CHECHNYA: The Mujahedin Factor - Part 1 of 3 Yossef Bodansky, Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, Houston, TX, 1998.
Roots Russia's original conquest and submission of Chechnya and Dagestan in a lengthy campaign between 1825 and 1859 was most challenging. Local resistance peaked with the revolt under Imam Shamil during the 1850s. Shamil's surrender to Tsar Alexander II did not end the fighting, as Russian columns continued to be attacked in the 1860s. Ultimately, however, the local population was exhausted into submission. Still, the revolt revived whenever the local population sensed a weakening in the Russian power. The North Caucasus resisted by force the imposition of Soviet rule between 1917 and 1921, with isolated clashes continuing into the 1930s. During the Second World War, the Caucasian revolt against Soviet rule flared again in cooperation with the German invasion. This revolt was brutally suppressed by Stalin in 1944, including a mass exile of the local population into the heart of Central Asia. At the same time, however, the Caucasian population developed a unique way of life where Islam was a manifestation of nationalism and self-identity. Although Muslims, the Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus did not manifest any strict following of traditional Islam, let alone fundamentalism. By the middle of the 20th century, through prolonged exposure to the Russian presence (both Imperial Russia and the USSR), the Caucasians underwent a near-complete Russification. For example, the Chechens speak Russian even among themselves and very few of them know how to pray. Indeed, General Dzhokar Dudayev, the original leader of the Chechen revolt rose in the ranks of the Soviet Air Force, including a post of commander of a bomber regiment equipped with nuclear weapons -- a highly sensitive command post one would not have been assigned unless thoroughly Russified and fully trusted by Moscow. Dudayev was married to a Russian and his break with Moscow occurred over the violent suppression of the nationalist movements in the Baltic states, and not in the Caucasus. Indeed, when the present wave of the Chechen revolt began in the early 1990s, it too had a distinct nationalist character and was an integral part of the disintegration of the USSR. .... It was during this phase of the fighting that Dudayev raised the Islamic factor for the first time. He described the Chechen war against Russia as a Jihad, while appealing for greater support from the Muslim World. This, however, was slow to come because Iran and other key Muslim states were in the midst of strategic negotiations with Moscow and support for the Chechens would adversely affect this expanding relationship. Islamabad became directly involved in the active support for the Chechen Jihad already in the spring of 1994. At that time, the ISI-sponsored Taliban offensive endangered the flow of Heroin from Afghanistan which served to finance the Chechen revolt. Islamabad intervened to ensure the continued flow of drugs, as well as capitalize on the relationship between the Chechens and ISI-sponsored Afghans, then maintained via Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami as a front, in order to expand the ISI's direct relations with the Chechen leadership. Consequently, between April and June 1994, a high-level Chechen delegation headed by a lieutenant of Dudayev's named Shamil Basayev visited the ISI-sponsored terrorist training infrastructure in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the Chechens visited the ISI's training facilities in the Khowst area, then run under the banner of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. In Pakistan, the Chechens had a series of high level meetings with the Pakistani leadership -- particularly with Gen. Babar, Defense Minister Gen. Aftab Shahban Mirani, and General Javid Ashraf of the ISI (who was presented as the head of the ISI branch in charge of support for, and sponsorship of, Islamist causes). These three officials became the patrons of the Chechen Jihad, arranging for the establishment of a comprehensive training and arming program for the Chechens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Chechens also met with former ISI Chief, General Hamid Gul, and an aid of his named Col. Imam, who would assist the Chechens in arranging for local connections and contacts for their drugs and weapons smuggling operations. Moreover, Gen. Babar intervened with the Taliban leadership already in early 1994 to ensure the uninterrupted flow of Heroin from the Helmand valley. However, the Heroin was now shipped northwards to the airfield near Chitral from where the drugs, as well as a growing number of Chechens and 'Afghan' volunteers, were flown to Chechnya. Islamabad intervened to ensure the continued flow of drugs. The training of the Chechens began immediately. The first hundred or so Chechens were added to the ISI-run training camps near Khowst where between two and three hundred Uzbeks and Tajiks were already being trained in guerrilla warfare and prepared for the export of the Islamist revolution into their homelands. Most important were the advanced sabotage and guerrilla warfare courses provided to a select few Chechens in the Markaz-i-Dawar center in Pakistan. In the Fall of 1994, in order to expedite the flow of expertise to Chechnya, the ISI organized mixed detachments made of recently trained Chechens and veteran Pakistani operatives, most of them with long combat experience in the ranks of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. These forces brought with them large quantities of weapons and ammunition. In addition, fighters from an ISI battalion of Afghan Mujahedin stationed in Pakistan were also dispatched to Chechnya in late 1994 to bolster the Pakistani-Chechen detachments. These Pakistani-led detachments saw combat already around the first of 1995. Significantly, the ISI retained combat and tactical control over these detachments. The Pakistani commanders maintained radio communications with their HQ in Pakistan, not dissimilar to communications maintained between the Islamist forces in Kashmir and their rear bases in Pakistan. Meanwhile, in late 1994, the international Islamist leadership, particularly the Armed Islamic Movement sponsored by Iran and Sudan, adopted the Chechen war as a Jihad. Senior Islamist commanders and emissaries deployed to Grozny from where they coordinated their activities with the authorities in such places as Tehran, Khartoum, and Islamabad. Their early reports noted the growing Islamicization of everyday life in Chechnya under direct orders from Dudayev. Consequently, between late 1994 and early 1995, several Islamist charities associated with the pursuit of militant Jihad (from Kashmir and Afghanistan to Bosnia) began establishing front offices in Chechnya. The flow of money and Mujahedin, many of them veterans of previous Jihads, began soon afterwards. "Mujahedin from around the world have been arriving at the Caucasus area to join with their brethren in the fight of the aggressor occupying forces of the Russian forces who came to subjugate Muslim Caucasia under their Christian Orthodox rule," the commanders reported in late December 1994. Thus, by the time fighting erupted in late December 1994, the Islamist command and control system was already functioning. .... The outbreak of hostilities constituted a tactical surprise, catching the main Mujahedin forces still unprepared. However, reinforcements of people and weapons were rushed to Chechnya. Thus, in early January, the Grozny-based commanders reported that "Mujahedin are still arriving from all neighboring Muslim states to give the Russian enemy a taste of its own medicine." A week later, the commanders' reports were more upbeat concerning the Islamicization of the Chechen struggle and the impact of the foreign Mujahedin. "Green Flags are flying throughout the city, marking high moral and strong Islamic spirit, and Mujahedin are seen praying in groups on the charred streets of Muslim Grozny. Many held their Qur'an along with their personal weapons. The words of Allah-hu-Akbar in Arabic are seen written in some visible areas by some Mujahedin arriving from other countries. Several Mujahedin of the Martyrdom unit wore distinct black bands around their heads, they vowed resistance to the end." In mid January, at the height of the battle of Grozny, the commanders reported that "a number of Pakistani Mujahedin have arrived in Grozny and are now fully mobilized along their Chechen brothers." .... In late January, the Islamist commanders reported the launch of terrorist operations against the Russians by a joint force of 'Afghan' Arabs and Islamist Chechens. "Mujahedin have mounted an organized and disciplined Martyrdom operation which instilled fear and terror among enemy ranks. Several Mujahedin have dressed up in Russian soldiers uniform, even with fake Russian ID, military ID cards, and are penetrating deep inside Russian lines, at ammunition supply and Command centers, they are strapping their bodies with explosives and are blowing themselves up. Russian enemy special forces were reportedly firing at anything that moves including animals for fear of Mujahedin Martyrdom attacks." At the same time, the Grozny-based commanders were worried by reports reaching them according to which "Russian enemy tanks are filling the streets in neighboring Muslim Dagestan, and Russian army have mobilized 40 to 50 thousand troops at the Chechen-Dagestani borders with Azerbaijan to prevent Mujahedin and relief convoys from passing." Nevertheless, in mid February, the Islamists were able to expand the flow of Mujahedin and equipment from Iran via Azerbaijan and Dagestan. One of the most important reinforcing forces that arrived in this wave was an organized group of hardened Gulf (Saudis, Kuwaitis, etc.) and Maghribi (Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, etc.) Arab Mujahedin under the command of one Khattab. Khattab is a Beduin from north west Saudi Arabia and/or southern Jordan. Over the years he has identified himself as both a Saudi Arabian and a Jordanian, depending on the circumstances. Khattab would soon emerge as one of the more important commanders in Chechnya. Shamil Basayev organized the first known incident of nuclear terrorism.
In early April 1995, the Islamist commanders reported that "Azeri and other Caucasus volunteers have been waiting in training camps in the mountains for their turn to carry out attacks on the Russian enemy and on the Georgian troops if they try to intervene." By June, these military measures developed into a strategic reorientation of the war. During the Summer, the Chechnya-based commanders kept reporting the deterioration of the situation in Chechnya, a continued withdrawal of Chechen and Islamist forces to remote mountain sites, a few hit-and-run attacks, and acute logistical shortages. At the same time, however, they announced the beginning of region-wide mobilization in order to orchestrate a widespread rebellion against Russia. "The Caucasus area does not belong to Russia, it belongs to its Muslim people from the Black to the Caspian sea. The area was savagely suppressed and occupied by criminal Russia about 150 years ago, now is the time for every Muslim to share the reward of freeing the land of the free, Caucasia."
While Moscow could cope with a low level of insurgency in the Caucasus, it
could not tolerate international terrorism.
These were not ideological tracts. The entire region was preparing for a
major escalation in the fighting to be initiated by the Chechen and Islamist
forces. In late June, the Islamist commanders reported that "[Chechen]
Mujahedin have announced that they are preparing horses and mules, and that
the coming months will require a lot of effort. Mujahedin have organized
themselves in several Battalions, and have spread throughout the Muslim
lands of the Caucasus."
Significantly, in preparation for the anticipated escalation, the on-site
Islamist commanders conducted a thorough study of the Muslim forces
operating in Chechnya. "In Chechnya today, there are three Mujahedin groups
which are all united under one banner: 'La Illaha Illa Allah, Muhammad
Rasoolu Allah.' The first group is the Mujahedin themselves led by their
Ameer and they have strong knowledge of Islam, the second group is the
Government troops, and they also practice Islam as much as they know, and
are sure that victory will only come from Allah, but this group also have
some minor Bid'a and that is why good Muslim Da'wa is needed. The third
group is led by a brother called 'Shamil' [Basayev who is] named after the
great Imam and Mujahid Shamil who defeated the Russians for over 25 years.
This group is also abiding by Islam, and all three groups are working
together and have the responsibilities divided among them. In short the
banner of Islam and Jihad is now very clear, Alhamdulillah in Chechnya." The
commanders recommended the marked escalation of the fighting in Chechnya --
particularly the launching of an offensive against the Russians as well as
spectacular terrorist strikes into the heart of Russia.
....
> In the long run, the most perturbing development is the Islamicization of
> the population in Chechnya. During this current, more prolonged cessation
> of fighting holding, the extent of the Islamist influence in Chechnya is
> becoming apparent. The popular Islamicization which is being enforced by
> Chechen fighters is a profound and most dangerous phenomenon because of
> the local historical circumstances. Although Muslim, the peoples of the
> Caucasus have followed the traditions of their tribes and nationalities,
> relying on codes of behavior and Muridism, rather than on 'classic' Islam,
> to guide them. A series of fierce rebellions were motivated by the
> strength of tribalism and Muridism, most notably demonstrated in Shamil's
> revolt. In contrast, there is no local tradition of Islamism or of strict
> following of Islamic codes in the Caucasus. Hence, with the collapse of
> the Soviet and Russian legal system, the population should have revived
> the traditional social and legal system.
> Instead, Chechnya has emerged as a fertile soil for a popular Islamist
> surge. Furthermore, the most conservative variant of the Sharia is being
> enforced in Chechnya in a revolutionary manner. Chechen fighters impose
> the Sharia by force or through Islamist revolutionary courts. The Ulama,
> most of them educated in Islamist schools abroad, oversee the
> establishment of Councils of Ulama as the only judicial organs in
> Chechnya. The Chechen Ulama are aided by numerous religious experts from
> the Arab World, Iran and Pakistan. Their enforcement of the Sharia is
> draconic. In the rebel-held parts of Grozny, the main law in the city is
> now the Sharia. Campaigns for the enforcement of a strict "modest" dress
> code for women and against alcohol are already being conducted. People
> detained for consumption of alcohol in public are flogged with a cane. A
> thief caught will have his hand cut off. These social norms have been
> imported along with the Islamist assistance for, and thorough manipulation
> of, the Chechen revolt. Thus, the enforcement of, and support for,
> Islamism are recently imported phenomena. The prominence of the
> Islamicization is the most important manifestation and expression of the
> inherent strength of influence cast by the sponsoring states, the foreign
> Mujahedin, and their local proteges.
> Chechnya has emerged as a fertile soil for a popular Islamist surge.
> Therefore, in the longer range, and irrespective of the fortunes of the
> negotiated settlement now being worked out, there remains the ticking
> time-bomb -- the Chechens trained and indoctrinated in Afghanistan,
> Pakistan and Iran. The mere fact that Shamil Basayev visited Afghanistan
> and Pakistan twice recently to inspect and modify the training programs
> provided to his people, is a reflection of the importance of these
> fighters.
> By the Fall of 1997, several hundreds of Chechens were being trained in
> ISI-sponsored camps near Warsaj (Takhar), Jabal ol-Saraj (Parwan), Khowst
> (Paktia), and other smaller sites. Some 250 Chechens were undergoing
> clandestine training in a camp near Peshawar by ISI operatives and expert
> terrorists from Egypt and Sudan. Some 100 Chechens were being trained by
> the ISI in the Lahore area in sophisticated terrorism and urban warfare. A
> VEVAK-run terrorism training base in Ziarat Jah (Herat) was transferred to
> Gorgan (Mazandaran, Iran) in the Fall of 1995 because of the fighting.
> Chechens now attend other Islamist higher terrorism schools in Iran under
> the control of al-Quds forces. Several hundreds Mujahedin, mainly Afghans
> and Chechens, were being trained by Iranian intelligence and the HizbAllah
> in Sudan. Moreover, in the spring of 1996, in anticipation for a marked
> escalation, about 400 Chechens were sent to HizbAllah training camps in
> the Biqaa, Lebanon, to undergo the six-month advance courses run by
> Iranian Pasdaran instructors. These training programs still continue in
> early 1998, with new classes made of young Chechens replacing the
> graduates that returned Chechnya. Ultimately, the mere presence of
> Chechens in these terrorism schools is indicative of Tehran's and
> Islamabad's trust.
>