The nature of anarchism (Lefty Despair etc.)

Justin Schwartz jkschw at hotmail.com
Sun Sep 29 20:42:42 PDT 2002



>I agree, class isn't determined by political power where the means of
>production is privately owned and controlled. And of course market
>socialism has collective ownership and theoretically collective democratic
>control. However this control would be exercised via an elected leadership.
>No problem there, as such,

So far so good.

but the problem arises from the fact that this leadership would, in addition to exercising economic power over other people, also exercise political power.This is far too much power. We have seen where it leads.

I have no idea what you mean.


>The economic power derives from the power to determine who works where and
>under what conditions.

No, in my market socialism anyone can decide to work at any cooperative taht will have her, or for the government if she can get the job. And the conditions of production will be decided by the workers themselves under democratic self-management.


>This is already more power than members of the capitalist class in our
>present society has. They at least have to compete for labour,
>theoretically. None of them exercise anything like such an absolute
>monopoly of economic power.

And so will enterprises under MS have to compete for labor.


>
>Of course market socialism tempers this with democratic checks on the
>ruling class,

There is no ruling class. Everyone able to work is a worker and has the same relation to the means of production. All are also owners. There are no employees (except for state employees). Some people are elected officials, but that doesn't make them a class.


>Now clearly, under the market socialist model, there is no guaranteed
>economic a sense of personal security.

In my model, everyone has a right to a job; if you can't find a place at a coop, the govt has to create a job for you; if you can't work, you get a decent subsidy or welfare payment.


>But any exercise of free speech which involved speaking out against top
>managers involves the very real perception of risk, that to so challenge
>the powers-that-be might bring repercussions.

The managers will probably be elected, if the coops decide on that form of management. I'd extend First AMendment protectiosn to the workplace--all enterprises would be technically owned by the govt anyway, so First AMendment protections would be extended even under our current law.


>
>And I haven't even touched on the dangers of political power being directly
>exercised by the same body exercising a monopoly on economic power.

I'd oppose that too. Fortunately, there's no such body thathas monopoly economic power. The legfislature would decide the broad outlines of economic priorities; investment decisions would be made by a state bank, and production and managenent decisions would be made by the enterprise.

Read Schweickart's Against Capitalism (or his shorter new Beyond Capitalism), so you're criticising something I'm actually advocating.


>
>The problem of economic power could be substantially ameliorated by an
>unconditional citizens income, which divorces the issue of economic
>security from the issue of management. However you refuse to consider this
>option, precisely because you complain it would remove the power to
>discipline the workforce. Yes, it would, that is the whole point, that is
>what is necessary in a free society. And a free society is obviously an
>essential prerequisite to a democratic society.

Well, if had an unconditional citizen income, we wouldn't need to get rid of capitalism. The Basic Income proposal, as it's called, has been discussed in a recent book by that title. I think it is utopian. However we cannot agree on your view that workers need no incentives.


>
>As I see it then, because of this flaw your market socialism would not be
>truly democratic. If the means of production are not genuinely subject to
>democratic control, then it cannot be said to be any more than notionally
>socially controlled. So the means of production is socially owned, in the
>sense that it is owned by the government, but not socially controlled. My
>definition of socialism is a society where the means of production is both
>socially owned and socially controlled. Market socialism fails this test.

Yes it does. The market limits democracy. Alas, I can see no way around this.

Changing the subject:


> >though I think appointed judiciaries make for better law);
> >>
> >>Indeed it does. It is appalling to think of judges currying favour and
>fearing disapproval, while trying to administer the law without fear or
>favour. Only a moral bankrupt would even contemplate such a career in the
>US.
> >
> >Oh, there are a lot of excellent elected state court judges. It leads to
>judges being tough on criminal defendants and being nice to civil
>plaintiffs, on average. The latter effect leftists cannot decry.
>
>It isn't a matter of left or right. It is simply that proper enforcement
>of the law requires that Judges preside without fear or favour. Since you
>freely admit that judges operate with a prejudice against criminal
>defendants, I am at a loss to explain how you believe that can be
>consistent with the proper administration of the law.

Well, there's a lot of unavoidable discretion in the law, for example, in making calls on what evidence is admissible. The better state court judges don't defy the law to exercise their prejudices, but they do use their discretion in accord with them. Btw, pro-civil plaintiff prejudices are jsut as much prejudices.

Back to the subject:
>
> >>Decisions about *things* would be enforceable, but not contracts between
>people.
> >>
> >
> >Give me an example I can understand. Say it is democratically decided
>by--what, the works council? the planning board?--that firm A will make
>8000 valves for kidney dialysis machines by such a date. They fail to do
>so: they're late, and half the valves are no good. How can the promise or
>decisions about things be enforced without enforcing it against someone,
>that is, against people.
>
>They can enforce that decision by installing new managers for firm A. Or
>get them made somewhere else and ask Firm A to re-fit to produce something
>less vital. This is just a routine management decision, managers have to
>take responsibility for sourcing supplies, taking into account the record
>and experience of the firms who promise to deliver.

Firing the whole management because of an ordinary breach of promise (if you won't call it contract) isa bit drastic. Likewise stripping and refiiting the firm because of a routine screwup. Why not just make them pay for the damges so that they will be more careful next time?


>Obviously the existing managers at firm A are incompetent, but it serves
>little purpose to try to punish people for incompetence. Just get new
>people and source supplies elsewhere. That's how I'd deal with it as a
>manager.

That's silly. Every contractor I have ever dealt with was late. That didn't mean that theyw ere all incompetent. Some of them were quite able. Some of them, I wouldn't use anyone else. But there have to be consequences for failure to keep promises taht people rely on.
>
> >Even supposing that no one would intentionally screw up, that's not
>enough, since there are no incentives in your story to avoid
>uninintentional screwups.
>
>Logically, if a screw-up is unintentional, incentives would have been
>irrelevant.

No, if theya re due to carelessness or overextention, the tharet of having to pay damages makes them more careful.


>
> >>You also have no incentive to be inefficient. That's a big step forward.
> >
> >Sure you do: you might not want to work so hard.
>
>Working at a leisurely pace is not an inefficiency, often it is quite the
>opposite. Haste makes waste Justin, my dad taught me that.

And a stitch in time saves nine. I don't want people, including me, to work as I long and and intensively as I and many people do. But I do want them to do their jobs when theya re doing them. People relay on others doing their jobs. The dialysis example makes the point ina n extreme way.


>A problem arises only if someone promises to work hard and then doesn't. My
>solution eliminates any incentive to make such misleading promises. People
>would instead freely admit to being a lazy bastard on their job
>application.

Well, I wouldn'te hire 'em or vote to bring them into my cooperative.


> >
> >>You would have a plan though and as much predictability as voluntary
>compliance permits. You are basically arguing that the only way to get
>people to comply with a plan, or to be efficient, is to coerce them.

Yes.


>
>My definition of "voluntary" is different to yours. To me, "voluntary"
>means without consideration of punishment if one fails to "volunteer".
>

OK, good luck.


> >
> >You neglect the free rider problem here. Why would I work to bring about
>a benefit that will accrue to me even if I don't work to bring it about?
>Particularly if my own contribution is infinitesmally small, also my say on
>in the decision.
>
>You want people to think highly of you.

That's it? But in many cases my own contribution is infinismal. The free rider problem is real and pervasive. Look around around you.

Your obsession with so-called free riders won't get you far with me though Justin. Every time you display your anachronistic Protestant work ethic like that, I picture you as a sort of Cromwellian figure in a Puritan hat. You might as well start raving about witches and possession by Satan, it seems about as relevant.

ANd I imagine you as living in the land of Faery, where everyone does as they should because it's right, no one is self-regarding. Who's living in the fantasy world? I am proud of my Jewish-Protestant work ethic. I'm worth Marx: real freedom is attained in thea ctivirty of work, in overtcoming obstacles we throw up for ourseolves.

Change of subject:
>
>
> >Contract law is about a lot more than compensation. It's mainly about
>incentives. It's intended to raise the costs of breaking your promise.
>
>Well, the courts take an entirely different view. If you attempted to
>prosecute a case in the civil courts merely on the basis of a desire to
>provide a deterrent effect, or to make a point of censuring would be
>promise-breakers, you would get very short shrift. You won't even get a
>hearing in civil courts here, if you aren't seeking substantial and
>effective redress.

No shit. But you confuse standing, the doctrine that you need an injury to bring a lawsuit, with the purposes of the law, which include, standardly, compensation and deterrence. You can't bring a suit merely to deter bad behavior that has not affected you, but if you can bring the suit, the law can be designed to deter as well as to compensate.


>
>So, unless there is a different legal doctrine operating in US
>jurisdictions, and I very much doubt it, I think you are wrong in law.

Not a chance on this one. Remember, comrade, this is what I do for a living. And I chargea fuck of a lot for it too.


> > If there are costs to doing so, people will be a lot less inclined to
>keep their promises. And all losses are personal. The people who do not get
>their dialysis machines will die as individuals,
>
>Again losses by defendants isn't the issue at all. Their losses are merely
>incidental to the compensation of the injured party.

I'm losing you here. Defendants havinbg to pay for the damage they've done--even compensatorily--deters them from from damage.


>Except for punitive damages of course. Punitive damages are rare here,
>perhaps they are more common in the US?

Punitive damagesa re basically not available in contract disputes in the US. Tort, especially intentional torts, that's another story.


>I recall a case where I took action against the Aust federal Police,
>challenging the way a warrant was executed against me. In the end I had to
>drop the damages element of the case, because of complications. (I hadn't
>suffered any damage personally and the organisation that had wasn't willing
>to risk incurring costs by becoming a party to the case.) I continued to
>seek declaratory relief, but the government solicitor nearly had the case
>thrown out. If it hadn't been for the fact that the cops refused to admit
>that they weren't intending to lay charges against me, it would have been
>thrown out.

Right, this is all about standing.


>But if the risk of legal consequences encourages people to keep their
>promises, there will be fewer such problems.
>
>My solution is to avoid the need to make promises. Surely this is just as
>effective in avoiding the problem of people breaking their promises?
>Lateral thinking mate. ;-)

Uh, and how will this help with economic interaction? I say, can you fix my sink? Sure I can. Will you? Maybe, can't say. Would you work with that plumber? But all plumbers would be taht plumber in your story.


>> >We see things quite differently. Poverty can be abolishged by social
>>democracy, and has been in the davanced European countries.
>
>That is simply untrue.

Sure it is. In Scandanavia and the Northern tier countries, poverty of the worth we have in the US is basically nonexistent.


>And in fact it is impractical to abolish poverty under capitalism, it would
>eliminate the ability to discipline the workforce you see.

A capitalsit myth disproved by the prosperity of the Northern tiet social democracies.

> What has not been attained, and cannot be attained in class society, is a roughly equal political say in decisionmaking.
>
>I'm not sure I'd agree with that. We have universal adult franchise,
>everyone gets an equal say in political decisions. The problem is with
>economic decisions, but in any case democracy is a means, not an end.

No: we get an equal vote. But the saying is: votes count, money decides.


>
> >> >>But I fail to see what would be served by attempting to coerce
>workers at a plant to do something they aren't willing to do freely.
> >>>>
> >
> >I'm a fan of worker self-management, so I wouldn't want that. But I am in
>favor of giving workers incentives to achieve desired outcomes, such as
>keeping their promises.
>
>But you are also giving them an incentive to make promises they might not
>be able to keep. The other way to give people an incentive not to break
>their promises, is to encourage them not to promise more than they feel
>like delivering.

The cost in wealth is too great.


>
>And what's wrong with laziness anyhow? You seem really obsessed with the
>notion that idle hands do the devil's work. That's bullshit, have a
>holiday, relax.
>

As I say, I'd like people to work less. A three or for day week would be great. But I want them to work while they are working.

jks

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