> 2) iiuc, it bears on Blix's current search. The conventional wisdom, as
> recounted once again by Kenneth Pollack last week, is that inspectors were
> pretty sure that the bulk of the weapons stocks were destroyed by 1995
> until Kamel defected and told them the opposite. And that's why Blix is
> looking for evidence that stocks that existed in 1995 were destroyed since
> -- solely on the basis of Kamel's testimony. But if Kamel said exactly
> the opposite, there is no basis for that search.
>
> This seems to imply that Blix has been kept in the dark and doesn't know
> it, which would be interesting, to put it mildly. It also means the list
> of Iraq's Things to Do would have gotten enormously shorter.
That's not quite how I read it. Kamel never led UNSCOM to hidden weapons, or evidence of hidden weapons. He led them to documents that showed Iraq's weapons programs had been more extensive than previously known. I guarantee you that Blix has read the transcripts of Kamel's debriefings. They're UNSCOM documents, which Blix has access to. That's why Blix has frequently said it shouldn't be assumed that any hidden weapons exist. Unfortunately, the list of things to do hasn't gotten shorter. UNMOVIC still needs evidence the weapons Kamel said were destroyed were actually destroyed. They can't take his word for it, even though they probably believe he was telling the truth.
Seth