>These are elements of an elementary moral compass. One has to be able to call an evil >act "evil," or to call a policy or leader "insane" or "lunatic." Otherwise, one enters into a >kind of deranged pedantry, where the worst acts and greatest sufferings must meet >exacting standards of definition before one can even think of condemning them.
Where does it say that a psychological judgement has to turn to a moral/ethical judgement has to then turn into an value judgement? I can understand how morality has a place in such a value judgement, but not psychological judgement. If I say that Stalin acts rationally, which he does occasionally, that isn't to say that it's a model that we should follow, just that he is in possession of the facts of a situation, and is able to manipulate that situation to follow an end which he wishes to reach.
>In criticizing Chris, you seem to be equating 'rational' with 'good.' But if you look at >things in class terms, a leader can be perfectly rational and sensible acting in the >interests of his class (take Bush, for example), which can mean catastrophe for another >class. Men act in rational ways to oppress women. Beating us up, for example, is not >insane, it's part of a rational calculation that we will be more obedient afterwards. Doesn't >make it less bad, in ways you could say it's worse since it's an exercise of class power >not a random bad act which has no other effect.
I agree with this. In fact, Badiou writes in Ethics that an example of evil is that one follows the interests of a group rather than all. It has nothing at all to do with rationality.
>Look, one can niggle and nitpick unto infinity about whether an act is 'rational' or not-- >patting oneself on the back for creating such fine distinctions. But to insist upon such >ridiculous pedantry before making a judgement is, I think, surrendering one's own moral >authority. I reserve the right to call an act, a person, or an event "insane" or "lunatic" or >"evil."
>Let's apply this logic to a single word which captures all of these-- the word "bad." >Imagine that someone denounced the mass murders of Hitler or Stalin as "bad." One >can easily imagine a Chris-like figure stepping in to say that one should not use the term >"bad," because once people hear that word, they refuse to hear any more nuanced >commentary. Or, he or she might argue, "Men beating up women is not bad; it's part of a >calculation to gain power, which is a rational thing for anyone to desire." Is such >hairsplitting really useful? Only if one wanted to dismiss, or mitigate, or even applaud >things which are clearly, unquestionably, horrible.
Again, there is a conflation of "insane" and "lunatic" (psychological); "evil" (ethical); "bad" (value). These judgements work together (ethics and value, especially), but they are not the same. To say that someone is 'in credit' psychologically ("rational") is not to say that their acts are not 'evil' and therefore not 'bad'.
> Except in times of war, when we regard it as a duty.
Duty belongs to ethics. If someone says that they do something out of duty this _does not_ let them off the hook ethically. Duty cannot become the basis of an ethical law. To look at your example, 'duty' is moral if it's in the right cause, and 'horrible' if it isn't. This relies on something a posteriori. Kant wrote "there is no excuse for doing one's duty": otherwise Nazi soldiers could simply claim (as they did) to be following orders and be let off the hook.
Simon H.
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