> ...Assessing the challenges facing U.S. troops
RAY SUAREZ: For more on the situation facing U.S. forces in Iraq and what can be done about it, we get three perspectives. Colonel W. Patrick Lang is a former Army Middle East intelligence analyst and former Special Forces officer. Retired Marine Corps Colonel Gary Anderson had extensive experience commanding troops, saw combat in Somalia, and has focused extensively on urban combat operations. And Louis Cantori is a professor of political science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He has written extensively about the Middle East. Gentlemen, welcome all.
Given what we've seen since the president declared an end to active hostilities, how would you describe what we're seeing now, Colonel Anderson, and the level of threat to U.S. forces in the field?
COL. GARY ANDERSON: I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld. We are not seeing a classic three-stage guerrilla war, or if we are, the Ba'athists have badly botched it. Normally what happens in the first stage of such a conflict is that the guerrillas -- the insurgents -- lay low, they organize, they do sabotage, undermine the government -- which they are doing. But they don't attack the enemy's strength. And they don't -- they don't encourage the enemy to come to strength in their sanctuary, which really the -- Fallujah - - what is called the Ba'athist Triangle there, should be their natural sanctuary, so now what they've done by acting as precipitously as they have, if in fact this is -- the Ba'athists are behind it -- and I believe they are behind a lot of it -- they have tipped their hand a little bit too early and exposed their cadres.
So quite frankly I don't -- I don't think -- if it's their game, I think they've made a mistake. I frankly think they have another model. I think they're going to attempt to cause us to overreact to the various incidents that are occurring, do something that might incite the population to a popular uprising like Tehran in '79 or the people power thing in Manila. That makes more sense to me. It's entirely possible they're just shooting people to see what happens. But it makes more sense to use that model. But that's very dangerous for them
RAY SUAREZ: Colonel Lang, what do those attacks look like to you and what are they a sign of?
COL. W. PATRICK LANG: I think you have to remember this is Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and places like these, these are big built up areas in an open country where there are not a lot of trees or things like this. If there is going to be resistance, it has to be in the towns pretty much and at night along the roads. That's largely the pattern of what has been happening here. And as I look at these, the pattern of the... emerging pattern of more and more of these attacks, many, many small attacks in different places, and increasing levels of weaponry -- now they're using mortars. You don't learn to use 82 millimeter mortar, which is what they probably got, by walking down the street somewhere. Somebody has to teach you.
This looks like a reasonably organized effort by at least some of the factions as Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about and I would add former officers and men of the Iraqi army to that who have been dispossessed in their career and living in the process. So I don't see a reason not to think that this, in fact, real resistance that is effective in terms of its political effect. Everybody knows that they can't destroy the U.S. Army. But what is intended here is some sort of political effect, maybe the one Colonel Anderson means, but some sort of political effect.
The political dimension to the situation in Iraq
RAY SUAREZ: Well, Professor Cantori, let's look at it in a political dimension. When Mr. Bremer, when other U.S. officials say they see signs of growing coordination in these attacks, what should we conclude from that?
LOUIS CANTORI: Well, I think we need to start with a little bit of sociology in order to explain the following. These attacks are coming from what is called the Sunni Triangle, which is Baghdad and cities to the North and to the West. And what is characteristic of this area is that historically it was heavily tribalized. Then it... became agricultural. As it became agricultural, different social social groupings were created. Now, what I'm trying to describe very quickly is a kind of onion. There are layers of classes and groups and so forth in this situation.
.From '91 onward, when the sanctions began to cut at the society, what began to happen is the formal organizations that had been set up in that area began to deteriorate. And what has happened is that area now is back to a basic structure of tribalism. But it is not simply tribalism, because there are probably Ba'athist elements involved in this as well. But the Ba'athist leaders themselves have tribal backgrounds and loyalties. So from this comes discipline, and from this comes coherence.
We don't need command and control in this type of an operation. It resembles the Palestinian resistance the same way. In other words, there is a task that is to be accomplished. You must kill Americans if you want to make their presence in the country awkward and if you want to get rid of them. And everyone understands that's the task at hand. Then what happens is different groups bring their different talents to bear on this. And then what I think we're experiencing is, this is becoming sustained. There is a social reservoir for this, and it has elements of revenge and of offenses that are taken at the Americans' effort to try to repress all of this and so forth and so on.
So I think this guerrilla warfare is real, and I think it is enduring, and I don't think that the American forces have the capability of being able to deal with this effectively.
RAY SUAREZ: You wanted to say something?
COL. W. PATRICK LANG: There is no reason to think this is going to die out of its own accord. I agree with Professor Cantori. I think... taking into account these processes he is talking about, and the different groups that Secretary Rumsfeld is talking about, there is a sufficient well of resentment, hatred, nationalism, anti-American feeling there that it can go on generating resistance to us for quite a long time.
RAY SUAREZ: And a lot of young men with nothing to do, right?
COL. W. PATRICK LANG: Exactly. Especially all those soldiers who were sent home with their weapons and no paycheck every month, to tell mama why it is they can't bring groceries home anymore. That's a big problem. And this could go on for a long time. A lot of these counter guerrilla operations like Sidewinder, if you are not careful, they may net you a few people, but they also irritate the devil out of people in the area where you conduct the operation. There is a cordoned search, and you search these houses that are full of women. And if he and I know a great deal about Arabs, I think, and in fact you do that in somebody's house, you make him so mad he can't hardly stand himself. So you got to be careful there isn't a big negative effect there.
RAY SUAREZ: So what is the military response?
COL. GARY ANDERSON: No insurgency has ever been won militarily. The military can control it. They can control the manifestations of it. But if you want to nip an insurgency in the bud -- and we are in the bud stage right now -- you take away the causes. There are two drums that the Ba'athists are beating right now. The Americans are occupiers, and things are not -- things are worse than they were under Saddam Hussein.
Things are going to get better. Ambassador Bremer is working hard to put the country back on its feet. Things are getting better in the South. They'll get better if we can stop the sabotage that's going on in the Sunni Triangle. And things are going pretty well in the North. But as that happens, then one of those causes goes away.
Second cause, the Americans are occupiers. How do you deal with that? You start to put Iraqi security forces on the street, slowly reduce the American presence to a very healthy reaction force to deal with situations when they might start to get out of hand. But get the Iraqis on the streets doing the searches, doing the things that they need to do. And then all the Ba'athists have to do is run on their record, which is not particularly good. <SNIP>