Wednesday, May 21, 2003
Pakistan - a US garrison?
G. Parthasarathy
If Gen Pervez Musharraf is indispensable for the US' war on terrorism, it is because he has gone a long way in accommodating American military requirements for Afghan operations. He has also provided facilities for the FBI and the CIA that no self-respecting democratic government would. New Delhi should not get too excited about this. It should set an agenda for cooperation with Washington and spell out to it what the bottomline is on the US cuddling with its favourite general, says G. Parthasarathy.
ALARM bells started ringing in the Carter White House in December 1979 when Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. These concerns were not because of any great love for the people of Afghanistan, but because of fears that the Soviet military action was a prelude to efforts to challenge American power and influence in the oil rich Persian Gulf. On January 23, 1980, the US President, Mr Jimmy Carter, declared: "Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the USA, and such an assault will be repelled by all means necessary, including military force".
The establishment of a formidable "Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force" (RDJTF) immediately followed this enunciation of the "Carter Doctrine." When Carter relinquished office in 1981, the RDJTF had become a force of 200.000, with over 100,000 from the army, 50,000 from the marines and the rest comprising elements of the air force and navy.
The RDJTF grew in size and firepower with the passage of time and became a full-fledged military command designated as the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in January 1983. Successive American Presidents obtained bases and military facilities from which American forces could operate in countries ranging from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Egypt and Kenya to Singapore and Australia. These bases and facilities supplemented the Diego Garcia base to enable the US to intervene expeditiously and effectively whenever it desired. CENTCOM today has an area of responsibility covering 25 countries in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea and in Central and South Asia. Pakistan is today the eastern tier of the CENTCOM theatre of operations. It is largely because of access to bases and facilities in these regions that the US was able to intervene decisively during operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991 and more recently in Afghanistan and once again in Iraq.
The CENTCOM recently described the wide-ranging cooperation and support that it receives from the Government of Gen Pervez Musharraf. Describing the support from Pakistan in the aftermath of the terrorist strikes of 9/11 as "prompt" and "unequivocal", the CENTCOM outlined the actual support that it received in Pakistan between October 2001 and October 2002. Islamabad has provided five bases on its territory from which CENTCOM forces operate in Afghanistan. It has also agreed that in an emergency American aircraft can operate out of and land in any air base in the country. More important, Pakistan leased out two-thirds of its entire air space for American military operations in Afghanistan. This space was then not available for use either by Pakistani military or civilian aircraft.
A total of 57,800 sorties have been undertaken by American aircraft from bases in Pakistan with an average fuel consumption of 400000 litres per day.
Pakistan has provided landing facilities for US ships in Pasni, where 8,000 marines, 330 vehicles and 1350 tonnes of supplies were offloaded and transported to Kandahar. Pakistan curtailed naval exercises and operations and to permit US/coalition naval forces to operate in the Arabian Sea. The CENTCOM has also revealed the extent of cooperation received in operations against terrorists within Pakistan. The US made 2160 "requests" to Pakistan for different types of assistance. Pakistan took "action" on 2008 of them. The two sides conducted 99 raids during which 332 of the 420 foreign nationals arrested were handed over to the US for interrogation and incarceration at Guantanamo Bay. Pakistan has also concluded a memorandum of understanding with the US providing naval and air base facilities in Karachi for the International Stabilisation Force, now operating in Afghanistan under NATO Command.
The CENTCOM document claims that Pakistan initially deployed two Corps and 55000 paramilitary personnel to support its operations in Afghanistan. Following the tensions with India, this force was reduced to three brigades and around 45000 paramilitary forces.
Anyone reading the CENTCOM report will notice that portions regarding the Pakistani contribution of forces and its relations with India have been written by a Pakistani and not an American military official. The CENTCOM has been careless and naive in using statements given to it by the Pakistan military, rather than depending on its own independent analysis. New Delhi will no doubt draw the attention of the Pentagon to this.
The recent CENTCOM data provide an insight into the reasons why the US regards Gen Musharraf as almost indispensable for its war on terrorism. Unlike such military leaders as Gen Aslam Beg and Lt Gen Hamid Gul, Gen Musharraf has gone a long way in accommodating American military requirements for operations in Afghanistan. He has also provided facilities for the FBI and the CIA to operate in Pakistan that no self-respecting democratic government would agree to. This also explains why the US Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell, looks the other way or obfuscates when Pakistan supplies nuclear enrichment facilities to North Korea, or the ISI provides haven to Taliban leaders and support to its favourite Jehadis in Jammu and Kashmir.
It is now obvious that the Bush Administration will happily support the authoritarian dispensation of Gen Musharraf as long as he is able to periodically arrest a few Al Qaeda leaders. Gen Musharraf knows that the primary interest of the Bush Administration is to eliminate the Al Qaeda, because it is this group alone that has the global reach to attack the US itself. The arrest of a few Al Qaeda leaders every now and then enables Gen Musharraf get continuing American support.
The timing of the information provided by the CENTCOM is interesting. The CENTCOM holds that as a result of supporting the American war on terrorism, Pakistan has incurred a cost of $10 billion. This is obviously based on data supplied by the GHQ in Rawalpindi. Interestingly, reports from Pakistan now suggest that it is precisely a sum of $10 billion that Gen Musharraf will demand from the Americans as economic assistance for services rendered, when he meets the President, Mr George Bush, at Camp David. Thus, what Gen Musharraf will seek in Washington is continuing military and economic assistance over the next five years. Obtaining such a commitment from Washington will serve him well in continuing as President, even as he dons the uniform of a four star General. And in the likes of Colin Powell, Tommy Franks and Anthony Zinni, he will find no dearth of American four star Generals to espouse his cause.
New Delhi should take note of, but not get too excited, about these developments. It should have its own agenda for cooperation with the US and privately spell out to the Americans what the bottomline is on their cuddling their favourite Pakistani General. The time has also come to end excessive focus of attention on Pakistan. There is no need to publicly respond to every statement or move that Islamabad makes. It would be ideal if our Government and media could publicly adopt a policy of benign neglect towards Pakistan, even as we privately engage Islamabad with the pro-active agenda that the External Affairs Minister, Mr Yashwant Sinha, has spoken of, and remain prepared to respond appropriately to likely contingencies. The international community is sick and tired of hearing Pakistan speak of its "core issue" and of our endlessly repeating the mantra about ending "cross-border terrorism".
(The author is former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
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