> By the
> 1890s, sure, Germany was semi-industrialized, but still had a very large
> hinterlands (as did France, incidentally). The geography of the thing was,
> the Ruhr industrialized pretty rapidly, but much of the output was devoted
> to building the Reich's military machine; the eastern regions of Germany
> remained fairly undeveloped. Politically, this was the source of the
> infamous alliance of iron and rye, i.e. Ruhr industrialists and Prussian
> Junkers.
>
> -- DRR
Well, I hate to tiresomely belabor a point, but really, the emergence of Germany as an industrial power _par excellence_ is one of the most elementary facts of 19th century European history. It was not a "partially" or "lightly" industrialized country, but one of the three leading industrial states in the world at the time. Germany had its export-dependent agricultural lands east of the Elbe river, just as the US had its midwestern breadbasket and agrarian south. So what? I have never before heard anyone refer to 19th century Germany as a "periphery" by virtue of this fact. The industrial plants and factories of the Ruhr and other regions were not all enterprises devoted mainly to the production of war materiel, but privately owned firms producing the full panoply of industrial products, from raw steel to pots and pans to turbines. Germany did not become the world's leading exporter of manufactured goods by cranking out artillery pieces.
The significance of the famous "alliance of iron and rye" was that the semi-feudal east Elbian grain growers combined politically with the industrialists in support of the Bismarckian Reich and a policy of protective tariffs (the eastern conservatives had been dubious about German unification and had favored a free trade policy). Domestically, both staunchly defended the existing social and political order, and both favored an aggressive foreign policy built around colonial acquisitions and "navalism," the construction of a large battle fleet consciously intended to rival and surpass Britain's. In Germany, there was no ocasional alliance between the progressive bourgeoisie and social democracy in favor of political reform, against the old aristocracy. That possibility died in 1848, and was buried in 1871. Instead, the bourgeoisie tended to adopt the values and ethos of the aristocracy. It has often been said that Wilhelmine Germany "projected social tension outward," that is, diverted the potential for social upheaval through constant war preparation and a series of foreign adventures. Post-1871 Germany thus presents a curious paradox. It was economically, technologically, and scientifically, the most advanced country in the world, but at the same time politically backward, a quasi-parliamentary democracy and a quasi-autocracy all at once. When combined with the reckless and irresponsible leadership of Wilhelm II and his men, it proved a deadly brew, and not just for Germany.
Jacob Conrad