On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:32:39 -0400 Brian Siano <siano at mail.med.upenn.edu>
writes:
> Jim Farmelant wrote:
>
> >The term evil is uselful for theologians, moral philosophers,
> >and metaphysicians but I fail to see its utility for social
> >scientists, behavioral scientists or scientific historians.
> >When people use it in historical analysis, the concept tends
> >to act as an obstacle to further inquiry. Thus, as has already
> >been pointed out when people label Stalin "evil" they tend
> >not to pursue any sort of a deeper causal analysis into the
> >phenomenon of Stalinism. Stalin killed lots of people because
> >he was "evil", and "evil" people tend to do that sort of thing,
> >no further analysis being required. This tends to support
> >a "great man" view of historuy (or perhaps in this case
> >an "evil man" view of history).
> >
> >
> I've heard this argument before, and every time I hear it, it sounds
>
> more and more ridiculous.
I wonder if you find E.H. Carr's version of the argument ridiculous as well?
"The more serious ambiguity arises over the question of moral judgements on public actions. Belief in the duty of the historian to pronounce moral judgements on his dramatis personae has a long pedigree. But it was never more powerful than in nineteenth-century Britain, when it was reinforced both by the moralizing tendencies of the age and by the uninhabited cult of individualism. Roesbery remarked that what the English people wanted to know about Napoleon was whether he was a "good man." Acton in his correspondence with Creighton declared that the "inflexibility if the moral code is the secret of authority, the dignity, and the utility of History," and claimed to make history "an arbiter of controversy, a guide of the wanderer, the upholder of that moral standard which the powers of earth and of religion itself tend constantly to depress" - a view based on Acton's almost mystical belief in the objectivity and supremacy of historical facts which apparently requires and entitles the historian, in the name of History as a sort of superhistorical power to pass moral judgements on individuals participating in historical events. This attitude still sometimes reappears in unexpected forms. Professor Toynbee described Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 as a "deliberate personal sin"; and Sir Isaiah Berlin in the essay already quoted insists with great vehemence that it is the duty of the historian "to judge Charlemagne or Napoleon or Genghis Khan or Hitler or Stalin for their massacres." This view has been sufficiently castigated by Professor Knowles , who in his inaugural lecture quoted Motley's denunciation of Philip II ("if there are vices . . . from which he was exempt, it is because it is not permitted by human nature to attain perfection even in evil"), and Stubb's description of King John ("polluted with every crime that could disgrace a man"), as instanced of moral judgements on individuals which it is not within the competence of the historian to pronounce: "The historian is not a judge, still less a hanging judge." But Croce also has a fine passage on this point, which I would like to quote:
The accusation forgets the great difference that out
tribunals (whether juridical or moral) are present-day
tribunals designed for living, active, and dangerous
men, while those other men have already appeared
before the tribunal of their day, and cannot be condemned
or absolved twice. They cannot be held responsible before
any tribunal whatsoever, just because they are men
of the past who belong to the peace of the past and as
such can only be subjects of history, and can suffer no
other judgement than that which penetrates and
understands the spirit of their work . . . Those who
on the plea of narrating history bustle about as judges,
condemning here and giving absolution there, because
they think that this is the office of history . . . are
generally recognized as devoid of historical sense.
"And if anyone cavils at the statement that it is not our business to pass judgement on Hitler or Stalin - or, if you like, on Senator McCarthy - this is because they were the contemporaries of many of us, because hundreds of thousands of those who suffered directly or indirectly from their actions are still alive, and because, precisely for those reasons, it is difficult for us to approach them as historians and to divest ourselves of other capacities which might justify us in passing judgement on their deeds: this is one of the embarrassments - I would say, the principle embarrassment - of the contemporary historian. But what profit does anyone find today in denouncing the sins of Charlemagne or of Napoleon?"
A little later on, Carr does say that it is part of the historian's work to pass judgement on past social institutions so while the historian will not pass moral judgement on individual oriental despots, he will pass judgement on say the instutions of oriental depotism as compared to say the institutions of Periclean Athens.
Jim F.
>
> First of all, you're starting off by presuming that the audience is
> a
> bunch of know-nothing thimblebrains who react to the word "evil"
> with a
> complete and irrational shut-down. If that's your going assumption
> of
> the audience, then why would you even _bother_ to present them with
> the
> pearls of your painstaking analysis? You might as well read Voltaire
> to
> a cage of mountain gorillas. (Can't imagine what you make of Noam
> Chomsky, who presumes that average people are _very_ capable of
> subtle
> and informed analysis, and speaks to _that_ capability.)
>
> Second, look at what you're asking. We're talking about a man
> responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent human beings,
> whose
> state apparatus imprisoned, tortured, and murdered thousand on the
> slightest of pretexts, and whose influence deformed the history of
> the
> human race for years after his death. And you say we cannot use the
> word
> "evil" to describe him, merely because some dumb people might not
> listen
> to a careful analysis about him. (And in this case, it's Chris's
> analysis arguing Stalin's perfect rationality and superior political
>
> skills.) If you can't call _that_ track record evil, then how could
> you
> present even a feeble opposition to _any_ kind of brutality?
>
> Third, why the hell should any of us be hamstrung from using simple,
>
> direct language because there might be dumb people out there? Look,
> Jim,
> most of us on this list count ourselves among the American Left.
> Many us
> of have no trouble saying that the United States exports terrorism,
> has
> a track record of crushing democratic movements in other countries,
> and
> has caused a tremendous amount of misery. And there are dumb people
> who,
> upon hearing us say such things, will shut down their brains and
> denounce us as Commies or lunatics even if we don't use the word
> "evil."
> (Not a big problem, generally.) But does this prevent us from using
> plain, direct language, or making moral judgements? Obviously not.
>
> So, why are we expected to suspend our language? I'd hate to think
> it
> was because the subject was Joseph Stalin, because it'd be genuinely
>
> dishonest for all the wrong reasons, and it'd give credence to
> creeps
> like David Horowitz and Ann Coulter. But I suspect there's a kind of
>
> elitism lurking in this argument as well: that the common folk, with
>
> their primitive notions, can't appreciate the sophisticated and
> hyperaestheticized insights of Our Crowd.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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