Iraqwar.ru

[ChrisD(RJ)]

A Russian view of the war 
By Martin Sieff
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 31 (UPI) -- Testimony to the tactical excellence of the 
U.S. armed forces in Iraq -- and a shrewd assessment of the unexpectedly 
formidable enemy they are striving to overcome -- is emerging from a 
remarkable source: Russian military intelligence, or GRU.

Daily assessments of developments in the war from Russian journalists and 
military analysts are being posted on the Internet daily at the IRAQWAR.RU 
Web site, or analytical center. The reports are described as being based on 
"Russian military intelligence reports" and contain alleged Russian 
intelligence intercepts of radio communications between U.S. and other 
coalition forces in Iraq. 

While the factual reports based on these claimed intercepts cannot be 
independently verified, and may possibly contain deliberate disinformation, 
the analytical assessments the performance of U.S. forces and the opposition

facing them is based on much material also clearly reported by U.S. and
other 
sources and verified by the Pentagon. And it is shrewd and of a high -- and 
thought-provoking -- order.

First, as different columns of coalition troops are again reported closing
in 
on Baghdad, the reports give high marks to the tactical performances of the 
U.S. forces and their remarkable ability, already displayed to adapt to 
radically different tactical problems from those they had been briefed and 
trained to expect.

"In general, the U.S. soldiers showed sufficiently high combat resilience,"
a 
March 28 report posted on the Web site concluded. "Even in the extremely 
difficult weather conditions the troops maintained control structure and 
adequately interpreted the situation."

And despite the entirely unanticipated sustained high levels of fierce 
resistance in cities throughout Iraq, "Combat spirit remained high. The 
majority of troops remained confident in their abilities, while maintaining 
belief in the superiority of their weapons and maintaining reasonable 
confidence in the way the war was being fought."

Ad the same analysis also acknowledged, "despite the sand storms, the
terrain 
favors the coalition actions by allowing it to employ their entire arsenal
of 
weapons at the greatest possible range, which makes it difficult for the 
Iraqis to conduct combat operations outside of populated areas."

Also, "The main strong side of the coalition forces was the wide
availability 
of modern reconnaissance and communications systems that allowed to detect 
the enemy at long ranges and to quickly suppress the enemy with 
well-coordinated actions of different types with different forces."

The Russian analysts also had some shrewd assessments about both the
strength 
and weakness of the Iraqi forces putting up such an unexpectedly stiff fight

against the coalition forces. In particular, they list a number of tactical 
and organizational strengths that we in UPI Analysis have been alone in 
predicting in the American media.

"Among the strong sides of their of the Iraqi troops are their excellent 
knowledge of the terrain, high quality of defensive engineering work, their 
ability to conceal their main attack forces and their resilience and 
determination in defense. The Iraqis have shown good organization in their 
command and communications structures as well as decisive and well-planned 
strategy."

What is striking about this Russian assessment is that it confirms the 
assessments of the handful of Western journalists who covered the highly 
successful Iraqi defensive operations against vastly numerically superior 
Iranian forces during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In other words, the Iraqis 
were not suddenly showing some supernatural capabilities they had never been

capable of before. The tactical skills that have been taking U.S. war 
planners and troops by surprise over the past two weeks have been a 
documented characteristic of the ordinary Iraqi army -- and not just its 
elite Republican Guard units -- for the past 20 years.

But the Russian report also documents the Iraqis' newly found skills at 
conducting guerrilla operations behind coalition lines. And this is an 
entirely new -- and from the coalition point of view, extremely unwelcome 
development that had no precedent in either the Iran-Iraq War or the 1991 
Gulf War.

"Commanders of the -- Iraqi -- special operations forces are making good use

of the available troops and weapons to conduct operations behind the front 
lines of the enemy. They use concealment, cunning and imagination," the 
report said.

But some things have not changed for the better, especially from the Soviet 
training and military doctrine that has shaped the Iraqi army for the past 4

1/2 decades.

The Russian analysts also observed: "Among the drawbacks of the Iraqi forces

is the bureaucratic inflexibility of their command, when all decisions are 
made only at the highest levels. Their top commanders also tend to stick to 
standard 'template' maneuvers and there is insufficient coordination among 
the different type of forces."

Impressive strengths and unexpected -- or all too familiar -- weaknesses of 
both U.S. forces and their foes alike. It should not come as a surprise to 
readers of these analyses. For most wars are filled with such complexities, 
ironies and reversals of fortune. As we have noted before, the "walk in the 
park," minor, "gunboat-type" conflicts that the United States conducted so 
often and so easily over the past 20 years give a misleading impression of 
the real nature of war.

It is messy and unpredictable even for the best-run campaigns and the most 
highly trained, brave and best-equipped armies -- just as the Russian 
analysts have observed.