By Jack A. Smith
Behind its triumphalist rhetoric, the Bush administration is haunted by the possibility that Iraq may blow up in its political face, destroying plans to reorganize the entire Middle East under U.S. hegemony.
The White House recently assigned nearly 2,000 new troops and specialists to the politically crucial task of locating at least a trace of the alleged weapons of mass destruction that served as the pretext to convince the American people to support an unjust war against Iraq.
But the missing weapons are hardly the administration's biggest worry, compared to the nightmare prospect of having the guerrilla insurgency joined by an uprising of the Shi'ite majority of the population. In addition, a plethora of other problems are afflicting President Bush and his coterie of neoconservative strategists, including evidence of gross miscalculation in organizing the entire adventure, such as:
• Given the Iraqi resistance and various difficulties plaguing the occupation authorities, the U.S. swiftly scrapped its original plan for administering Iraq based on the acceptance by the masses and the various political groupings of an invasion and a long colonial occupation. The trouble is that the new strategy, under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer, is still unable to restore essential basic services and is resorting to near-stormtrooper tactics to subdue the mounting opposition. Months after the CPA was established, the New York Times is arguing that "What is needed is a realistic and workable recovery plan."
• The White House last month had to double its minimum cost estimate for maintaining the occupation army of 150,000 from $2 billion to $4 billion a month.
• The occupation, according to Pentagon leaders in the last few weeks, will require considerably more troops than originally estimated because of Iraqi resistance. The top brass has already threatened to punish GIs who have started to complain to the press about having to serve in Iraq longer than a few months.
• This news comes at a time when Washington's military commitment to empire has reached the stage where it is running out of soldiers to patrol the world and may have to increase the size of the Armed forces. At the same time it cannot resume conscription for fear that many more young Americans will join the antiwar movement.
• The global peace movement intends to reassert itself starting in September. A planned Oct. 25 "March on the Pentagon" is particularly worrisome to the White House.
• The U.S. is desperately calling upon key allies to send troops to Iraq to participate in the occupation and to contribute money to offset the costs of reconstructing the country America destroyed with "shock and awe" bombardments and a dozen years of killer sanctions. Most traditional allies, where popular antiwar sentiment is extremely high (as it is in the great majority of countries), shun the suggestion. India announced July 14 that it would not send so-called "peacekeeping" troops to Iraq. A day later, France declined as well, among many others. Some allies are demanding a major role in developing occupation policy before they even consider becoming involved. The U.S., however, is refusing to relinquish any real authority in Iraq to allies or the UN. Poland, the Netherlands and Japan are sending troops, among some others, but most of the opportunistic Coalition of the Willing doesn't seem anxious to go beyond verbal support.
• Changing its controversial original plans for installing a reliable puppet coalition in power in Baghdad under Ahmad Chalabi, the Pentagon's darling, the U.S. has constructed an Interim Iraqi Administration, composed of 25 figures belonging to various political and ethnic factions. A "president" will rotate every month. Anything the body decides, however, must be approved by Bremer. The U.S. promises popular elections for a genuine Iraqi government will be held sometime in the future, but is delaying selection of a date until it is assured the new entity will remain in Washington's control. The CPA's immediate problem is that even the interim coalition may break apart.
• Back home, the Bush administration is in disarray due to all the unexpected problems in Iraq. Various bureaucratic agencies are indicting other agencies for mistakes in handling the war and occupation. The White House is blaming the CIA while the CIA is leaking to the press that President Bush's key henchmen are the real problem. One faction is spreading rumors that Secretary of State Colin Powell may resign after Bush's first term, while another faction denies them. The "opposition" Democrats still largely support the war but some leading politicians, including a couple of major candidates for the presidential nomination, are beginning to speak out in opposition.
• Meanwhile, guerrilla attacks are taking place daily, the occupation authorities are being criticized by human rights groups, and Saddam Hussein not only remains at large but he is issuing weekly bulletins encouraging the Iraqi people to rebel.
And yet, these problems are secondary to the greater fear haunting the Bush administration — the possible two-front insurgency in Iraq.
The immediate White House worry is that the present low-intensity guerrilla war will escalate into a medium-intensity conflict, causing the GI death toll to jump from one to five deaths a week to, say, 10 or 15. This would cause immense political problems for President Bush.
Washington is also deeply concerned about the disposition of the Shi'ite majority (60% of Iraq's population), mostly residing in the southern sector of the country. Recognizing that the Shia generally opposed the Hussein government on the grounds that it was repressive and primarily represented the interests of the Sunni minority, the Bush administration assumed they would not only welcome the invasion but totally cooperate with the occupation authorities in return for a few favors. The Shi'ites, however, have put the CPA on notice that they plan to assume political power commensurate to their numbers and that they want to U.S. to vacate Iraq "soon." The distinct implication is that they will rebel unless both desires are satisfied.
An intensified guerrilla conflict in the Sunni center of the country, and a Shia uprising in the south, combined with all the other occupation problems besetting the White House, could destroy U.S. designs in the region and President Bush's plans for reelection as well.
At this stage the U.S. is trying to grab it all, using military might, money and manipulation. Washington believes that its large-scale raids and repressive round-ups throughout the country can inhibit the growth of the guerrilla struggle, and that it can somehow find a mechanism for convincing the Shia to comply with the Bush administration's overall intentions. Those intentions consist of a quite lengthy occupation, the establishment of a secular puppet government responsive to White House instructions, permanent U.S. bases, and American control of the rebuilding process and of the country's immense oil resources. This would allow the Bush regime to begin implementing its strategy for reorganizing the governments of the Middle East, based on the new Iraqi model of secular "democracy" beholden to U.S. economic and military power.
The outcome of this aspect of the Bush administration's war is uncertain, of course. There's no telling whether the guerrilla insurgency will expand, but it shows signs of doing so. For their part, the Shi'ites are not going to bend the knee to a continuing imperial occupation and government by remote control from a non-Islamic crusader state. Some sectors of the Shi'ite population are already prepared for an uprising; another sector seeks to construct a fundamentalist Islamic government, which is anathema to the U.S. because it contradicts imperial objectives in the Middle East. If the Shi'ites do not receive a large amount of power and autonomy fairly soon, an insurrection seems entirely possible.
In the extreme, the U.S. may try to buy off the Shia majority with a grand compromise. One way might be to promise the Shi'ites de facto control of the government if they refuse to push for a formal Islamic state and agree to allow the White House to have a say in Iraqi affairs for a specific period of time, in return for which generous U.S. dollars would be invested in reconstruction and certain long-range understandings would be bartered. Part of such a bargain would probably include a U.S. promise not to invade or subvert neighboring Iran, an adventure obviously on Bush's agenda. As the only Shia-dominated country in the Islamic world, Iran's security is a matter of importance to Iraq's majority. In return, Washington would want a promise from Iran not to become further involved in Iraqi (and perhaps also Afghani) politics, along with guarantees not to build nuclear weapons and to refrain from supporting anti-Israeli combat groups.
Naturally, such a compromise is just speculation — and it may not even be required — but compared to the potential crisis and the frantic ideas that must be circulating in the White House these days, it's not that wild at all.