> The point is what the left should be arguing for and my view is that
> they
> should argue consistently for human rights and democracy and social
> equality
> as ideal values. Part of that is arguing that non-violence is usually
> the
> best tactic in pursuit of those values, although there are exceptions--
> which is exactly where the social values should be in the front of the
> argument, not silly legalistic distinctions around national sovereignty.
>
> In Iraq, there was a brutal nasty regime that the American public
> rightly
> felt should in the ideal be eliminated. It was up to the left to
> articulate
> a strategy and analysis of why non-violent solidarity with the Kurds,
> Shia
> and other forces seeking democratic change was a more effective option
> than
> war. The peace movement failed to engage that issue substantially and
> mostly said do nothing.
I have thought ever since the Vietnam War that nonviolence was a wonderful idea, but as far as preventing or stopping wars is concerned, it is unfortunately still only an idea in almost all cases. Of course the peace movement "fails to engage the issue," because, though I hate to say it, nonviolent action is mostly *not* an effective option, in reality. The fate of the "human shields," kind and gentle souls who went to Iraq to "intervene nonviolently" and were ordered by the Iraqi government to go where the government wanted, is a good example.
What *concrete* way of acting on the laudable principle of nonviolent solidarity with the Kurds and Shia would have been possible in the pre-war period? Of course, demonstrating and writing letters to leading newspapers are always noble endeavors, but what do they really accomplish? And what more, specifically, could have been done? On the other hand, sending in the U.S. and British military, sadly, is very effective (leaving aside the question of what it ultimately accomplishes).
> And that was a substantial reason that large chunks of even liberal
> opinion
> moved into supporting the war. You can excuse it by saying they were
> all
> misinformed by the media and such, but it's worth understanding and
> emphasizing that two months ago, only about one-third of the public
> supported war without significant global support, as signified by UN
> endorsement, and now an additional 40% of the public now supports
> unilateral
> intervention. It is the failure of the antiwar forces to hold that 40%
> of
> the public that needs to be analyzed.
As others have said, I think that talking about the "failure of the antiwar forces" to convince the American public is a mistake. My analysis is that, deep down, much of the public were hit in their guts by 9/11 and, with the failure to get OBL, continued to thirst for revenge. The attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan was apparently not enough to quell this thirst, and Saddam was a very inviting substitute. This is why so many folks jumped to the firm conclusion that Saddam was "behind 9/11," despite all the rational arguments against this idea that the peace movement presented. People who are in the grip of this kind of blood lust pay no attention to such arguments. Calling this a "failure of the antiwar forces" is like calling the fact that a brick wall doesn't fall over when you ask it to a "failure."
In addition, I think we should honestly acknowledge that the fact (which I think nearly every one admits) that the Iraqi regime was a particularly nasty one set up a genuine ambivalence in almost all peace movement people in this country. It is much easier to be whole-heartedly antiwar when Washington is bearing down on poor, innocent Third-World peasants than when it has a Saddam in its sights. My assumption is that a lot of the crumbling of the anti-war poll figures once the war started can be accounted for by this ambivalence.
Jon Johanning // jjohanning at igc.org ________________________________ How good bad music and bad reasons sound when we march against an enemy. -- Nietzsche