> > ----------
> > From: Vlad Spanu
> > Reply To: Moldova at moldova.org mailing list
> > Sent: Wednesday, July 9, 2003 4:54
> > To: Moldova at moldova.org mailing list
> > Subject: Will the EU Become Europe?s Main Peacekeeper?
> >
> > WILL THE EU BECOME EUROPE'S MAIN PEACEKEEPER?
> > By Vladimir Socor
> >
> > The Wall Street Journal Europe; June 27-29, 2003
> >
> > The 20th century ended in 1991, leaving four huge pieces of
> > unfinished post-Soviet business for the West to tackle. A decade, more
> > or less, elapsed before the West finally rose to the challenge--and not
> > until that unfinished business had returned to haunt the West in the
> > Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Those problem areas are being stabilized
> > now, owing primarily to the American-led NATO and "coalitions of the
> > willing." Meanwhile, the countries situated between the Baltic and the
> > Black seas are set to join NATO and the European Union. The remaining
> > piece of unfinished business for the enlarging West is that of securing
> > and integrating its immediate perimeter: the still "gray" areas of
> > Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.
> >
> > Europe will not be complete or secure without Ukraine, Belarus,
> > Moldova and the Black Sea-Caspian Sea corridor integrated with it. A
> > history of Russian rule has bequeathed vulnerable and failing states
> > here, in Europe's backyard and on its doorstep. Most of these countries
> > face--indeed, they invite through their weakness--a wide range of
> > security threats and risks, not just to themselves but to Europe as a
> > whole. These include organized international crime, the drug trade, arms
> > trafficking, illegal migration, political manipulation of ethnic
> > conflicts and the insecurity of energy supply routes. To a large extent
> > these problems, whether they originate in Russia or the wider Middle
> > East, are spilling over into the EU through its new direct neighbors.
> >
> > While those "soft threats" beset all of the EU's
> > eastern-neighborhood countries, some of them also face risks and threats
> > in the area of "hard security." These stem from post-Soviet instability
> > and from current attempts to pull those countries into Russia's
> > political and security orbit.
> >
> > For instance, military presence and political tutelage under the
> > guise of peacekeeping are central goals of Russian policy in Moldova and
> > in Georgia. In both countries, Russian troops act as "peacekeepers"
> > between the legitimate governments and secessionist forces that Russia
> > itself has created and armed. The Kremlin farcically "mediates" between
> > the legitimate governments and its own proxies, seeking political
> > settlements that would legalize those proxies in power, and would cast
> > Russia in a new role as "guarantor" of such dispensations, with its
> > troops in place and a semblance of international blessing.
> >
> > Thus far, the West has rightly turned down Russia's requests in
> > this regard. So Moscow has been pushing for the Organization for
> > Security and Cooperation in Europe to develop a peacekeeping role,
> > assuming the OSCE's role would be confined to authorizing Russia itself
> > in the lead role to "guarantee stability" in ex-Soviet countries. Such a
> > maneuver would all but exclude NATO and the EU from this region's
> > security arrangements, acknowledge Russia's primacy, and bestow a
> > semblance of international legitimacy on what wound in fact become a
> > Russian sphere of influence. At the moment, Moscow prefers to work
> > through the OSCE because it has a major say in this organization with
> > respect to the ex-Soviet domain.
> >
> > Some months ago, NATO and the United States envisaged
> > participating jointly with Russia in peace-support operations in
> > post-Soviet countries, and there were NATO-Russia exploratory talks on
> > the subject. By now, however, America and its NATO allies must reckon
> > with the prospect of overextension elsewhere; the U.S. and allied
> > countries are redeploying troops from the Balkans to Iraq, Afghanistan
> > and other theaters of operations.
> >
> > Yet the EU is at last acquiring peace-support capabilities, so
> > the stage seems set for the EU to become Europe's main peacekeeper. In
> > this rapidly-changing context, Moldova has become a focus of attention.
> >
> > The OSCE, meanwhile, struggling to reinvent itself, has
> > concluded that the frozen conflict in Moldova is more amenable to an
> > early settlement than other enduring conflicts in the post-Soviet area.
> > This year's Dutch chairmanship of the OSCE hopes to rescue the
> > organization from irrelevance through a quick success in Moldova. The
> > U.S. State Department, still reluctant to raise the Moldova issue with
> > Russia directly and at high levels, is now pursuing this issue through
> > the OSCE more energetically than ever. These players appear intent on
> > scoring a "success" by a self-imposed deadline in November-December this
> > year, at the cost of awarding Russia a dominant say in the post-conflict
> > dispensation in Moldova.
> >
> > The EU is also beginning to look at Moldova to test its emergent
> > peace-support capabilities, as part of developing its European Security
> > and Defense Policy. The European Commission's Communication on Wider
> > Europe Neighborhood (draft guidelines made public in March 2003)
> > mentions for the first time a possible peace-support role for the EU in
> > its new post-Soviet neighborhood -- namely, in Moldova. Last month, the
> > EU's Paris-based Institute for Security Studies issued an ambitious, if
> > tentative, proposal for direct EU-Russia cooperation on European
> > security affairs (ISS, "Russia Faces Europe," May 2003). Some elements
> > of this proposal appear designed to set the stage--and the
> > precedent--for the EU to bypass the U.S. and NATO, though the ISS
> > disclaims such intent. The proposal's author, Dov Lynch, singles out
> > Moldova as the country in which such EU-Russia cooperation can be put to
> > a promising test.
> >
> > This proposal would create an entirely new format for
> > negotiations and post-conflict guarantees in Moldova. The existing
> > format, Russia-Ukraine-OSCE, is clearly dominated by Russia. The ISS
> > proposal calls for a new body that would be co-chaired by the EU and
> > Russia, and include (along with Ukraine) Moldova's neighbor Romania--a
> > NATO invitee and prospective EU member. The OSCE would retain a seat at
> > the table, but the EU would take over essential political and security
> > responsibilities in Moldova. The EU and Russia would, each, provide
> > troops for a very brief peace-support operation. After that,
> > peace-support and post-conflict guarantees would rely mainly on police
> > units. The goal is de-militarization; Russia's troops would leave, and
> > Trans-Dniester's own army would be demobilized.
> >
> > These ideas are clearly more promising in terms of securing
> > Moldova for the West, and of stabilizing the region in the West's
> > interests, than the current joint offer from Russia and the OSCE. That
> > offer excludes a direct Western role in the negotiations and the
> > post-conflict guarantees. It would legalize Trans-Dniester's
> > secessionists in power; allow some Russian troops to remain (as part of
> > an internationalized force of unspecified composition); retain
> > Trans-Dniester's army, Russian in all but its official name; and place
> > Moldova under mainly Russian political "guarantees," without a direct
> > Western role.
> >
> > On the other hand, the general context of the ISS proposal would
> > seem to suggest that it regards Moldova as a playground for EU-U.S.
> > competition in Europe. Some American diplomats already view the ISS
> > proposal in this light, complaining that it "excludes" the U.S. Some may
> > even be tempted to thwart a full-fledged EU role, so as to frustrate
> > the ESDP of an early success.
> >
> > Yet the ISS proposal does advance overall Western interests in
> > this region. The U.S. should pool efforts with the EU to ensure a common
> > success. Then, Moldova would become a test case not for EU-Russia
> > cooperation bypassing the U.S., but rather a test for Euro-Atlantic
> > cooperation to guarantee the enlarging West's interests along its new
> > borders.
> >
> > Mr. Socor is a senior fellow of the Washington-based Institute for
> > Advanced Strategic & Political Studies.
> >
> > ***************************
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