In the first part of this series, there was a discussion of the misuse of the term "middle class" when referring to a certain group of wage earners and consumers in Russia today. In this follow-up, I review some of the necessary conditions for the term to have any significant meaning. All of these conditions, unfortunately, remained tied, even hostage, to the current government's reform project.
The ability of the citizens to effect social change is still dependent on the well-known tradition of Russia's very specific historical experience with the "trickle-down effect." What Russia is experiencing now is a repeat of tried – and failed – practices with little indication that tradition is about to be overturned.
For Russia to have a middle class, its civil-society project has to start making real progress. Being able to travel abroad, own a mobile telephone and afford fashionable Western apparel are not important when it comes to defining members of the middle class. Nor do they serve as evidence that civil society exists. Civil society comes in different forms and is based on different foundations in different places and times. It is also a set of practices and established traditions that respect the empowerment of citizens and their right to make political and financial decisions. In short, money is not the only element necessary for the rise of this class. At this juncture, money is the only thing that the so-called "middle class" in Russia has. This is an uninspiring beginning for a group that, at least in theory, should become the dominant political and economic force in the Russian society.
In today's Russia, money is part of the "discourse of power." The middle class must have a "discourse of representation," and its self-confidence derived from what it contributes to the society. Most of the people considered to be part of this class are traders and service providers; few actually make anything or export anything with a competitive advantage.
This is very important. To date, the acclaimed "Russian middle class" talked about by Western pundits has lacked the ability to grow. It is common knowledge that the number of small businesses – and entrepreneurs in general – is much smaller than before the August 1998 financial meltdown. At the same time, this group of consumers appears to be getting larger. Why? Small businesses and entrepreneurs may be in decline, but the influx of investment into the economy by Russia's raw-materials-export mandarins is on the increase. In many ways, our mythical middle class is a by-product of high raw-materials commodity prices around the world. This is not the strongest leg to stand on for those who define themselves in terms of conspicuous consumption while taking advantage of cheap and state-subsidized social services.
The individuals who are said to be in the "middle class" are remarkably apolitical. They are, in fact, politically homeless. Once the government forces it to pay for the social services it takes for granted, this group will find itself with decreased disposal income, and, as a result, demand will slow. This just might be the best thing to happen for this stratum of society, which has gotten used to some of the finer things in life. Who knows, they just might want to protest, using the present political system, to protect the privileged lifestyle they have learned to appreciate over the past few years.
Those who claim Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) represent the middle class are delusional – or at best attempting to apply Western political theory to Russia without the slightest interest in basing their conclusions on reality. Yabloko and the SPS seem quite happy to be the Kremlin's loyal-opposition think tanks. This is the service both parties provide to the Kremlin, and it may prove to be in the latter's best interest to see them find a place among the victors in the new parliament following this year's elections. At present, the SPS and Yabloko are courting Russia's fun-loving and complacent consumers of "staples of decency" without much effect.
However, it will be an encouraging sign when those threatened with the loss of that icon of well-being, the mobile telephone, in the event of an economic shock turn to the these two parties. When this happens, it might be a blessing for democracy and the civil-society project. After all, protest is at the heart of a meaningful middle class.
In what may be an exercise in counterintuitive thinking, the best thing the government could do is to demand those who are thought to belong to Russia's middle class to fight for their lifestyles, which may engender the process of identity creation so sorely lacking among this stratum of the population.
The government needs to protect those who cannot protect themselves while, at the same time, it has limited leverage over those who control so much of the economy. The current government would also be well-advised to create a Middle Class Ministry to protect those who desire the visible perks of being what is considered prosperous and modern out of self-preservation. In doing so, a real and politically significant Russian middle class will have a vested interest in this country. The super-rich can always expatriate their wealth, and Russia's post-communist poor will have to be managed as a tragic generational problem. Those who want to emulate their Western peers just might save Russia, mobile telephones in tow.
(Peter Lavelle is a Moscow-based analyst and the author of "Peter Lavelle's Weekly Russia Report"available at www.russiareport.ru and the Russian Business report at business.russiareport.ru.)