMV activities. R&D of indigenous uranium enrichment technologies Destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless all known single-use equipment used in enrichment R&D
Destroyed all known facilities and equipment for the enrichment of uranium
Subjected to ongoing monitoring and verification all facilities and known dual-use equipment capable of being used in enrichment R&D Design and feasibility studies for an indigenous plutonium production reactor Inspections revealed no indication that Iraq's plan for an indigenous plutonium production reactor proceeded beyond feasibility study. R&D of irradiated fuel reprocessing technology The relevant facilities at Tuwaitha used for irradiated fuel reprocessing R&D were destroyed during the Gulf War R&D of weaponisation capabilities for implosion-based nuclear weapons Destroyed the principal buildings of Al Atheer nuclear weapons development and production plant.
Destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless all known purpose-specific equipment A "crash programme" aimed at diverting safeguarded research reactor fuel and recovering the HEU for use in a nuclear weapon The chemical processing plant was destroyed during the Gulf War; IAEA monitored sites with relevant capabilities as part of their OMV activities.
Verified, accounted for, and recovered the entire inventory of research reactor fuel
Arranged for removal of all HEU fuel from Iraq
25 April 2002, IAEA
-----
CJ
__________________________________________________ Yahoo! - We Remember 9-11: A tribute to the more than 3,000 lives lost http://dir.remember.yahoo.com/tribute