Ramsey Clark Fights For Peace

debsian at pacbell.net debsian at pacbell.net
Tue Feb 25 10:52:22 PST 2003


Pending forthcoming, unlikely in the extreme, meetings of Clark with the Iraqi Communist Party,other leftist opponents of the Ba'athists, Bush and Blair in Iraq, or Kurds in the KDP and PUK (forget the PKK) in de-facto rump Kurdistan (Kurds getting fucked again, as if anyone is surprised, btw) his actions couldn't be a better gift to Perle, Wolfowitz and co. Just as in Indonesia where the US Embassy provided the military with extensive lists of Communists and trade unionists to execute in '65, the complicity of the USG in Ba'athist repression of the Iraqi Left is enormous. Michael Pugliese

National Security Archive Update, February 25, 2003 *Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984*

 

U.S. Documents Show Embrace of Saddam Hussein in Early 1980s Despite Chemical

Weapons, External Aggression, Human Rights Abuses

 

Fear of Iraq Collapse in Iran-Iraq War Motivated Reagan Administration

Support; U.S. Goals Were Access to Oil, Projection of Power, and Protection of

Allies; Rumsfeld Failed to Raise Chemical Weapons Issue in Personal Meeting

with

Saddam

 

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82

 

For more information contact:

Joyce Battle - (202) 994-7145

 

Washington, D.C., 25 February 2003 – The National Security Archive at George

Washington University today published on the Web a series of declassified U.S.

documents detailing the U.S. embrace of Saddam Hussein in the early 1980’s,

including the renewal of diplomatic relations that had been suspended since

1967. The documents show that during this period of renewed U.S. support for

Saddam, he had invaded his neighbor (Iran), had long-range nuclear aspirations

that would “probably” include “an eventual nuclear weapon capability,

harbored known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens,

and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people. The

U.S. response was to renew ties, to provide intelligence and aid to ensure

Iraq would not be defeated by Iran, and to send a high-level presidential

envoy named Donald Rumsfeld to shake hands with Saddam (20 December 1983).

 

The declassified documents posted today include the briefing materials and

diplomatic reporting on two Rumsfeld trips to Baghdad, reports on Iraqi

chemical weapons use concurrent with the Reagan administration’s decision to

support Iraq, and decision directives signed by President Reagan that reveal

the specific U.S. priorities for the region: preserving access to oil,

expanding U.S. ability to project military power in the region, and protecting

local allies from internal and external threats. The documents include:

 

* A U.S. cable recording the December 20, 1983 conversation between Donald

Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein. Although Rumsfeld said during a September 21,

2002 CNN interview, “In that visit, I cautioned him about the use of chemical

weapons, as a matter of fact, and discussed a host of other things,” the

document indicates there was no mention of chemical weapons. Rumsfeld did

raise the issue in his subsequent meeting with Iraqi official Tariq Aziz.

 

* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114 of November 26, 1983, "U.S.

Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," delineating U.S. priorities: the ability to

project military force in the Persian Gulf and to protect oil supplies,

without reference to chemical weapons or human rights concerns.

 

* National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 139 of April 5, 1984, "Measures

to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the

Iran-Iraq War," focusing again on increased access for U.S. military forces in

the Persian Gulf and enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities. The

directive calls for “unambiguous” condemnation of chemical weapons use,

without naming Iraq, but places “equal stress” on protecting Iraq from Iran’s

“ruthless and inhumane tactics.” The directive orders preparation of “a plan

of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse.

 

* U.S. and Iraqi consultations about Iran’s 1984 draft resolution seeking

United Nations Security Council condemnation of Iraq’s chemical weapons use.

Iraq conveyed several requests to the U.S. about the resolution, including its

preference for a lower-level response and one that did not name any country in

connection with chemical warfare; the final result complied with Iraq’s

requests.

 

* The 1984 public U.S. condemnation of chemical weapons use in the Iran- Iraq

war, which said, referring to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s refusal to agree to end

hostilities until Saddam Hussein was ejected from power, “The United States

finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its

avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq

to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the

moral and religious basis which it claims."

 

Follow the link below to view the documents:

 

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82

 

_________________________________________________________________________

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non- governmental research

institute and library located at The George Washington University in

Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents

acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax- exempt public

charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is

supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and

individuals.

_________________________________________________________________________

PRIVACY NOTICE

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-- Michael Pugliese

"Without knowing that we knew nothing, we went on talking without listening to each other. Sometimes we flattered and praised each other, understanding that we would be flattered and praised in return. Other times we abused and shouted at each other, as if we were in a madhouse." -Tolstoy

-- Michael Pugliese

"Without knowing that we knew nothing, we went on talking without listening to

each other. Sometimes we flattered and praised each other, understanding that

we would be flattered and praised in return. Other times we abused and shouted

at each other, as if we were in a madhouse." -Tolstoy



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