> NEWS RELEASE
> COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
These are, generally, things that are needed to rebuild civil society. Public safety has to be protected, and the infrastructure of common needs (food supplies, jobs, works projects) should be established to a degree that encourages trust.
> The group identifies seven critical goals and makes specific
> recommendations to accomplish them:
>
· Establish public safety in all parts of the country. Virtually every
Iraqi and most CPA and coalition military officials cited this as their
number one concern. The current configuration of composite security forces
(U.S., coalition, and Iraqi) does not adequately support the reconstruction
mission.
· Expand Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process at the national,
provincial and local levels, and ensure success of the newly formed Iraqi
Governing Council.
· Put people to work and provide basic economic and social services
immediately. Short term public works projects are needed, as is a massive
micro-credit program.
With an unstable economy, there's a danger that the most reliable job market'll be among the security forces, i.e., public works will come and go, but they'll always need cops, soldiers, security, interrogations specialists, people with weapons to keep the angry, unemployed rabble in line, etc. In other words, a lot will be riding on how well the other public works efforts will be supported and funded.
The establishment of micro-credit programs isn't a bad idea, generally. It allows participation in the banking and credit system at much lower levels of income. And establishing them should help crowd out loansharking and other exploitative credit systems (as with the former Soviet Union).
· Decentralize reconstruction efforts. They are too big to be handled exclusively by the central occupying authority and national Iraqi Governing Council.
This'll probably be read as code for "turn everything over to the free market," and we can expect a lot of little fiefdoms to pop up if there's not enough central authority over them. But a degree of decentralization allows for greater resiliency; there's room for experimentation, and less likelihood that a bad policy decision will ruin everything.
· Implement a concerted, even relentless full-scale marketing campaign to effect a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind--from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope.
Okay, that sounds like utter PR bullshit at best, and the phrase "re- education" should pop to mind almost immediately. But it's going to be needed, if only to help people live in a country where Saddam is gone. (It's analogous to counseling people after a traumatic event or an abusive childhood.) The more that Iraqis participate in (and profit by) reconstruction efforts, the more successful this might be. (In other words, if Brown and Root or Halliburton are siphoning off billions while Iraqi children starve, the Iraqis are not going to have any reason to trust in whatever society gets established.)
· Quickly mobilize and broaden a new reconstruction coalition that includes countries and organizations beyond the original war fighting coalition.
In other words, integrate the global economy with Iraq. Not a bad principle, but how likely is it that they'll apply it to Iraq's number-one natural resource?
· Make money more forthcoming and more flexible. "Business as usual" is not an option for operations in Iraq, nor can it be for their funding. CPA will need supplemental appropriations to get through fiscal year 2004, and oil revenue projections for the next few years are low.
Good idea, but one fears for the usual World Bank/IMF leveraging of whole countries into unpayable debt.