> > However in Iraq and Afghanistan *you have no state.* You have no
> > everyday security of property and person, and no functioning economy
> > that provides for people's needs. This is historically new, the
> > result of our historically new instant invasions.
>
> It depends what is meant by "economy".
I'm sorry, that was a bit compressed. I was only concerned with the economy insofar as it can be the basis for a polity. So I meant firstly an economy that provides for basic needs; second an economy you can build a state on; and thirdly, and economy you could base a democracy on. At the moment you have none of them in Iraq or Afghanistan. And without security, you can't take the first steps toward buiding them. You can't get the infrastructure built (roads in Afghanistan, power lines in Iraq). Nor can you have aid projects in Afghanistan nor investment in Iraq.
All of this gives a historically new leverage to small random acts of violence and sabotage.
It's useful to compare the Algerian revolution. There's a guerrilla war threw out the oppressors. But not only didn't they they do that by terrorism alone, their campaign of urban terrorism was a complete failure from a military point of view.
People forget this when they watch Pontecorvo's brilliant movie because of the wonderful way he jumps ahead 6 years in 30 seconds at the end. But it's in there. The one-year, 1956 urban terrorism campaign that constituted "The Battle of Algiers" ended in a decisive defeat for the FLN and a decisive victory for the paras. When they catch that last guy in the hiding in the wall, they have completely uprooted the last vestige of the resistance in Algiers. It was such a devasting blow that it took a year for the FLN to recover into an effective force again. Paras became the heros of France that young boys wanted to be and that girls wanted to date. It really looked like France had won.
The lesson the FLN drew was that the urban terrorism strategy and backfired bigtime, and they returned to their original strategy that had been working up until then: war in the wilayas, in the countryside. That's where the Algerian war was won. As well as in Metropolitan France. And Bandung and the UN.
And that's generally the case. Every successful guerrilla movement has engaged in random urban violence and sabotage to one degree or another. It was used in Vietnam, it was used in China, it was used in Kenya. Sometimes it might be useful. But it has never succeeded by itself and has often detracted. It has never been by itself a real threat to already established states.
But in non-established states, I argue, things are different. Here, theoretically (everything at this point is theoretical, since we're making guess about the future of something that is historically new), random violence can keep them from ever being established, just by itself. This means there doesn't need to be large forces and safe harbours for resistance to be prolonged and effective. And for better or for worse -- and I mean that ambivalence quite strongly -- it means there doesn't need to be a unified resistance movement to pull it off. Several small cadres, or outside funding, fed by young men willing to take part once or twice out of anger or honor, could theoretically be enough to keep it going forever.
BTW, I would note in passing on that last point that killing people who kill your kinsmen, even by "accident" is one of the essential points of honor in both countries. And attacking from hiding is perfectly compatible with that honor because it's connected with a different tradition of warfare: raiding.
Michael