>as Negri and Hardt argue in their book, empire and imperialism have very different meanings.
Fans of _Empire_ might take a look at an old article by Jerome Slater (a very conservative scholar who argues US foreign policy is neither "imperial" nor "imperialist"), "Is United States Foreign Policy 'Imperialist' or 'Imperial'?" _Political Science Quarterly_ 91.1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 63-87:
***** Nonradical "Imperial" Theory
Somewhat unexpectedly, in the last decade or so important aspects of this radical analysis [which saw US foreign policy as "imperialist" and explained why] have been accepted by an increasing number of nonradical, non-Marxist students of United States foreign policy, and even by some conservatives. Though it is not accurate to describe the overall United States world role as _imperialist_ or _imperialistic_, they argue, it is accurate to describe it as _imperial_. No analyst has thus far thoroughly and systematically contrasted the concept of an "imperial" role with an "imperialist" one, but it seems clear that at least four important distinctions usually are implied. First, imperial policies are seen to be primarily a function of the structure of the _international_ rather than _domestic_ system, in particular, of course, the absence of international institutions capable of maintaining peace and performing other critical governmental functions. Second, an imperial polic! y ! or posture is not fundamentally
Third, writers describing the United States as an "imperial" power are usually less inclined (although they are somewhat ambiguous on the matter) to attribute to policy makers a _conscious intent_ to dominate, whatever their motivations, than those preferring the "imperialist" label. That is, the United States play an imperial _role_ without having an imperialist _policy_. The focus is primarily on consequences, not intentions or motivations. The root cause of the American imperial role, or, alternatively, a conception of security so broad as to require imperial policies de facto, is simply power itself. _Any_ great power in the present world system is irresistibly drawn toward imperial policies, argues Raymond Aron; only weak states with no alternatives adopt a conception of the national interest restricted to mere political survival. In effect, goes the argument, interests and commitments of states naturally and inevitably expand as their power expands.
The final significant distinction is that terms "imperialist" or "imperialistic" are invariably condemnatory and indicative of a radical disaffection with United States foreign policy, whereas this is not necessarily the case for "imperial." Indeed, if imperial policies are seen as fundamentally deriving from an anarchic international system, the emphasis is far more likely to be on the "responsibilities" than on the abuse of power. For example, Aron argues that even if the American role in Europe during the postwar period could be accurately described as imperial, it was both right and desired by the people of Western Europe; and relatively conservative writers like George Liska and John Spanier call for a more open, self-conscious, unapologetic imperial role for the United States as the only alternative to global chaos. Even Tucker, who until very recently has been a most forceful critic of the American imperial conception of its national interest, has now (because of t! he!
growing power of the Third Wor
(footnotes omitted, pp. 65-) *****
Yoshie