[lbo-talk] rational argumentation

Eubulides paraconsistent at comcast.net
Tue Dec 30 10:04:33 PST 2003


----- Original Message ----- From: "Devine, James" <jdevine at lmu.edu> To: <lbo-talk at lbo-talk.org> Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2003 5:18 PM Subject: [lbo-talk] rational argumentation

[was: RE: [lbo-talk] RE: Xmas message]

said I: a separate point: I've found that some interpret efforts at rational argumentation as being efforts at "privileging" a world-view. silly.

Ian writes:
>and who, pray tell, gets to define what rational argumentation is? :-) <


>
The meaning is pretty clear if you pay attention to the context of what I wrote: there's a difference between arguing with someone (using words, references to logic, perceived empirical reality, etc.) and _forcing_ a view on to someone (as with a privileged class using indoctrination in order to legitimate its power). In addition, there's a difference between rational argumentation and irrational argumentation (e.g., those that appeal to authority, engage in _ad hominem_, mysticism, ambiguous language, illogic, etc.)

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I never denied there was a distinction. The second part of your first sentence is what has led to the large literature on the pedagogy of the oppressed, anti-colonialist critiques of 'western science-epistemologies' and the like. That one could not enjoin those cultures to accept western norms of rationality without the conquering occurring in the first place is what has led to enormous skepticism about the benefits of them. And the very attempt by westerners to separate the issues, is, for many, yet another sign of the serious limitations of western norms of rationality and the normative concepts intimately bound up with social causation The second sentence begs the question as to just who makes and how those distinctions are made, especially with regards to logic[s].


>
usually, serious rational argument does not involve deciding that some proposition is valid or true (except deductively, i.e., given its assumptions, which themselves may be invalid, of course). Rather, it decides which propositions are invalid (e.g., astrology's claim that the stars affect our individual destinies in a meaningful and nontautological way). The propositions that survive as "non-invalid" aren't really "true" as much as being working hypotheses and the like. These working hypotheses will likely turn out to be wrong later, and to be replaced by new working hypotheses. (It's crucial to remember that more than one working hypothesis may exist at any one point, while they may contradict each other.)

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Thank you, Karl Popper. It's precisely the sentence in parentheses that causes interminable/irresolvable disputes in the quest for knowledge, which was my point. Hey, we agree on something at the end of the year, yeah! I was pointing to the issue of when one of the parties begins the appeal to signifiers such as objectivity and truth etc., as if that settles the issue......


>I once saw two physicists, one a Nobel Prize winner, nearly destroy an
overhead projector in the course of intense and very abstract/rational argument debating the minutae of Bell's theorem. The invective was palpable in the room.<

this was not rational argumentation, except perhaps in name. The only reason this story is relevant is because it shows that those who say that they're rational are often not. We knew that. There's no reason to believe anyone's own self-presentation.

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Well I was there and it was rational argumentation. Both parties were trying to overcome the underdetermination of theory by evidence problem as it related to the interpretation of a physics experiment. What happened was that with each iteration of each parties attempt to make assertions, the speed of the other parties counterassertion accelerated. It was the speed of the dialogue that created the problem, not the logical coherence of each speaker's assertions. Now, we could say that to the extent the accleration of dialogue was driven by adrenaline and ego and a forgetfulness of the lessons of underdetermination the form of the dialogue was irrational/arational but the content was not. This, of course, raises many many more questions about the sociological context of knowledge claims...........

Your last sentence would, in all probability, simply lead to global skepticism with regards to large numbers of human beings. Self-presevertion necessitating that every one else is an irrational fake or knave unless they pass muster with respect to one's own biases as to what constitutes rationality. Let's say my criteria of what constitutes a rational person is that they hold a thorough knowledge of neurochemistry or legal theory, or the predicate calculus in addition to all the other attributes that people 'normally' associate with rationality. Am I being irrational? How could you possibly prove it and how do you know you wouldn't engage in errors in reasoning in attempting to demonstrate the irrationality of my criteria? An ecologist's criteria of rationality with respect to [the] environments are far different from 'the head' of a large organization producing some 'good', even one working for an electrical engineering company or oil company who have to have a pretty thorough knowledge of said environment[s]. Which one is irrational? Is the contested rationality of environmental regulation an imposition if those who disagree with it for scientific as well as business reasons have substantive grounds for disagreeing with the axioms, methodologies and conclusions which set the context for drawing up the regulation? Bureaucratic existence is filled with such problems and to chalk up all disagreements as the result of at least one of the parties being irrational is not helpful.

"Paradoxically, a peculiarly American belief in rational decision-making and scientific determinacy, has often produced a paralysis of regulatory decision-making on issues such as setting threshold limits on carcinogens. Decision processes tend to be taken over by interminable disagreement over the 'real' risk." [Sajutha Raman] http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003/Sujatha%20Raman.pdf

No "consensus" is needed. Such a consensus is impossible, anyway, since there will always be mystics, dogmatists, fools, etc.

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Consensus on an enormous number of normative issues may be impossible without anyone being a dogmatist, fool or mystic. That was my point.

Ian



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