Was 56 Kilobytes (!!!!!!!!) so I radically reduiced. CJ read it. Michael Pugliese
Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #11 Carl Conetta 18 January 2002 (revised 24 January 2002)
Companion study released 30 January 2002: Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan war
Table Of Contents
1. A study in contrast: the Afghanistan and Kosovo air campaigns 2. A different air war 3. A greater emphasis on GPS-directed weapons 4. Bombers and cluster bombs 5. Demographic factors 6. Campaign objectives, targeting methods, and unreliable intelligence
boost casualty count 7. Rapid engagement: trading accuracy for time? 8. Conclusion
Appendix 1. Estimation of Civilian Bombing Casualties: Method and Sources
Appendix 2. Resolving Discrepancies in Casualty Accounts
Notes
Despite the adulation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as a "finely-tuned" or "bulls-eye" war,1 the
campaign failed to set a new standard for precision in one important respect: the rate of civilians killed per bomb dropped. In fact, this rate was far higher in the Afghanistan conflict -- perhaps four times higher -- than in the 1999 Balkans war. In absolute terms, too, the civilian death toll in Afghanistan surpassed that incurred by the 1999 NATO bombing campaign over Kosovo and Serbia; indeed, it may have been twice as high. Key among the factors shaping this outcome were (i) the mission objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, (ii) some of the operational and tactical features of the bombing campaign, and (iii) the mix and technical characteristics of the weapons employed.
1. A study in contrast: the Afghanistan and Kosovo air campaigns Through 10 December the total numbers of attack sorties and weapons expended in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were far less than those in the 1999 Balkans campaign, Operation Allied Force (OAF): approximately 4700 attack sorties in OEF versus 13,000 in OAF; and, 12,000-plus weapons in OEF versus 23,000 in OAF.2 Nonetheless, credible reports of bombing mishaps and accidental civilian casualties suggest a level of civilian fatalities in Afghanistan greater than that experienced in the 1999 Kosovo war. At least 500 civilians were killed in the Kosovo war by the NATO bombardment.3 In Afghanistan, it is very likely that the bombing campaign claimed 1000-1300 civilian lives. (See Appendix 1. Estimation of Civilian Bombing Casualties: Method and Sources).
Given that fewer weapons were expended, a higher level of civilian fatalities in Operation Enduring Freedom implies that the bombing campaign in Afghanistan was less accurate than the one associated with the 1999 Balkans war.
Of course, there is a propagandistic aspect to the accounting and reporting of civilian casualties that complicates any effort to discern the facts.4 At the end of October, the Taliban asserted that more than 1600 civilians had been killed in bombing raids during the first three weeks of the war -- an average of 533 per week. US defense officials discounted these claims as lies, preferring to talk in terms of dozens of casualties (when they were willing to offer estimates at all).5 However, in early November, a report by British intelligence, directly countered the Taliban claims, estimating that only 300 civilians had been killed during October -- an average of approximately 90 per week.6 (Notably, bombing was relatively light during two of the weeks covered by this report; it became both more intense and more free-ranging after 20 October.)
Another insight on bombing casualties has been provided by Dr. Marc Herold, a University of New Hampshire economics professors, who has compiled a database of hundreds of articles on the war from the world press. This database includes accounts of more than 4,000 civilian deaths from bombing during the period 7 October - 1 January 2002.7
As noted above, the present study uses a lower estimate: between 1000 and 1300 civilians killed in the bombing campaign through 1 January 2002. This estimate relies on a press review that is less extensive than the Herold review, but that applies a more stringent accounting criteria in order to correct for likely reporting bias.8 Regarding an upper-end estimate of casualties: the present study finds it difficult to reconcile a civilian death toll from bombing that is much higher than1300 with the conditions being reported currently by journalists on the ground in Afghanistan -- although this may change when (and if) more comprehensive and systematic surveys are conducted. (See Appendix 2. Resolving Discrepancies in Casualty Accounts.)
The estimate used in the present study is broadly consistent with two other recent reviews: one by Human Rights Watch, which calculated at least 1000 civilian deaths, and one by Reuters news agency, which concluded that perhaps 982 people were killed in 14 incidents.9 It is also broadly consistent with an extrapolation of the estimate made by British intelligence at the end of October.
The high likelihood that 1000-1300 civilians were killed in the OEF bombing campaign directly contradicts the notion that the campaign was "cleaner" than other, recent ones. Instead, in terms of the rate of civilian deaths per bomb or missile expended, there seems to have been a distinct deterioration from the standard set in Operation Allied Force (1999), in which fewer civilians were killed and more munitions used.
The remaining sections of this report explore why Operation Enduring Freedom might have incurred a higher casualty rate. Stated more formally: the next sections examine the prior plausibility of the hypothesis that the Afghanistan bombing campaign imposed a higher rate of civilian casualties than did the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999.
2. A different air war A reliable and comprehensive empirical accounting of the civilian death toll may be a long time coming; indeed, it may not come at all or it may be left to non-governmental organizations with limited resources, as was the case following the Kosovo war. Nonetheless, there are good reasons, primae facie, to expect that the Afghanistan bombing campaign was less accurate than the one executed as part of Operation Allied Force.
Many features of the bombing campaign in Afghanistan distinguish it from the 1999 campaign in the Balkans, although not all pertain to the issues of accuracy and collateral damage:10
Naval aircraft provided the lion share of the tactical air power in Afghanistan. Seventy percent of the shooters were naval and they flew more than 80 percent of the sorties. By contrast, in Operation Allied Force the Navy provided about 25 percent of US air assets and flew about the same percentage of combat sorties; Bombers played a larger role relative to tactical aircraft in Afghanistan than they did in Operation Allied Force. Among bombers, B-1s and B-52s flew a greater proportion of bomber sorties in Afghanistan than they did in Operation Allied Force; the role of the B-2 was much reduced; Most aircraft had to fly sorties of much longer duration due to the distance of targets from US carriers in the Arabian sea. Afghanistan's southern border is 300 miles from the Arabian sea and Kabul is another 400 miles inland. F-14 crews were flying 6.5 hour sorties over Afghanistan -- more than twice their normal practice; The percentage of smart bombs used in Afghanistan was perhaps twice as high as in the 1999 Balkans conflict: 60 percent versus 30 percent. However, in Afghanistan, a much greater proportion of the smart weapons were guided by the Global Positioning System than was the case in the 1999 Yugoslavian war, where most were laser-guided. Also, a greater percentage of the air-dropped munitions in Afghanistan were cluster bombs. Indeed, the absolute number of cluster bombs used in Afghanistan might surpass the total for the 1999 Balkans war. (In Operation Enduring Freedom more than 1,210 were used through 31 December 2001; in Operation Allied Force approximately 1,600 total were used.)11 Also, four 15,000-lb. BLU-82 slurry bombs ("daisy cutters") were used in Afghanistan; none were used in the Balkans.12 Although "daisy cutters" are not fuel-air explosives, the United States did send at least 10 true fuel-air explosives to Afghanistan in late December.13 Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Allied Force had different objectives with regard to the respective enemies in Afghanistan and Serbia. Notably, OEF sought to remove the Taliban regime and kill or capture as many Taliban and Al Qaeda cadre as possible. Afghanistan offered many fewer fixed targets of value than did Serbia, and the Taliban's command and control network was more spartan than Milosevic's. Correspondingly, US air forces adopted new methods and protocols for rapid, flexible engagement. These were supposed to give theater air power -- including strategic bombers -- a capacity to act very quickly on intelligence and to attack emerging targets, mobile targets, and targets of opportunity more effectively.14 The synergy between air and ground forces was much more pronounced in Operation Enduring Freedom than in the 1999 Operation Allied Force. This synergy involved a greater emphasis on battlefield support for ground troops (beginning late October) and close cooperation with special and covert forces throughout the war. The Operation also relied more heavily for targeting intelligence on local insurgents.
Several of these distinctive characteristics of Operation Enduring Freedom may have contributed to an increased rate of civilian casualties relative to the experience of the 1999 Balkan war. Three are examined below: weapon mix, mission objectives, and targeting methods. By looking at these we can assess the prior plausibility of the civilian casualty rate in the Afghan war being greater than that in the 1999 Kosovo war. <snip> http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html