On Mon, 3 Feb 2003 17:58:01 -0800 (PST) andie nachgeborenen
<andie_nachgeborenen at yahoo.com> writes:
>
> Jim F. says:
>
> > Well, I think that Miles is on to something here. The
> extreme enphasis that our culture places on the role
> of individual intentions as the determining factor in
> human social behavior, goes far beyond what can
> be vindicated by modern behavioral or social science.
>
> Given what "modern behavioral or social science" has on offer,
> that's not necessarily much of a criticism.
Well when I think of "modern behavioral science" I tend to think of Pavlov, Watson, Skinner, and others in their tradition, while when I think of "modern social science" I tend to think of Marx and his disciples. I also have time for Durkheim and some of Weber but not much else.
> But you misunderstand
> Miles' point. It wasn't that American ideology is too
> individualistic and ignores social causes of intentions. It was that
> science, or maybe philosophy, has proved that there are no such
> things, that their existence cannot be tested scientifically, and
> that they have no causal efficacy. This is full blown eliminativism
> of a fairly radical sort.
Well, Skinner as I understand him, was in part an eliminativist in that he thought that much of our mentalist language could safely be dispensed with and replaced with language describing functional relationships between environmental stimuli and operant responses. On the other hand he also seemed to think that much of our mentalist language was translatable into language describing behavioral dispositions. So, I don't think that he was as extreme an eliminativist as the Churchlands are, and to the extent that he thought that mentalist language was translatable into language describing behavior and behavioral dispositions, then his position was reminscient of Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*, and indeed, Skinner did hold Ryle (and Wittgenstein too) in fairly high regard.
>
> > Any viable
> sort of scientific determinism is going to require us
> to change the way that we conceive of ourselves.
>
> A pleasant philosophical parlor game. If you like, I will also prove
> to you that there is no such thing as personal identity through
> time, and therefore you should care less about what happens to you
> in particular; moreover that you should not fear death, which is a
> patetly irrational thing to do, and lots of other conduncrims that
> philosophers amuse themselves with.
And indeed, the Epicureans proved the irrationality of the fear of death more than two millenia ago ("When we are, death is not, when death is, then we are not. Therefore, death is of no concern for either the living or the dead"). And Hume and other philosophers have called into question the validity of our notions concerning personal identity. All that in of itself may be philosophical parlor games but given the right social conditions it can become a lot more than that.
>But the only thing that changes
> the way So if masses of people think about themselves is changes in
> their social relations.
As a Marxist, I would whole heartedly agree with that (social being determining consciousness and so forth). However, you may also wish to note that the young Marx in CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
"As philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy."
>
> So if Luke is right that:
>
>
> It actually seems quite conceivable to me that within the next
> hundred years
> or so most people in the US won't think of fetuses as persons.
>
> It will not because people have been persuaded of the correctness of
> some metaphysical views, but because feminism (underf whatever name)
> will have won some major victories.
>
> > Honderich insists that while determinism can be
> reconciled with notions of freedom as voluntariness,
> we must accept that determinism at the same time
> requires that we sacrifice our notions of freedom as
> origination. And in Honderich's opinion that does
> imply that we rethink our notions concerning such
> matters as retributive punishment and of defenses
> of social and economic inequality in terms of just
> deserts, which presuppose a conception of freedom
> as origination.
>
> But of course it would not be irrational to say that if that is what
> we must do to maintain scientific determinism of Honderich's sort,
> then to hell with it.
And indeed, apologists for the status quo would no doubt say exactly that, just as many of these same same apologists would trot out the theorems of neoclassical economics (which you yourself have condemned as being unscientific) and even the vilest forms of religious superstition, all for the sake of defending the existing order. When the status quo become irrational, then we shouldn't be too surprised if its apologists turn to irrationalism in order to defend and justify it.
>At any rate, whatever logic requires, it is
> only changes in social circumstances that will bring out such
> reconsideration. A more solidaristic and less competitive society
> might place less emphasis on the idea that what each of us
> contributes (good or bad) somehow ought to determine our lot.
> Afterwards, the philosophers will rationalize the view.
And of course, I have no quarrel with that.
>
> >
> > But more to the point, there is absolutely zero payoff
> > in esscalating a political discussion to metaphysics.
>
> That point is certainly well taken. One of the consequences
> of the development of behavioral science is that this
> issue is being gradually taken out of the hands of the
> philosophers and is being placed in the hands of behavioral
> and social scientists.
>
> A good thing, but not my point. Politics doesn't belong to the
> experts. They have a role, but they can't tell us what matters to
> us, and in a free and democratic society don't get to make the final
> decisions, only to kibitz, offer advidce, and adminster the
> decisions made by the hoi poloi -- the rest us us, including them as
> acitizens.
No quarrel there either. I was not upholding Saint-Simon's or Comte's ideas of placing the social scientists in charge of things.
Jim F.
>
> Lke says:
>
>
> I can't really see the conflict here. One can acknowledge that
> intentions
> generally move action (I'm inclined to accept the stronger claim
> that they
> always move action) while granting that they don't arise ex nihilo.
> Social
> convention plays an immensley large role in shaping the preference
> structures of individual agents.
>
> Sure, so?
>
> > With good reason! I don't know that I'll ever understand where the
> retributive compatibilists are coming from.
>
> Because not everyone is hard determinist or an autonomist?
>
> Anyway, stop with the metaphysics. It's mere entertainment, in fact
> self-indulgence, and a distraction, sort of the mental equivalent of
> spinning hula hoops. Were talking politics, and the metaphysicians
> are trying very hard to derail the conversation. "But first you must
> say what the meaning of 'is' is." Puuuleeze.
>
> jks
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------
> Do you Yahoo!?
> Yahoo! Mail Plus - Powerful. Affordable. Sign up now
________________________________________________________________ Sign Up for Juno Platinum Internet Access Today Only $9.95 per month! Visit www.juno.com