> Well, I think that Miles is on to something here. The
> extreme enphasis that our culture places on the role
> of individual intentions as the determining factor in
> human social behavior, goes far beyond what can
> be vindicated by modern behavioral or social science.
I can't really see the conflict here. One can acknowledge that intentions generally move action (I'm inclined to accept the stronger claim that they always move action) while granting that they don't arise ex nihilo. Social convention plays an immensley large role in shaping the preference structures of individual agents.
> Of course philosophers have been formulating various
> sorts of compatibilisms for years and years, but I think
> we should heed Ted Honderich's warning against
> accepting compatibilisms on the cheap. Any viable
> sort of scientific determinism is going to require us
> to change the way that we conceive of ourselves.
> Honderich insists that while determinism can be
> reconciled with notions of freedom as voluntariness,
> we must accept that determinism at the same time
> requires that we sacrifice our notions of freedom as
> origination. And in Honderich's opinion that does
> imply that we rethink our notions concerning such
> matters as retributive punishment and of defenses
> of social and economic inequality in terms of just
> deserts, which presuppose a conception of freedom
> as origination.
With good reason! I don't know that I'll ever understand where the retributive compatibilists are coming from.
-- Luke