[lbo-talk] Note on Lieven

[Michael Pollak]

Lieven makes in passing a hugely important point.  In Vietnam -- as well
as in every guerrilla war that strategists have ever previously considered
-- what you had was war against a state.  Because of that, guerrilla
forces had to be substantial, and the losses they inflicted had to be
substantial.  That was why you needed the three stages of the Mao/Giap
strategy; why you needed large forces; and why you needed safe havens.
And this was why people assumed that guerrilla resistance in Iraq was
impossible.  Historically the desert was a great safe haven, up there with
mountains and jungles.  But all that changed after WWI with the military
application of the airplane.  Since then, the only long-running guerrilla
wars in the middle east have been in mountainous regions.

However in Iraq and Afghanistan *you have no state.* You have no everyday
security of property and person, and no functioning economy that provides
for people's needs.  This is historically new, the result of our
historically new instant invasions.  And this changes the entire guerrilla
equation into something never seen before.  Now the resistance doesn't
have to topple a state.  All it has to do is keep a state and stable
economy from coming into existence.  This is an infinitely easier task and
one that hugely leverages their power.  All they have to do to
perpetuate the
current insecurity is commit random acts of violence and sabotage.  It
takes very little to accomplish it, and it is impossible to guard against
because you can't guard every mile of pipeline and every electrical pylon
(especially when most of your force is devoted to defending itself).  And
they don't even need to sabotage much.  So long as they keep the police
from being effective, massive poverty will ensure the looters act like a
continual cloud of locusts.  Iraq is now the world's biggest exporter of
copper for recycling -- and it produces no copper.

Furthermore, as long as pervasive insecurity is perpetuated, there can be
no investment, no aid and no democracy.  And since *we created the chaos
through the invasion,* its perpetuation, and the poverty, sickness and
crime that go with it, will be considered our fault.  For, the people will
reason, how can such massive military might that was just on display be
stopped by mere pinpricks? But without the force multiplier of legitimacy,
it's impossible to produce civil peace.  The demands are astronomic.  You
need a policeman for every adult in the country.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq the resistance seems to have hit on this same
strategy.  Very few fighters are needed and almost no central
coordination.  Add dire poverty, and mix in a few outside funds, and you
have the recipe for something that could conceivably go on forever based
on an endless pool of angry weekend warriors willing to try it once.

In other words, a quagmire, although based on very different principles.

Perhaps we should update that image, which was more appropriate to the
jungles of Vietnam.  For Iraq, the better image would probably be the one
the French came to use to to sum up their experience in Algeria -- a
sandstorm.  Blinding, gumming up all works, and unbelievably destructive
for such a seemingly trivial event.  People who are trapped in one are
literally eroded to death.

Michael