Still trying to understand Western commentary on Chechnya. It's just wierd.
Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 170 September 10, 2002 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] EX-PREMIER PRIMAKOV CALLS FOR REVIEWING COUNTER-TERROR TACTIC IN CHECHNYA By Yevgeny PRIMAKOV
Chechnya is Russia's largest problem and its main frontline of counter-terror struggle. But the time has come to amend the policy with regard to Chechnya. The strategy is all right in that Chechnya should remain part of the Russian Federation. But the tactic of attaining this strategic goal should be amended.
The previous policy with regard to Chechnya was only partially successful. The federal forces delivered a debilitating blow at the bandit groups, thanks to the men and officers of the army and the Interior Ministry troops. But the resistance of the bandits has not been crushed as proved by their continued mass raids, which are doing serious damage to the federal forces. It would be wrong to put the entire blame on the command, although planning could have been better. The trouble is that the Chechen problem cannot be resolved by only or at the current stage predominantly military methods.
Several special operations of the Federal Security Service (FSB) were successful and resulted in the liquidation or detainment of field commanders, including such notorious ones as Raduyev and Khattab. However, the overall command of the Chechen bandits has not been disrupted. Judging by the nature of bandit operations, they are controlled by one centre.
Some Chechens agreed to collaborate with the federal forces but this does not mean that Chechens are effectively tackling the Chechen problem on a mass scale.
Meanwhile, the bandits have not changed their tactic of doing the largest possible damage to the federal troops, staging pogroms and killing those Chechens who refuse to help them, kidnapping people, including foreigners, engaging in slave trade and staging ruthless terrorist acts against peaceful Russian citizens outside Chechnya.
What should we do in this situation? I understand that what I am going to write next may be criticised by and irritate certain quarters that are directly involved in the Chechen problem. But I have thought long and seriously and believe that I have the moral right to put forth my ideas.
First: We should take optimal action in order to separate peaceful civilians from bandits. This is the main element of the solution of the Chechen problem at the current stage. Regrettably, we failed to do this at the beginning of the counter-terror campaign, as the bandits were concentrated in settlements, and fighting and mopping up operations there led to major losses among peaceful Chechens. Of course, it is simple to be wise after the event. Yet the losses could have been smaller if the separation of peaceful civilians from the bandits was among the major tasks of the operation since its beginning.
At present the federal forces are trying to separate common people from the bandits by entrusting the powers of self- government and protection of security in Chechen settlements to Chechens. But this method is not effective and will remain ineffective for some time. There are no grounds to say that the bulk of peaceful Chechens are turning their back on the bandits even though the bandits hunt down those who tend to collaborate with the federal authorities. We must admit that contradictions between Chechens and the federal authorities proved stronger than their fear of the bandits.
Second: It is apparent that the policy of transferring executive functions in local self-governments and security establishments to Chechens will not be successful without negotiations with field commanders or at least some of them.
Neither should we place absolute trust in elections. In themselves, they will not change the situation even if respected and effective people are elected to the bodies of power. Because the situation has not yet been created in Chechnya where power could be turned over to the local forces, as in other constituent members of the federation. These forces are not yet strong enough to start fighting the bandits immediately after the elections. This struggle can be effectively stopped only by negotiations. Consequently, elections in Chechnya cannot be seen as alternative to negotiations.
Third: There are grounds to assume that Chechen bandits would like to negotiate and playing for time in order to regroup is hardly the only reason for this. After September 11, 2001 it has become more difficult to provide financial and material assistance to Chechen separatists and to send mercenaries from international terrorist centres to Chechnya, not to mention the moral assistance which they had found abroad on a much larger scale before September 11. In this sense, the US operation in Afghanistan had its positive effects on the situation Chechnya. Afghanistan has ceased to be a training and supply base for Chechen bandits.
I believe that the Saudi and Turkish authorities will now act more cautiously and control their internal forces, which helped Chechen separatists so actively before, more strictly. The same goes for Georgia, which is now more closely - although not as closely as we would like it to - gearing its policy with regard to Chechen bandits in the Pankisi Gorge to the interests of Russia-Georgia relations. We have reasons to be embarrassed by many things in Georgia's behaviour. But we must know that the struggle against Chechen separatists is only an episode, although a vital one, in Russia's relations with Georgia, a traditionally friendly country. Consequently, we must not see these relations only through the prism of our struggle against Chechen bandits, as some media and politicians are doing now.
After September 11, 2001 Vladimir Putin mentioned the possibility of negotiations between his representative and an envoy of Maskhadov. But the initiative fell through because the execution was unacceptable. The Chechen side was actually ordered to surrender weapons within 72 hours rather than invited to ponder the idea of negotiations on such surrender, as the president had intended. The conclusion is clear. Negotiations should be seen not as a game launched to suit somebody's tastes but as a carefully considered method of resolving the Chechen problem.
We should stipulate several stages of negotiations. The first should stipulate ceasefire. Before launching negotiations, Chechen representatives must publicly dissociate themselves from terrorist acts. A refusal by any one of them to do this will make negotiations impossible. Chechens must search for those field commanders who would agree to meet this obligatory demand.
I want to stress once more that the possibility of negotiations does not rule out military operations to rout bandits. To do this, a requisite part of the federal forces should remain in the republic. Besides, we should strengthen cooperation with those Chechens who have surrendered weapons and are prepared to ensure the security of their settlements.
Fourth: Not only the September 11 tragedy in the USA but also Russia's own experience prompt the need to localise the seat of Chechen separatism. The leaders of Russian republics that border on Chechnya, above all of Ingushetia, Karachayev- Cherkessia and Dagestan, should admit their responsibility for creating a situation in their republics that allows Chechen bandits to collaborate with local "colleagues" and use their territory for preparing terrorist acts in Russia. Not only the federal special services should focus their attention on these republics. There is a patriotic core in all of these republics, as vividly shown by the example of Dagestan, that can render practical assistance to the struggle of the federal forces against terrorists, including those that come from Chechnya. Federal instruments should be used to take resolute preventive administrative, political, economic and - in case of need - military measures against separatist forces in the Russian territories that border on Chechnya.
Special stress should be put on the Stavropol Territory, whose administrative border with Chechnya must be reinforced and where all suspect persons who cross this border must be carefully screened. This should be a temporary measure but it should be applied until the Chechen crisis is settled.
Fifth: It should be said, without undermining the importance of troops, which are mostly fulfilling their tasks and acting heroically and in the spirit of loyalty to their military duty, that the military must not play the dominant role in the settlement. I mean the duration of hostilities or their useless termination, as it happened in the first Chechen campaign when the Khasavyurt agreement was signed. Everyone should do his bit. Politicians should responsibly and independently elaborate decisions and energetically demand their implementation, including from the military. Those who refuse to comply with these rules or are playing their own game must be removed from action.
I believe that a representative of the Russian president should control everything in Chechnya, including economic development, the military action against the bandits and the political work with the population. This person should assume control of the Defence Ministry units, the Interior Ministry troops, the FSB agencies and local administrations in Chechnya. The Russian president should use his representative to carry through his policy in Chechnya, which could be granted the status of a special presidential area.
This single command subordinate directly to Vladimir Putin would rule out uncoordinated actions, improve discipline, strengthen the responsibility of those who are dealing with Chechnya, and preclude a situation where the number of human losses is growing because of the carelessness of army and Interior Troops commanders.
The president must be provided only with truthful and objective information about the situation in Chechnya. The reports of all services to the Kremlin must be honest and devoid of embellishments.
Sixth: We must work consistently on the Chechen problem not only with the leaders of international organisations and foreign states but also with the public, especially the public of those countries which proclaimed support for the US action against terrorism. The September 11 tragedy can facilitate a correct understanding of the situation in Chechnya. We must rule out double logic on the part of our partners or gung-ho patriotism on Russia's side.
The world must see, at long last, what heavy burden we are straining to carry and how difficult it is to fight at the forefront of the most sanguinary battle against terrorism for years without being understood. Counter-terror solidarity is not only Russia's support for the US operation in Afghanistan but also support provided by the USA, the West and all of the healthy forces on this planet to Russia's counter-terror actions in Chechnya.
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