My answer to (B) is that it depends. What is certain is (B') that Israel was not perceived by the US power elite as a strategic asset before 1967 and (A') that there was no powerful pro-Israel lobby in the United States -- not even among US Jews -- before 1967. A number of researchers with a variety of political dispositions corroborate (B') and/or (A'): Norman G. Finkelstein, _The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering _; Peter Novick, _The Holocaust in American Life_; A.F.K. Organski, _The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel_; and Stephen Zunes, "The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel," <http://er.users.netlink.co.uk/Palestina/zunes.htm>; and Zunes, "Why the U.S. Supports Israel," <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/usisrael.html>. To put it differently, only _after_ Israel decisively demonstrated its military prowess, i.e., its capacity to become a strategic asset rather than a strategic liability in the predominantly Arab region, in the Six Day War did the USG begin its "special relationship" with Israel, which in turn belatedly warmed US public opinions, including US Jewish public opinions, toward it (see, also, Bill Schneider, "Mideast 101: Evolution of U.S. Feelings toward Israel," <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/04/16/me101.schneider/>).
What conclusion should US leftists draw from Israel's metamorphosis from a politically doubtful entity (initially receiving weak support from all powers, including the USSR, then making an alliance with France until Charles de Gaulle gave up Algeria and made peace with the Arabs -- Cf. <http://hnn.us/articles/751.html>) into a US strategic asset in the eyes of the US power elite? First of all, Israel is useful to the US Empire only to the extent that (C) it is itself militarily powerful, (C') the Arabs (Palestinians and non-Palestinians) are politically supine, and (C'') public opinions in the USA and the rest of the world are not aroused against the crimes committed by the state of Israel. US leftists can change neither (C) nor (C') directly, but we can damn well change (C''). Struggles against (C') and (C'') tend to go together: when Palestinians for instance rise up in an intifada, raising the moral and political costs of the occupation, US activists (Arabs and non-Arabs) awaken from inactivity, and US public opinions become more critical of Israel and more receptive of demands for Palestinian rights (without an intifada, Palestinians are "out of sight, out of mind"). Once struggles against (C') and (C'') reach a critical mass, the US power elite's perception of Israel is likely to change from a strategic asset to a strategic liability. Only to the degree that activists -- in the Middle East, the USA, and the rest of the world -- resist, however, would the state of Israel become a strategic liability, which gives an answer to (A). The reason the USG continues to support Israel economically, militarily, and diplomatically is neither that Israel is intrinsically useful to it (it wasn't before 1967) nor that the pro-Israel lobby is powerful (it wasn't before 1967); the only reason is that our resistance has yet to reach the critical mass. -- Yoshie
* Calendar of Events in Columbus: <http://www.osu.edu/students/sif/calendar.html> * Student International Forum: <http://www.osu.edu/students/sif/> * Committee for Justice in Palestine: <http://www.osudivest.org/> * Al-Awda-Ohio: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Al-Awda-Ohio> * Solidarity: <http://solidarity.igc.org/>