>> I always said --
>> you can look it up in the archives -- that we _knew_
>> that there were no WMDs, otherwise the US would not
>> have attacked Iraq.
>
> I'll take your word, Justin, that you always "knew." But Saddam surely
> had
> weapons in 1991
http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
IRAQ
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs[1]
Nuclear[2]
With sufficient black-market uranium or plutonium, Iraq probably could
fabricate a nuclear weapon. If undetected and unobstructed, could produce
weapons-grade fissile material within several years. Engaged in clandestine
procurement of special nuclear weapon-related equipment. Retains large and
experienced pool of nuclear scientists and technicians. Retains nuclear
weapons design, and may retain related components and software. Repeatedly
violated its obligations under the NPT, which Iraq ratified on 10/29/69.
Repeatedly violated its obligations under United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapon
capabilities. Until halted by Coalition air attacks and UNSCOM disarmament
efforts, Iraq had an extensive nuclear weapon development program that
began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget
totaling approximately $10 billion. In 1990, Iraq also launched a crash
program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear
weapons. Considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using
unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-
Hussein derivative with 650km range. In 1987, Iraq reportedly field tested
a radiological bomb. Biological[3]
May retain stockpile of biological weapon (BW) munitions, including over
150 R-400 aerial bombs, and 25 or more special chemical/biological Al-
Hussein ballistic missile warheads. May retain biological weapon sprayers
for Mirage F-1 aircraft. May retain mobile production facility with
capacity to produce "dry" biological agents (i.e., with long shelf life and
optimized for dissemination). Has not accounted for 17 metric tonnes of BW
growth media. May possess smallpox virus; tested camelpox prior to Gulf
War. Maintains technical expertise and equipment to resume production of
Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax), botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and
Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene). Prepared BW munitions for missile
and aircraft delivery in 1990-1991 Gulf War; this included loading al-
Hussein ballistic missile warheads and R-400 aerial bombs with Bacillis
anthracis. Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial
vehicles. Repeatedly violated its obligations under UNSC Resolution 687,
which mandates destruction of Iraq's biological weapon capabilities.
Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire
agreement. Chemical[4]
May retain stockpile of chemical weapon (CW) munitions, including 25 or
more special chemical/biological al-Hussein ballistic missile warheads,
2,000 aerial bombs, 15,000-25,000 rockets, and 15,000 artillery shells.
Believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of
tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents. Reconstructing former
dual-use CW production facilities that were destroyed by U.S. bombing.
Retains sufficient technical expertise to revive CW programs within months.
Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-
1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. An extensive CW arsenal–including 38,537
munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor
chemicals–has been destroyed by UNSCOM. Repeatedly violated its obligations
under UNSC Resolution 687, which mandates destruction of Iraq's chemical
weapon capabilities. Not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Ballistic missiles[5]
May retain several al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles with 650km range
and 500kg payload. May retain components for dozens of Scud-B and al-
Hussein missiles, as well as indigenously produced Scud missile engines.
Maintains clandestine procurement network to import missile components.
Reconstructing missile production facilities destroyed in 1998 by U.S.
bombing. May possess several hundred tons of propellant for Scud missiles.
If undetected and unobstructed, could resume production of al-Hussein
missiles; could develop 3,000km-range missiles within five years; could
develop ICBM within 15 years. Launched 331 Scud-B missiles at Iran during
the Iran-Iraq war, and 189 al-Hussein missiles at Iranian cities during the
1988 "War of the Cities." Developing Ababil-100 with 150km range and 300kg
payload, flight-testing al-Samoud with 140km range and 300kg payload, and
producing Ababil-50 with 50km range and 95kg payload. Cruise missiles[6]
C-601/Nisa 28 and HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload. SS-N-2c
Styx with 80km range and 513kg payload. Exocet AM-39 with 50km range and
165kg payload. YJ-1/C-801 with 40km range and 165kg payload. Other delivery
systems[7]
Reportedly converting L-29 jet trainers to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
for delivery of BW or CW. May possess spraying equipment for BW
dissemination by helicopter. Experimented with MIG-21 as unmanned delivery
vehicle for BW. Fighter and ground attack forces may total 300 fixed-wing
aircraft, including Su-25, Su-24MK, Su-20, Su-7, MiG-29, MiG-25, MiG-23BN,
MiG-21, Mirage F1EQ5, and F-7. Ground systems include artillery and rocket
launchers, notably 500+ FROG-7 artillery rockets and 12-15 launchers, with
70km range and 450kg payload.
Sources:
[1] This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a Iraq's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently. Although inspections by UNSCOM and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team provided detailed information about past Iraqi programs, assessing Iraq's current capabilities is difficult due to its policies of denial and deception, and to its expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in November 1998.
On Iraq's deception and denial policies, see: Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000). David Albright, "Masters of Deception," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:3 (May/June 1998). Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of Hide and Seek," Washington Post, 10/11/98. Barton Gellman, "Arms Inspectors ‘Shake the Tree," Washington Post, 10/12/98.
On UNSCOM's efforts to disarm Iraq of WMD, see Robert Einhorn, Robert Gallucci, Dimitri Perricos, Jere Nichols, Gary Dillon, Ephraim Asculai, and Michael Eisenstadt, 6/14-15/01, transcripts from a conference, "Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review," Washington, DC. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/index.html>. Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets-The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).
[2] IAEA Action Team on Iraq, 7/13/01, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme," International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Kelly Motz, undated [accessed 9/12/01] "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601>. William J. Broad, "Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq," New York Times, 4/29/01, p. 16. David Albright, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," PolicyWatch #301, 2/18/98, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/301.htm>.
U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>. Steven Dolley, 5/12/98, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/iraq/iraq511.htm>. Steven Dolley, 2/19/98, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/i/ib21998.htm>. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 85-86. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50.
[3] United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Report: Disarmament, 1/25/99, United Nations, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm>. Motz undated. Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2/17/98), pp. 1-5. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Cordesman 2001, pp. 81-84. Gellman 1998. Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, 1993, 14(3): 229-71.
[4]U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," 9/7/01, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>. Motz undated. Javed Ali, Spring 2001, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Bowman 1998, pp. 1-5. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr 1998, p. 18. Cordesman 2001, pp. 75-79. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," 5/98, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>. Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2.
[5] CIA 9/7/01. Cordesman 2001, pp.71-75. "German Assessment: Iraqi Missiles Will Reach Europe by 2005," Deutsche Presse Agentur (Berlin), 2/23/00, <http://www.BerlinOnline.de>. Jane's Online, "Country Inventory – In Service," and "Offensive Weapons, Iraq," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 36, 7/24/01, <http://online.janes.com>. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, 9/99, <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missle_developments.htm>.
Carnegie Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, undated [accessed 8/14/01], "World Missile Chart, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm>.
Motz undated. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Federation of American Scientists, undated, "Iraq," <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/>. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), undated, "National Briefings: Iraq," "Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country," and "Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/>. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr, p. 18. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989). Interview with Tim McCarthy, Senior Missile Analyst, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 4/30/98.
[6] National Defense Industrial Association, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: Volume 2, Emerging Cruise Missile Threat, 8/99, <http://www.ndia.org/committees/slaad/ECMTVol2.pdf>, pp. 138-145. CDISS, undated, "Emerging Cruise Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/images/tabled.htm>.
[7] CIA 9/7/01. Motz undated. Jane's Online 7/24/01. The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 141.
http://www.yale.edu/yup/books/075820.htm
The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence Avigdor Haselkorn ISBN 0-300-07582-0 Yale University Press, 1999
-- Michael Pugliese